


NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE



TRENT UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

La

Société

Historique

du Canada

RAPPORT 1962

**de l'assemblée annuelle tenue à Hamilton
les 6 - 9 juin de cette année**

Contenant les

Communications historiques

**La Rédaction : JOHN P. HEISLER
et FERNAND OUELLET**

F5000.C26 1962

The Canadian Historical Association La Société Historique du Canada

1962-1963

OFFICERS — OFFICIERS

Honorary President — Président honoraire

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VINCENT MASSEY, C.H.

President — Président

MISS HILDA NEATBY

Saskatoon, Sask.

Vice President — Vice-président

MARCEL TRUDEL

Québec, P.Q.

English Language Secretary — Secrétaire de langue anglaise

T. M. HUNTER

Ottawa, Ont.

French Language Secretary — Secrétaire de langue française

BERNARD WEILBRENNER

Ottawa, Ont.

Treasurer — Trésorier

R. S. GORDON

Ottawa, Ont.

COUNCIL — CONSEIL

Past Presidents — Anciens présidents

R. A. PRESTON

Kingston, Ont.

W. K. FERGUSON

London, Ont.

Retiring — Jusqu'en 1963

UBALDE BAUDRY

Ste-Rose (Laval), P.Q.

R. G. GLOVER

Winnipeg, Man.

P. B. WAITE

Halifax, N.S.

B. WILKINSON

Toronto, Ont.

Retiring — Jusqu'en 1964

W. J. ECCLES

Edmonton, Alta.

B. W. HODGINS

London, Ont.

K. A. MacKIRDY

Waterloo, Ont.

R. P. A. POULIOT, S.J.

Québec, P.Q.

Retiring — Jusqu'en 1965

GEORGES GUIMOND

Québec, P.Q.

M. E. PRANG

Vancouver, B.C.

S. F. WISE

Kingston, Ont.

D. M. YOUNG

Fredericton, N.B.

Editor — Canadian Historical Review — Rédacteur

JOHN T. SAYWELL, Toronto, Ont.

Editor of the Report 1962 — Rédacteur du Rapport 1962

JOHN P. HEISLER, Ottawa, Ont.

Associate Editor — Rédacteur adjoint

FERNAND OUELLET, Québec, P.Q.

CONTENTS — TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Presidential Address, by R. A. PRESTON	1
La Crise agricole dans le Bas-Canada 1802-1837, par FERNAND OUELLET et JEAN HAMELIN	17
Sir George Prevost's Conduct of the Canadian War of 1812, by J. M. HITSMAN	34
General Sir Patrick MacDougall, The American Civil War and Defence of Canada, by JAY LUVAAS	44
Mr. Gladstone Seeks a Seat, by J. B. CONACHER	55
Thoughts on the German Confederation 1815-1866, by ROBERT SPENCER	68
The Philosophy of History and the Historian:	
1. The Philosophy of History, by R. H. McNEAL	82
2. The Philosophy of History and the Historian, by W. H. DRAY	88
3. The Philosophy of History and the Historian, by D. J. McDOUGALL	95
Archival Legislation in Canada, by LEWIS H. THOMAS	101
Reports:	
Report of the Secretary, by T. M. HUNTER	116
Report of the National Historic Sites Division, National Parks Branch, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources	118
Report of the Archives Section, by SANDRA GUILLAUME	121
Report of the Treasurer, by R. S. GORDON	122
List of Members and Affiliated Organizations — Liste des membres et des organisations affiliées	126

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS *

Richard A. PRESTON

Royal Military College of Canada

Some past holders of this office have, on this annual occasion, seized the opportunity to present their own considered philosophy or interpretation of history, especially of the history of our own country. Others have analyzed the concepts of their colleagues, with greater or lesser degrees of kindness. But I believe that the address of my immediate predecessor, which aroused so much enthusiasm when it was delivered, and which we all awaited so impatiently to study in more detail in print, was the first in which a President of the Canadian Historical Association touched upon problems connected with university teaching. In the course of his address, Dr. Ferguson indicated the vital importance of the development, from the undergraduate level up, of the art of communication through the spoken and written word. Your immediate response to his remarks was no doubt stirred by the clarity of his own language; but it also showed that this question, one many of us meet regularly in our daily work, was something close to your interest. Yet the small amount of time that has been given in our meetings in the past to such problems would almost suggest that Canadian historians have been a little ashamed of the way they earn their living. Or perhaps they are afraid of being labelled as "educationists", as if it were necessarily a pejorative description.

This Association is not, of course, an organization of teachers. Most of our members are not professionally engaged in universities or schools, though teachers seem to be in a majority here tonight. But even for those of you who are not teachers, the continued excellence of the teaching of history in our universities must be of vital importance. Most of you were first aroused to an awareness of the fascination of history at one or another of our universities. And you will all agree that the full realization of the aims of this Association would be seriously affected if history teaching were to deteriorate. I make bold, therefore, to discuss another aspect of university teaching about which, as far as I am aware, there has been no previous discussion in a meeting in Canada drawing like this one from all parts of the nation. I want to say a little about the history curriculum in our universities.

There are, in fact, at least three major problems which, at this present, face Canadian universities in general, and faculties of history in particular, and each one separately foreshadows a crisis of major proportions.

* *Breakers Ahead and a Glance Behind*, read before the Canadian Historical Association, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, June 7, 1962.

portions and could well be the subject, by itself, of an evening's discussion. The most obvious and urgent, and the best-known, is that caused by the so-called "bulge", the imminent increase of student enrollment.¹

Obviously the swollen student body will cause many professorial headaches; and the danger of malaise and of a lowering of the general well-being is critical.

A second serious problem affecting the university and the department of history is the dangerous gap that has appeared between the sciences and the humanities. Two cultures are growing apart with an absence of mutual understanding. One possible link, the history of science, should be the concern of historians. This technological revolution of our time has thus presented Canadian historians with a second problem so serious that failure to solve it might impair much of the value of all their work.

The third problem facing university administrations and history departments today is, I believe, the most serious of all; and it is about this third problem that I want to talk tonight. It arises from the post-war emergence of new states and the freeing and revitalization of older civilizations. A few years ago, His Excellency Toru Hagiwara, the Japanese Ambassador in Ottawa, told a Canadian UNESCO conference that, much as it might seem desirable to help the Orient to understand the West, in fact the effect of the age of imperialism had been that the Orient already knows much about Western civilization. It was this knowledge that had inspired the present generation of non-Westerners to hunger for Western technology and other aspects of Western life. On the other hand, the imperialist era had failed to convey to Westerners much appreciation of other civilizations and much knowledge about other parts of the world. This, intimated the Ambassador, is the direction in which the cultural exchange is in greatest need of development.

It is certainly true that we can no longer placidly expect, as our optimistic forebears of a generation ago seem to have expected, that the rest of the world will inevitably move to adopt our way of life in every aspect. Our universities, therefore, have an obvious duty to include the study of non-Western societies in their curricula. In this work, the opening up of new fields of history is probably the most significant contribution that can be made.

Already many steps have been taken in that direction in the universities of Canada. Courses have been introduced in Eastern-European, Slavic, Russian, Middle-Eastern, Moslem, Far-Eastern, South-Asian, and

¹ The particular impact of this problem upon one department of history in the country was discussed a few years ago in an article which included a history of the teaching of history in the university.

(D. G. Creighton and J. B. Conacher, "The Plateau : 3. The Specific Problem at the Departmental level", *Varsity Graduate*, October, 1956, pp. 159-162, 178.)

Latin-American studies. Some faculties are now turning to Africa. The whole structure of the university curriculum, the backbone of our culture, is therefore changing as we watch. And the teaching of history is directly affected. Everywhere there are new courses, or new departments, or new institutes for area or special studies. These new courses we may call, for want of a more apt term, the *exotica*.

Have the implications of the changes now being introduced been thought through from sound premises to logical conclusions? For instance, what consideration is being given to the obvious danger that, in providing students with the means to know something of other civilizations, we may produce succeeding generations that know all too little about our own? Are our students not likely to become less informed about those great achievements that made possible, not only the essentials of our own way of life, but also our discovery of, and our contact with, other peoples who apparently lacked the qualities that have given the West its position of leadership? In other words, is there not again a danger of dilution and of the lowering of quality? It is not surprising that one Canadian university has reacted by setting up an institute for the furtherance of Canadian studies. But there has also been a noticeable trend towards dropping English history, which is surely of central importance for the English-speaking world, in favour of other courses which are peripheral. And this development has not been challenged.

There is, however, an added complication. The three problems I have mentioned face us just at the time when Canadian universities are seeking to turn to graduate work on a much larger scale. Canadian universities, attempting to add American-type graduate schools, are moving away from that former emphasis upon undergraduate teaching which they inherited from Britain. This, by itself, would have imposed great strain upon faculties which are already amply occupied by undergraduate teaching. For if graduate work is to be done properly, entirely distinct from undergraduate classes, it should mean substantial addition to the professorial establishment. Otherwise, in seeking to train specialized university teachers in the manner of the United States, we may endanger the century-old educational system that has hitherto compared favourably with that of our great neighbour. And the new venture at the graduate level may not measure up to American standards. The normal yardstick of good American universities is that graduate students will not normally be exposed to a professor who has not yet published either a book, or a substantial body of scholarly articles. Will our Canadian history departments meet that standard?

It is strange that Canadian historians have not made a historical study of the background of these developments in the university curriculum. A history of the teaching of history in Canadian universities, from which conclusions could be drawn for policy-making for future de-

velopment, is sadly lacking. The causal relationship between what has been imparted in the history class-room and the way in which it has been imparted, on the one hand, and the story of the growing Canadian awareness of Canada as a nation, of Canada's provincial and ethnic complexities, of Canada's social and economic problems, and of Canada's world responsibilities, on the other, remains still to be worked out. Does the lack of a history of historical teaching mean that Canadian historians have so little faith in their own work that they think that the politicians, traders, soldiers, preachers, and writers about whom they have taught and written so much, have had that much more influence in fashioning the mind of Canada than they have had themselves? There are many here tonight, and many more who have already passed on, whose contribution has been great. Surely this is a story worth the telling. It can only be assumed that the Canadian historians are over-modest. The longer the task is delayed, the less valid the findings are likely to be. For, not all of the influence of a teacher appears in his learned publications. Much of his doctrine is verbal and finds its way only into his students' minds (or sometimes only into their notebooks).

As the older workers leave the vineyard, the possibility of making a complete record declines. The official source of information about the content of university courses is the calendar. But what more inadequate primary source could one find anywhere? And who can discover anything about the personality of a teacher from a calendar? One would almost think that university calendars were deliberately designed to create booby traps for the future researcher as well as to confuse present-day students. But what other source material will there be for the future historian? Wallace Notestein, whose great contribution to the constitutional history of England in the seventeenth century was based on private parliamentary diaries, used to tell his students that it was their duty to posterity to keep a personal diary. How many here tonight are providing that kind of raw material for future historians?

So far, then, there has been no comprehensive, full, and detailed account of the teaching of history in Canadian universities. We have not provided the university statesmen (or as some cynics would call them unkindly, the "campus politicians") with the material for analysis of the background of the problems now facing the teaching of history in Canadian universities. We have left them to build upon a foundation derived from their own imperfect memories and from oral tradition and legend.

To recount the history of the history curriculum that is now being challenged is too big a task for an after-dinner talk. It is only possible to point to a few of the salient features of the story. The first discovery that one makes is that in the earliest days of the older Canadian universities, and even in the beginning of some of the newer ones, modern

history had no place at all. Up to the nineteenth century history at our oldest university, Laval, stopped with Julius Caesar. The historian of McGill tells us that in the middle of the nineteenth century the only history taught there was a little classical history. In 1845 there was *no* history in King's College, Toronto. In 1847 Queen's had only "Church History and Biblical Criticism".² And in 1853 Daniel Wilson, newly appointed to teach history at University College, Toronto, wrote in his diary, "Tomorrow I dine with Dr. McCaul, a clever lively Irishman. I suspect I shall have a battle to fight about my chair. He wants to make it a chair of ancient history... But I have not the slightest intention of being dictated to by anyone as to how I shall teach."³ Modern history was apparently taught at Vancouver College, an affiliate of McGill which was founded in 1899, but no courses were offered at McGill, British Columbia, which existed from 1906 to 1915, except Greek and Roman History as part of the classics course, and European History as part of the course in English. At that late date and even afterwards, modern history was not yet well established.⁴

A second point about the early teaching of modern history is that it was, as in the case of McGill, British Columbia, quoted above, usually associated with another discipline or was a subordinate course in another department. In 1856 French and German History at Toronto were taught "with those languages" which, according to John Squair, were "under the care of a very worthy pudding-headed old Italian."⁵ This was Dr. Forneri who, as a veteran of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, could at least have taught part of the course from first-hand knowledge.

The creation of separate departments for the teaching of history came very slowly. At Laval in 1854, Abbé J. B. A. Ferland was called "Docteur de Lettres, d'Histoire du Canada et de l'Amérique en Général." Not until 1864 did he drop the literary side of his teaching. His was one of eleven chairs which in 1858 were intended to form the future Faculty of Arts at Laval. General history, modelled on French ideas, had become a separate subject at Laval not long before 1852; but the full organization of the autonomous teaching of history there had in fact to wait until 1955 when *l'Institut d'Histoire* was formed by dividing *l'Institut d'Histoire et de Géographie* which itself only dated from 1946.

The first full chair of history in English-speaking Canada was established at Dalhousie in 1879 with the Reverend John Forrest as incum-

² Cyrus Macmillan, *McGill and its Story, 1821-1921* (London: John Lane, 1921), p. 215.

³ "Diary of Sir Daniel Wilson", September 21, 1853, typescript in the University of Toronto Library.

⁴ Henry T. Logan, Tuum Est : *A History of the University of British Columbia* (Vancouver: U.B.C., 1938), pp. 16, 23.

⁵ John Squair, *Autobiography of a Teacher of French* (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1929), p. 11.

bent.⁶ But the 1882-3 Dalhousie Calendar shows Forrest as "George Munro Professor of History and Political Economy"; and these subjects were not separated until 1911. That same combination was to be found at British Columbia when it was founded in 1915.

A separate department of history did not appear at Toronto until George M. Wrong was given his chair in 1895 after being lecturer for three years. McGill's first full-time history professor was Dr. Charles C. Colby, who was appointed also in 1895. At U.N.B. an independent status for history was not achieved until the appointment of Dr. A. G. Bailey in 1938, history having been taught there always as an adjunct of some other discipline.⁷

Most of the early professors of history in Canada were not specialists. Many were clergymen. At Queen's two of the early lecturers taught without salary. They were John Machar, Jr., a son of the Principal, and the Reverend J. A. Allen, father of the poet, Grant Allen.⁸ Daniel Wilson, it is true, already had a reputation in England for his publications in history, but he was not really a historian in the modern sense, partly because he dabbled in many related disciplines. He taught ethnology, archaeology, anthropology, as well as history and English literature; and he also administered both University College and the University of Toronto.⁹ When Wilson tried to divest himself of the burden of teaching both history and English in 1882, he wanted to keep English himself. That was his real love. Through what he labelled "politics", he failed to secure the appointment of a Dalhousie Professor of English, one Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, to be Professor of History, Constitutional Law, and Jurisprudence at Toronto. Wilson was therefore compelled to keep history himself and to find someone else to lecture in English. It should be noted, that if Wilson's plans had succeeded,¹⁰ not only would a Professor of English have been appointed to teach history at Toronto, but history would have become associated with law.

In these circumstances, as one might expect, the method of teaching history in Canada was rudimentary. Courses consisted of lectures with readings in textbooks that would today be considered unsuitable even for schools. Thus the classics professor, who gave history lectures at the University of New Brunswick, prescribed Sir William Smith's *Student His-*

⁶ Chester Martin, "Professor G. M. Wrong and History in Canada", in R. Flenley, ed., *Essays in Canadian History presented to George MacKinnon Wrong for his Eightieth Birthday* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1939), p. 4.

⁷ Desmond Pacey, "The Humanist Tradition", in A. G. Bailey (ed.), *The University of New Brunswick Memorial Volume* (Fredericton: The University, 1950), p. 67.

⁸ Queen's University, "Domesday Book"; 1863-4, 1865-6.

⁹ Chester Martin, "Wrong and History in Canada", p. 3.

¹⁰ H. H. Langton, *Sir Daniel Wilson: A Memoir* (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1929), pp. 156-59. Dr. Schurman was later appointed President of Cornell.

tory of England and Smith's *Student History of Rome* as texts.¹¹ In the early 1870's the Reverend George Ferguson at Queen's used the Reverend James White's *Eighteen Christian Centuries* and his *Lectures on the English Constitution*. However, by the 1890's there was more substantial fare. At Queen's the number of prescribed books had risen from two to nearly a dozen and one of them was Hallam's *Middle Ages*.

Canada was thus a step or so behind other countries in the teaching of history in the 1870's and 1880's. From 1857 on, the influence of the "father of modern history", Leopold von Ranke, had been flowing strongly in the United States. In 1866 Bishop Stubbs had been appointed Regius Professor at Oxford, the first trained historian to hold that appointment. This was in striking contrast to "the other place" where, in conformity with a century-old tradition at both universities, the poet Charles Kingsley had recently been given the Regius professorship. Stubbs, in his inaugural, said, "The study of modern history is, next to theology itself, the most thoroughly religious training mind can receive"; and his charters became the sacred books of English historical scholarship. In American graduate schools seminar teaching in history and political science, with emphasis on primary sources and individual effort, was well established by the 1870's. Soon afterwards, when Seeley and Acton had successively occupied Kingsley's chair at Cambridge, a porter of one of the colleges was heard to say, "Once the men who used to go in and out of these gates were gentlemen. Now they are scholars."

The tidal wave of such "ungentlemanly scholarship" reached Canada in the 1890's. George Wrong, an Anglican clergyman who was a true gentleman, even to the use of snuff, had been inspired at Oxford to teach history in the modern way; and although he began his career at Wycliffe College, he soon moved to the University of Toronto. One of his early students, who came from Queen's, tells in a letter that Wrong not only made him read general works on medieval and early American history, and write essays on the Peasant's Revolt and the Black Death, but was also "trying to get [him] accustomed to Medieval Latin by means of the *Chronicles* & the Selden Society publications." "All this," wrote that student, "is practically independent work." He went on to say "Professor Wrong never . . . attempts to group his facts by broad generalizations that the students could grasp, and that would show them where they are . . . The province of a lecturer . . . he believes . . . to consist not of *guiding*, which he thinks cannot be done to any extent by lectures, but of *interesting*, and so inducing the students to go on for themselves . . ."

Oddly enough this young man went on to say that this was "a theory which a Queen's man can scarcely be expected to accept"; and he declared

¹¹ K. W. McKirdy, "The Formation of the Modern University", in A. G. Bailey, *U.N.B. Memorial Volume*, p. 36.

that he preferred what he himself called the "barrenness" of Professor Ferguson of Queen's. But the former Queen's student was writing to a Queen's professor; and he seems to have been merely getting his loyalties a little mixed.¹²

Wrong, of course, introduced into the history department at Toronto a modified version of the Oxford tutorial system, with essay groups which have endured to this day, but which, as I understand, are now being weighed against seminars. It may be of interest that, in 1895, the same year as Wrong's appointment to the chair at Toronto, Charles Colby, who had been trained at Harvard Graduate School, introduced the "seminary" method at McGill. Both of these Canadian universities were at that time chiefly concerned with undergraduates. Colby's seminars, and Wrong's tutorial groups, although borrowed from American graduate school practice and English undergraduate teaching, respectively, were probably actually very similar in operation in Canada when they were applied to undergraduate teaching.

There was, for a long time, no very significant amount of graduate work in Canada. The Canadian universities, following English precedents, stressed undergraduate teaching and introduced at that level a degree of specialization, through honours courses, that was rare or unknown in the American college level course.

At the undergraduate level, by the turn of the century, some Canadian history departments were giving critical attention to primary sources. But a quarter of a century was to pass before Canadian universities were to begin to emulate American practice on any appreciable scale at the graduate level. Queen's, indeed, had offered the Ph.D. in History in 1890, and Toronto in 1897. But Queen's first doctorate in history was not conferred until 1921 and the second not until nine years later. Toronto gave doctorates from 1925 and McGill from 1938.

The development of the modern curriculum was almost as belated as the development of departmental organization, of teaching method, and of graduate instruction. For a long time courses were very general surveys far removed from the modern period and from the Canadian scene. Soon after Wilson began teaching at Toronto in 1853, the Vice-Chancellor called his department "really ridiculous" because he only taught the history of Egypt to Cleopatra, of Spain to Ferdinand and Isabella, and of England to Henry VII. Ridiculous or not, this was the prevailing pattern at that time.

In 1854, it is true, Ferland was teaching the history of New France at Laval. His *Cours d'Histoire du Canada*, published in 1861-5, was

¹² Cecil F. Lavell to Adam Shortt, December 2, [18]94, Shortt Mss., Douglas Library, Queen's University.

based on his lectures. Nevertheless, for twenty years after Ferland had ceased teaching in 1865, Laval had general history only, and the history of Canada did not reappear until 1887 with M. Joseph Beaudouin. After his tenure of the chair, there was another gap until M. Amedée Gosselin came in 1899.

In the English-speaking universities, Canadian history came much later. There was no Canadian history at Queen's in the B.A. course for many years. Lectures were devoted almost exclusively to medieval history; but in 1890 it was announced that students would also be examined on outside reading in J. G. Bourinot's *Constitution of Canada*. This must have been in *A Manual of the Constitutional History of Canada to 1888* which had appeared in 1888. At the same time, among six other books recommended for reading by Queen's history students, but apparently without the sanction of an examination, was Kingsford's *History of Canada*. This was only the first volume which had just appeared in 1889. In 1892 lectures on the Constitution of the United States were introduced; and in 1895 on the British Constitution and the Canadian Constitution. In the same year were given the first lectures at Queen's on Canadian history; but they were in the Department of Political Science when Adam Shortt began a course on Canadian Economic History.

When George Wrong came to his chair in the University of Toronto in 1895, his first plea was for the place of medieval history in the university curriculum. Yet in 1898 his department announced that there would be special emphasis on the History of England, of the United States, and of Canada. Mr. Wrong, however, believed in wide sweeps of history. His courses were all called "Chief Movements in..." and covered in four successive years Ancient, Medieval, Modern Europe and America, and Europe and America since 1763. In 1904 Bourinot's *Canada* (probably *Canada Under British Rule, 1760-1900*, published in 1900) was listed as a text. And two years later, in 1906, one of the optional special periods introduced in the fourth year at Toronto was a "History of Canada" with a long list of reference books.

Although Colby of McGill is best known to students today for his volumes in the *Chronicles of Canada* series, he taught no Canadian history in his first ten years or more. He gave five or six courses, and two summer reading courses, and every one of them was in European History; moreover, Colby's Europe does not seem to have included Britain — which does not fit in with my picture of McGill at all. The first departure from this pattern at McGill came in 1900 when, with Dean Frederick Parker Walton of Law, Colby introduced a course called "Constitutional Law and History" which consisted of the "Constitutional History of England to Edward I" and the "Constitutional Law of Canada".

In 1901 Colby was joined in the Department of History by Stephen Leacock. The number of courses offered was increased from five to nine.

One announced in advance for 1902-3 was "Canadian History, 1608-1791". When that session began, however, this Canadian course was deferred a year and its place there was taken by "The Political and Constitutional History of the United States". It sounds like a Leacock whimsey, especially as Leacock is reputed to have said that he would like to boot the Americans out of Canada. Next year the promised course on Canadian history was combined with that on the United States; but this combined course was marked in the Calendar, "omitted in 1903-4". In 1904-5 the United States was back again, and alone; and now the Law Department introduced a course in Canadian Constitutional History. There were more promises of Canadian history, and more non-starters. It was only in 1907-8 that "Canadian Government and Public Policy" was finally given by the McGill Department of History. The next year the "History of Canada, 1760-1837" was introduced. But again it was marked "omitted"!

It has sometimes been said that Canadian history was introduced into Canadian universities as a result of the growth of national feeling in Canada, particularly after the Venezuela incident. If there was any such nationalist stimulus it is more likely that it was the Alaska Boundary controversy of 1903. Meanwhile, however, Canadian lawyers had been demanding Canadian history, especially of the Constitution, for their own practical needs. At McGill, the Department of History seems to have been pushed into Canadian history by the lawyers. The same is not as clearly the case in Queen's, where the Faculty of Law had already, in 1883, "died peacefully", to quote the *Queen's Journal*. Yet even there a constitutional emphasis is noticeable and one suspects that the need to service lawyers was important.

In between the two world wars, the curricula of history courses in Canada came to include appreciable amounts of Ancient, Medieval, English, Canadian, and American history. Your university, McMaster, Mr. Chairman, was one of the first to institute what might be called the balanced programme of our day. The date was 1912-13, and the agent a young lecturer named Stewart Wallace. The curriculum in Canada thus came to be considerably more evenly balanced than that in the United States, where American history had a heavy preponderance, and than that in Britain, where American was unknown and Medieval history still held sway. If there was any bias in Canada, it was towards English constitutional history. At least that was the trend in Toronto. Probably this was due to British influence. There was certainly no undue emphasis in our universities on Canadian history. For instance, apart from optional special periods, only half of a compulsory course was devoted to Canadian history at Toronto until after the Second World War.

In the twenties and thirties, when history teaching had fully developed in Canada, although all Canadian historians did not go as far as Harry Barnes in the belief that history, as the key to the social sciences,

must become pragmatic and have practical utility, there were some who were close to that belief. And most saw history's purpose to be the co-ordination of other branches of knowledge, especially of the social sciences and humanities.¹³ However, the wide spread of the Canadian history curriculum obviously imposed a great strain. Notwithstanding, it was fully accepted by Canadian historians that the student must not only cover wide surveys in all the major fields but must also dig more deeply in special fields. Chester Martin wrote, in 1936:¹⁴

With the growing complexity of the modern university, the function of modern history has profoundly changed... The more highly specialized and diversified other departments in the Social Sciences have become, the more history has broadened out. *Specialization has been necessary here also*, but I think we must all recognize the necessity for some integrating factor, responding to the same general perspective and sense of direction.

He thus indicated, obliquely as was his wont, that specialization in history was also important.

There were few departures from this prevailing pattern of compulsory general surveys and optional special periods located in the main fields of Western history. One that is, perhaps, not so very far off the central theme was a natural result of the contemporary quest for a peaceful world: an interest in international relations. Further afield, the existence of an ethnic group in a university's parish led to the introduction of an "exotic" course: Professor Simpson at Saskatoon learned Russian in order to introduce, in 1937, "The History of the Slavic Peoples of Europe". This was the kind of exception that mainly serves to prove the general rule of adherence to the main areas of Western culture. However, another attempt to get outside it, General Currie's desire to introduce Far Eastern studies at McGill, met with no lasting success.¹⁵

There is one other important departure from Western studies. The existence of courses in "missionary hygiene" (*Santé missionnaire*) explains the purpose of certain university departments which taught Oriental and Latin-American courses including some history. In both English and French-speaking universities these were needed to prepare clergy for the mission field. Such departments, however, placed their greatest emphasis on those courses that had practical value for their theology students; and they did not, as a rule, develop historical teaching, much less teaching in other social sciences, to a high degree. Perhaps because of their earlier proclivities, such departments have not as a rule expanded to meet the

¹³ Harry Elmer Barnes, *History and the Prospects of the Social Sciences* (New York: Knopf, 1925), pp. 1-53; F. Flenley, "History and Its Neighbours Today", *Canadian Historical Review* (1953).

¹⁴ Chester Martin, "Wrong and History in Canada", p. 20.

¹⁵ Hugh M. Unquhart, *Arthur Currie: The Biography of a great Canadian* (Toronto: Devo, 1950) p. 310.

challenge of the new age, though many of the men who trained in them are now leaders in the new movements.

Apart from these minor departures, Canadian universities, and their departments of history, concentrated upon Western culture. In so doing they have provided at the same time a sound intellectual disciplinary programme. History was studied for training the mind as well as for content; and the training was probably the more important. It is this combination that is now challenged by the need to bring in more about the non-Western world. For what is perhaps the most serious danger is that dilution might depreciate the position of history teaching in our universities. It is a strange fact that we historians have not set out clearly our faith in the value and place of historical studies in the university as an argument for the defence of our position.

History differs from all other disciplines in two important respects. Firstly, it stresses the paramount need for one to discover what happened in the past before one attempts to understand the present or to plan for the future. Secondly, it is concerned with the whole of human experience and not with just a part of it. With its insistence upon looking backwards, it looks down the other end of the telescope from all the other social sciences that are concerned primarily with the present. And history's telescope is the only one with an all-embracing field of vision. The aphorism "history is past politics" is misleading. History is, indeed, also past economics, past society, past philosophies, and past theologies. It is even past technologies.

Two things automatically follow. History can give the student of every other discipline a better sense of the perspective of the relation of his own specialty to human development as a whole. But the very magnitude of the field of vision presents problems of selection if history is not to be the most superficial of surveys. This selection may be guided by the needs of teaching history as a service to other disciplines; but it must be governed by the need to provide values that can be imparted by the teaching of history intrinsically, and by history alone, to an adequate number of history specialists.

As it is taught today, as a specialized honours, major, or graduate study, history has certain features that distinguish it from all other university disciplines. It stands midway between the humanities and the social sciences and possesses some of the values of both. It seeks to do more than merely retail to new customers the story of the past. At all levels, from the freshman to the writer of a doctoral thesis, it provides ample experience for the student to search for facts, to establish their validity as evidence, to select those which are pertinent and significant, to analyse and arrange them in logical sequence, to present them in persuasive form, and to develop a thesis which has value in relation to

former knowledge and experience. Although history has now come to place greater emphasis upon scientific methods of scholarship, historical writing has not neglected its earlier call for literary style in exposition. It is, for instance, freer from a jargon unintelligible to non-devotees of the mystery than are some other social sciences. Therefore, specialization in history provides an excellent intellectual discipline of general educational value. And, as a result of history's comprehensive scope, this is a broad liberal education, and not a narrow specialized one.

I myself would go further, though all may not agree. In my opinion, history is more than an intellectual discipline, more than the training of the mind. It has a moral value. As many historians and philosophers have pointed out, the social development of man has been brought about by the abnegation of self, as well as by man's individual urge to improve his lot. The operative forces in international society are, to use E. H. Carr's labels, "utopianism" and "realism". Inside the state also, idealism, altruism, morality, and social convention are creative forces as important as law, authority, and self-interest. Toynbee believes that no one can belong to any school of historians at all who is unable to perform the self-transcending feat of endeavouring to break out of the self-centredness that is innate in every living creature.¹⁶ We may be painfully aware that all our fellow-historians are not entirely free from self; but if Toynbee is correct, history must always have a moral lesson to convey.

At this point we should recall that the fragmentation of the Christian world, and the spread of Western scholarship and education outside Christendom, have destroyed the possibility of a universally acceptable "Queen of the sciences". Scientific method in the physical sciences is, of course, universal and may seem now to have become the key to all knowledge. But, quite apart from any doubts the metaphysicians may have about such a claim, the application of the scientific method in the field of social science has serious limitations. Surely, in these circumstances, the one field of social study which is essential to all others is the accurate establishment of the facts of the past in every field of human endeavour, that is to say, history.

In view of these intellectual and moral gains which, as I have suggested, can be derived from history, and in view of the importance of history to all scholarship, it is tempting to assert that history today comes closer than any other discipline to that central position once occupied in the classical educational world by philosophy, and in the medieval educational world by theology. Although we may not be able to persuade our colleagues to recognize this claim to an 'absolutist crown, we can at least demonstrate that our position in the whole structure of the university is

¹⁶ A. J. Toynbee, *An Historian's Approach to Religion* (London: Oxford U.P., 1956), p. 135

important, unique, and even essential; and perhaps we may gain from them an admission that we are akin to presidents or constitutional monarchs. But we cannot persuade them unless we maintain our cause vigorously.

The history of history teaching in Canadian universities shows how slow was the development of the concept of history as a separate discipline. It grew in response to a real general need; but its development was obviously conditioned by local circumstances, particularly the initiative of an individual or the availability of specialists. It came to possess a key place in the whole university curriculum. No one will deny that there is now a requirement for further change to meet the challenges of our time. But, since we are historians, should we not try to learn from our own historical background? Should we not be wary lest, in response to pressures from zealots or popular enthusiasms or publicity-hungry administrators, we destroy in a careless moment a curriculum-structure that has been matured by time?

One particular thing upon which we should insist is that the excellence of teaching in history, as much, if not far more, than in any other subject, can only be maintained if the proper proportion of faculty to students is maintained. Classes must remain small. The large formal lecture has its place. But small tutorial essay groups or seminars with less than a dozen students under expert professors are vastly superior to quiz-sections of twenty-five or thirty conducted by graduate students; and they are infinitely better than large lectures supplemented by objective tests or examinations marked by machines. Small classes, personal contacts, and close supervision of reading, writing, thinking, and discussing are absolutely essential if history is to maintain the unique values which it has hitherto been able to provide for the full intellectual development of the student.

One other problem that ensues automatically from venturing into the exotic field of history must also be mentioned. It is the question of language. The need for mastery of languages has always been a hurdle in the study and teaching of history. In earlier days the knowledge of a few of the main languages of the Western world was adequate for almost the whole historical community in Canada to come to grips with primary material. It is now necessary to bring into the History Department, and into the University, men linguistically competent in remote Asiatic and Slavic languages. Research exercises will become dependent upon languages not generally known by Canadian students. Obviously advanced specialized study is less likely in these exotic fields. At the same time the teachers in those fields are less willing to share the teaching of general survey courses where their expertise is not required. One way to meet the language problem in the *exotica* would be to set up departments separate from the department of history. There is an additional compell-

ing motive. It is apparently easier to collect funds for a department dealing with the new fashionable area studies than for an old-time department of history. Area studies can pick up foundation money that passes history by. Therefore there is a great temptation to put all study of non-Western fields into special departments or institutes for area studies.

This problem of language has been met before. Classical history is frequently taught outside the history department, partly because of the traditional prestige of the classics, but also as a result of the language problem. Half of the courses given in our departments of classics are actually historical courses; and in many of them students see little primary material and then only in translation. Is it unfair to suggest that, in consequence, at least when it is taught outside the history department, classical history has less to provide in the way of educational value today than modern history?

The study of history outside the department of history is, of course, an old story. Quite apart from the case of classics mentioned above, departments of law, philosophy, languages and literature, economics, medicine, and the sciences have all ventured into teaching history at one time or another. Some are still doing it. They complain that history departments do not give what they require. Sometimes we are too specialized. Sometimes we don't give the particular specialization they want. But this often results in courses in which the value offered is not an intellectual discipline as historians know it and as historians seek to provide even in their wide survey courses, by use of primary sources and documents. History courses given by other departments are frequently merely exposure or informational courses lacking solid intellectual content.

Furthermore, the creation of departments for area studies means that they thus cover at least two, and often many more, disciplines. This in turn can mean confusion and stultification. To put it in its simplest form, if a department includes men of two disciplines, there is a built-in basic split that can destroy harmony and homogeneity. As the head of such a department must come from one or the other discipline, it is probable that one side will inevitably be stressed. A glance over the history of those departments of modern European languages which gave courses in "civilization" in former days will show that they have tended to move away from such courses and to concentrate upon the teaching of language and literature.

Exotic fields of history can, however, be introduced into the Canadian university by creating interdisciplinary committees. In the past these have often been disliked because they seemed sterile since they belonged to no one. If, however, they are dignified with the name of "institute", and if they are fattened with foundation funds, they should be able to pro-

duce more freely, Such "institutes" or "area studies" should, however, not have departmental status. They should not have the right to confer degrees, at least not the important degrees which in Canada are the Honours B.A., the Ph.D., and perhaps still also the M.A. Such degrees should be granted only by the department representing the particular discipline in the field in which the student specialized, be it history, economics, political science, sociology, philosophy, language, or literature. The faculty members of area-studies institutes should be members also of the departments of their own particular discipline. Only by following these principles will it be possible to preserve the values which have been developed over the years in the teaching of history.

Participation in interdisciplinary area studies, whether through institutes or otherwise, and whether for graduate or undergraduate studies will, however, still mean that history departments must add men in exotic fields. Interdisciplinary organization may help to minimize the dilution of the disciplines, but it will not remove the danger of the dilution of the content of history taught in Canada. Departments are usually smaller in this country than in the United States. They can therefore less easily afford to spread themselves. Moreover, as we have seen, they have in the past tried to maintain a rather more balanced spread over Western civilization. There is real danger, therefore, that expansion into non-Western fields will mean for Canada, more than will be the case in the United States, a weakening in education in essential Western concepts. This will diminish the student's grasp of the principles of the Western society of which he is a part. And it may affect even more seriously his sense of identity as a Canadian.

To sum up, in grasping for contact with the vast new world, we may jeopardise not only our intellectual strength but also, at the same time, our faith in Western liberal culture, our sense of Canadian identity, in fact the very things that have made us what we are.

LA CRISE AGRICOLE DANS LE BAS-CANADA, 1802-1837¹

par

Fernand OUELLET et Jean HAMELIN
Université Laval

Les historiens les plus attentifs aux réalités économiques n'ont pas eu de peine à saisir l'importance de certaines transformations majeures qui eurent lieu au début du 19^e siècle. C'est pourquoi le déclin du commerce des fourrures de même que la montée spectaculaire du trafic des bois et des céréales du Haut-Canada ont souvent fait l'objet de vigoureux exposés. Il ne s'agit pas ici de sous-estimer la portée de ces modifications structurelles mais plutôt de mettre en évidence un autre phénomène central bien caractéristique de cette époque d'anarchie. La dégénérescence de l'agriculture dans le Bas-Canada où la population rurale représentait près de 80% des effectifs démographiques et où l'idéologie dominante reflétait au plus haut point cet équilibre, apparaît comme un événement particulièrement lourd de conséquences. D'autres historiens avant nous ont abordé ce problème. La thèse de Maurice Séguin, *l'Agriculture et la Nation canadienne*², fait état des graves difficultés que rencontrèrent les paysans canadiens-français du temps. Mais le professeur Séguin semble avoir été trop désireux de justifier le rôle du régime seigneurial, «ce bouclier de la nation canadienne»; de sorte que cette préoccupation un peu exclusive l'a empêché de comprendre l'ampleur réelle des malaises agricoles. Quant au texte du professeur Parker, publié en 1959 dans la *Canadian Historical Review*³, il appelle aussi de sérieuses réserves. En effet l'auteur prétend que l'épidémie de la *mouche à blé* fut dès 1831 le point de départ d'une révolution forcée dans l'agriculture bas-canadienne. Désormais on allait assister au remplacement de la culture du blé par celle de l'avoine et de l'orge. Ces observations exactes mais partielles ne s'appuient que sur les données brutes des recensements de 1831 et de 1844. Pourtant le blé ne représentait déjà plus en 1831 que 20% de la récolte alors qu'il en formait encore 65 à 70% vers 1800. La nouvelle phase de déclin qui se prolonge après 1844 — année où le blé en signifie plus que 4% de la récolte — n'est pas aussi brutale qu'on pourrait le croire à la lecture de l'article de Parker. Les chiffres de ces deux recensements, parce qu'ils appartiennent à des conjonctures diffé-

¹ Ce texte donne les lignes générales d'un aspect d'une *Histoire économique de la Province de Québec* (1760-1896) entreprise en collaboration par F. Ouellet, J. Hamelin, J. Letarte, P. Houde et dont le premier volume couvrira la période 1760 à 1851.

² Thèse de doctorat présentée à l'Université de Montréal mais encore inédite.

³ W. H. Parker, *A New Look at Unrest in Lower Canada in the 1830's*, CHR, (1959), livraison de sept., p. 209-218.

rentes (1831 : moisson exceptionnelle; 1844 : année de mauvaise récolte), ne sauraient seuls servir à établir avec précision la tendance à long terme.

Ce qui voudrait dire que le changement dont parle le professeur Parker se serait amorcé longtemps avant 1831 et que l'épidémie de la mouche à blé n'aurait qu'accélééré un phénomène en pleine marche. Les témoignages des contemporains et les séries chiffrées en fournissent des preuves irréfutables. Ainsi un observateur déclarait en 1831 : « Une grande amélioration se manifeste dans cette branche (agriculture) par l'emploi plus général du fumier pour la culture des patates. En effet l'extension surprenante de la culture de ce comestible précieux opère d'elle-même une révolution presque entière dans la culture canadienne. »⁴ Au reste, cette substitution n'est pas le moteur principal du malaise agricole; elle est plutôt une réponse parmi plusieurs autres à la détérioration générale de l'agriculture du Bas-Canada après 1801.

I. L'ENRACINEMENT DE LA CRISE :

On aurait tort de croire que la dégradation de l'agriculture bas-canadienne n'avait pas certaines racines dans le passé. Sous le régime français, la conjoncture avait été nettement défavorable aux classes paysannes. L'absence presque complète de marché extérieur, la faible montée des prix pendant la première moitié du 18^e siècle, de même que l'état arriéré des techniques avaient voué l'agriculture à ne remplir que des fonctions de subsistance. La routine paysanne avait même provoqué une détérioration des sols. On parle bien de prospérité après 1713 mais ce n'est là qu'une vérité toute relative. L'augmentation de la production suit pas à pas celle de la population et des concessions de terres. De 1706 à 1740, quand le blé accapare de 65 à 73% de la récolte, les rendements se maintiennent toujours à un très bas niveau, soit entre 6.7 à 4.1 minots à l'arpent. Le fléchissement progressif des rendements, quand les défrichements ralentissent ou restent stationnaires, est déjà un des traits marquants de l'exploitation agricole canadienne-française. Du paysan moyen de 1739, on aurait pu dire ce qu'on dira du producteur de 1850 : « Le système canadien-français, affirmait un observateur entendu, au contraire implique le principe (si l'on veut s'exprimer ainsi) *de la détérioration du sol*. La conséquence est que le cultivateur canadien, après quelques années d'exploitation, trouve son sol épuisé et est lui-même appauvri. »⁵

⁴ JALBC, (1831-32), ap. D.

⁵ JALBC, (1851), ap. J. « Le principe fondamental de l'agriculture anglaise est l'amélioration du sol, conformément aux systèmes les plus approuvés — en pratique aussi bien qu'en théorie — et lorsque ce principe n'est pas suivi c'est à cause du manque de capitaux suffisants pour utiliser les avantages de l'habileté ou du manque de terres assez vastes pour l'union du capital et de l'habileté. Il est évident que cinquante ou soixante arpents en culture (environ la moyenne des terres défrichées pour les fermes de cent arpents appartenant aux Anglais) ne peuvent admettre qu'une application très limitée des procédés modernes, ou même l'emploi

Mais, après le grave accident cyclique de 1760, la conjoncture se modifie. L'expansion progressive du marché extérieur provoque une augmentation à long terme des prix agricoles. Ces circonstances nouvelles et les perspectives de hausse des taux des cens et rentes incitent les seigneurs à d'abondantes concessions de terres. L'accélération des défrichements, résultat de la croissance démographique et du caractère plus rémunérateur de l'activité agricole, entraîne d'elle-même une augmentation rapide de la production voire même des rendements. D'ailleurs les immigrants anglo-saxons suscitent par leur exemple une amélioration des techniques et de l'équipement.⁶ De même la présence d'une bourgeoisie d'affaires locale, sensible aux possibilités du marché impérial, se révèle alors éminemment précieuse. C'est elle qui prend l'initiative de construire de nouveaux moulins qui vont permettre à la farine canadienne de supporter la concurrence extérieure, rôle que la plupart des vieux moulins seigneuriaux étaient incapables de remplir. Ainsi en 1788, 300,000 minots de blé furent convertis en farine dans ces grandes meuneries de la région de Québec.⁵ Tout cela stimule les paysans à produire davantage et c'est grâce au blé, autant qu'aux fourrures, qu'ils participent maintenant à une existence plus largement impériale. D'année en année, les surplus de céréales deviennent plus considérables et le revenu du paysan industriel croît en proportion. Il peut alors se permettre de dépenser davantage pour l'achat de ses vêtements et mieux se livrer à la satisfaction de ses goûts somptueux.

Il ne faudrait cependant pas exagérer les progrès accomplis à la fin du 18^e siècle. Avec les cultivateurs écossais, l'agriculture moderne fait sans doute son apparition mais elle ne semble avoir influencé qu'une petite élite autour des villes et dans les campagnes. L'abondance des concessions de terres par les seigneurs demeure l'explication fondamentale de la poussée agricole de l'époque. On doit même dire que la masse paysanne n'a pas été touchée profondément par ce réveil qui, pour être durable, devait amener une révision des pratiques agricoles.⁷ Les témoignages des contem-

d'une main d'oeuvre inexpérimentée obtenue à prix d'argent. La preuve que le cultivateur anglais connaît bien la puissance de ces agents, pour améliorer sa culture et augmenter par là ses produits, résulte du fait qu'il s'en prévaut aussitôt qu'il a pu accumuler graduellement les moyens nécessaires. Il s'ensuit que dans les parties du pays où sont établis depuis vingt ou vingt-cinq ans des cultivateurs industriels et économes, le système de culture n'est pas inférieur à ce qu'il est en moyenne en Grande-Bretagne". Ibid., (1851).

⁶ R. L. Jones, *Agriculture in Lower Canada (1702-1815)*, CHR, (1946), p. 33-51.

⁷ L'esprit de routine fortement ancré depuis des générations demeurait extrêmement tenace même chez les hommes instruits chez qui assez souvent la paresse philosophique masquait la simple paresse caractérogique. Une lettre de D.-B. Papineau à son oncle François le montre bien. "Que je souhaiterais que vous puissiez venir ici faire avec moi les expériences sur l'agriculture mentionnées dans votre auteur; cependant je pense que nous n'aurons pas assés de patience et de constance à nous deux (qui faisons une profession ouverte d'une paresse philosophique) pour pouvoir suivre ces expériences bien loin. Raillerie à part je me propose de faire quelques essais; mais pour exécuter en grand cette nouvelle agriculture; les sai-

porains confirment ce jugement. Au reste, la détérioration rapide de l'agriculture bas-canadienne après 1802 prouve le caractère superficiel des conquêtes antérieures.

Dès le début du 19^e siècle, la tendance majeure se renverse. Désormais la production du blé ira régressant. Il est certain que la récolte exceptionnelle de 1801 surpassait en volume et en qualité la non moins exceptionnelle moisson de 1830.⁸ Il s'agit là d'une modification particulièrement importante. En effet, depuis la seconde moitié du 17^e siècle, l'agriculture avait reposé sur la culture d'une céréale principale : le blé, base essentielle d'une alimentation complétée par les pois, le lard et, plus tard en temps de disette, par la patate. Les produits secondaires, tels la patate, le blé d'inde, culture héritée des Indiens, et l'avoine, étaient affectés à la nourriture des quelques animaux de la ferme. La courbe des exportations de céréales qui reflète assez justement le recul du blé, n'est pas uniforme dans sa présentation. Même si elle établit dans ses grandes lignes une évolution irrémédiable, elle révèle aussi d'étonnants sursauts. Les exportations des années 1812, 1825 et 1831 expriment le refus évident des paysans de se plier à une orientation qui paraîtra irrésistible. Cela signifie donc que les habitants n'ont pas assisté de gaité de cœur à ce mouvement qui, à plus ou moins brève échéance, entraînait la disparition de leurs habitudes les plus chères.

De 1802 à 1812, on enregistre un premier retrait des exportations qu'on peut évaluer au minimum à 31%. Ce fléchissement ne peut être attribué à une contraction du marché extérieur; il dépend essentiellement d'une baisse de la production. (Evidemment on parlera, pour expliquer ce phénomène de conditions climatiques défavorables et d'invasion de la mouche à blé, des sauterelles et des chenilles; mais ce ne furent là que des événements annuels et localisés.)⁹ On ne doit pas négliger non plus le fait que les seigneurs deviennent dès cette époque beaucoup plus avares de concessions de terres. Il reste finalement que cette diminution de la production avait sa source dans le régime agraire du Bas-Canada.)

sons courtes et la main d'œuvre chère comme elles le sont dans ce pays je suis persuadé que jamais on ne pourra réussir ici tant que les circonstances seront les mêmes. Quand au mill plough se seroit une excellente amelioration pour nous et je me propose de m'en servir un jour à venir. Encore une chose dont l'on pourroit tirer un assé grand avantage c'est la façon de mettre plusieurs coutres à une même charrue...» Lettre écrite de la Petite-Nation «29 févr. 1812». APQ,P-B. Pendant ce temps, le voisin de Papineau, P. Wright, réussissait à merveille ses expériences agricoles. Quant à la seigneurie de la Petite-Nation, propriété du chef patriote, elle se maintiendra, avec ses très bas rendements, dans la ligne traditionnelle. Le rendement moyen à l'arpent en 1831 n'était que de 6 minots.

⁸ En 1797, La Rochefoucauld Liancourt évaluait la production de blé du Bas-Canada à 4 millions de boisseaux. *Voyage dans les Etats-Unis d'Amérique* «1795-97», t. II, p. 216-232.

⁹ *Histoire de la paroisse de Champlain*, t. II, p. 272ss.; *Eighty Years Progress*, «1863», p. 454ss.

La situation des producteurs de céréales du Bas-Canada s'aggrava encore pendant la décennie suivante. Les exportations de céréales dégringolèrent de 73%. Pour expliquer cette conjonction de malheurs, les paysans évoquèrent la vieille croyance aux sept années consécutives de famine.¹⁰ Il est vrai que la guerre de 1812 avait, d'une certaine façon, nui à l'agriculture; il est vrai aussi qu'après le conflit le marché impérial avait eu tendance à se refermer; mais ces événements ne sauraient rendre compte de l'extrême vulnérabilité de la production céréalière face aux perturbations extérieures. Ici le témoignage de Meilklejohn, exportateur de céréales, mérite d'être considéré. Le Bas-Canada, disait-il en 1822, est à la veille de devenir un gros consommateur de blé étranger. A moins qu'on incite les paysans «à des améliorations, ajoute-t-il, les choses viendront encore pis, car les habitants continuent leurs successions de moissons qui épuisent le sol, telles que le bled, l'avoine et autres grains, au lieu d'adopter une succession de moissons vertes, et faire des prairies plutôt que de laisser la terre en friche». ¹¹ Déjà, à cette date, la qualité inférieure de la farine bas-canadienne l'empêchait de concurrencer celle des États-Unis et du Haut-Canada sur le marché extérieur. Les exportations au port de Québec en font foi. L'enquête de Meilklejohn et les séries chiffrées dont nous disposons font état de ces moments cruciaux de transition.

Après 1823, le Bas-Canada ne connaît plus que deux moissons abondantes : celles de 1824 et de 1830. Désormais on ne parle plus que de très faibles surplus et de déficits qui s'amplifient considérablement après l'invasion de la mouche à blé en 1831. Dès lors le Bas-Canada devient un gros consommateur de farine du Haut-Canada et des États-Unis.

Le recul de la culture du blé comportait le recours à d'autres produits de remplacement. La culture des céréales secondaires panifiables fit bien quelque progrès; mais elles demeurèrent des productions peu considérables. Avaient-elles de l'avenir sur un sol épuisé ? Toujours est-il que les habitants adoptèrent progressivement, après 1802, la patate comme produit principal. En 1819, le président de la société d'agriculture de Montréal affirme que la culture de la patate «est devenue presque universelle». ¹² Fait plus important encore, les paysans en font peu à peu la base de leur alimentation. De 1827 à 1831, elle accapare 46% de la récolte de l'habitant bas-canadien. Les pois et l'orge reçoivent à cette époque une attention beaucoup plus grande. Quant à l'avoine, ce n'est qu'entre les années 1831 et 1844 qu'elle devint un produit important. De 17% de la récolte qu'elle est toujours en 1827, elle en forme 33% en 1844. D'ailleurs des différences appréciables existent quant à la répartition de ces divers produits entre les districts de Montréal, de Québec, des Trois-Rivières, de Saint-François et de Gaspé.

¹⁰ *Histoire de la paroisse de Champlain.*

¹¹ JALBC, 1823, ap. T.

¹² *Ibid.*, « 1819 », ap. D.

Ces transformations eurent des répercussions importantes sur la vie paysanne. L'alimentation de l'habitant s'en est trouvée changée. Ce dernier consomme de moins en moins de pain blanc. De deux à trois livres par jour qu'il absorbait au 18^e siècle, il n'en mange plus vers 1822 qu'une livre. Par contre, on entre dans l'âge d'or de la soupe aux pois qui incluait dans sa préparation le lard et la patate. Il y a aussi les fèves au lard et même la fameuse galette de sarrasin pour les pauvres, les *grippe-sous* et les colons.

Une autre conséquence non moins importante, c'est que l'effacement du blé, cette céréale impériale, au profit de la patate et de l'avoine, ces productions locales pour un marché local, avait favorisé le repliement de la société rurale sur elle-même et avait rompu certaines de ses attaches concrètes à l'empire. Par contre un sentiment de dépendance et de concurrence s'était en même temps développé à l'endroit du Haut-Canada. Fait beaucoup plus grave, le déclin du blé signifiait une baisse décisive du revenu des classes agricoles. L'appauvrissement des classes paysannes est un des événements les plus importants de cette période troublée.

Cet effondrement du revenu paysan, résultat des modifications structurelles et de la baisse des prix après 1817, furent les deux principaux motifs qui poussèrent les habitants à accorder une attention plus marquée à l'élevage. En effet, entre 1765 et 1831, le nombre de porcs, de chevaux et de bêtes à cornes par ferme, double. Presque partout le cheval remplace le bœuf comme animal de trait. Il s'agit là d'une amélioration technique décisive. Il n'est pas étonnant non plus que, dans cette conjoncture difficile, l'élevage du mouton ait enregistré un bond assez spectaculaire. L'habitant de 1765 avait moins de trois moutons; celui de 1831 en possède plus de dix. (Mais ces progrès, pour remarquables qu'ils soient, sont plus apparents que réels.) La grande majorité des cultivateurs ne cherchaient pas à accéder au marché urbain mais plutôt à maintenir leur système d'auto-consommation familiale. D'ailleurs la pauvreté des pâturages, les lents départs de la culture du navet autant que le manque de soins donnaient à ces troupeaux une pauvre allure. La maigreur des moutons et leur faible rendement en laine étaient des lieux communs. Il est très rare qu'un mouton produisit plus de deux livres de laine. Il est fort significatif qu'à cette époque, on ne soit parvenu à dénombrer qu'un rouet par cinq familles rurales. Dès 1818, la dégénérescence du bon cheval de race canadienne est devenue un objet permanent d'inquiétude.¹³ Il en est ainsi des produits laitiers et de la viande de boucherie qui, en général, ne sont propres qu'à la consommation familiale.

Tout cela nous ramène à une des réalités fondamentales de l'époque : la crise généralisée de l'agriculture bas-canadienne qui se reflète au niveau des rendements. Il est certain qu'à la fin du 18^e siècle, lorsque le blé

¹³ *Ibid.*, « 1820-21 », ap. F.

occupe encore la plus grande partie de l'espace cultivé, le rendement moyen s'établit entre dix et douze minots à l'arpent. En 1822, Meiklejohn ne parle que de six minots à l'arpent. Mais, en 1831, quand la patate domine la récolte, le rendement moyen n'est plus que de 7.7 minots. Pourtant, vers les mêmes années, il existait des rendements nettement supérieurs chez les cultivateurs industriels et éclairés. A Hull, P. Wright, grâce à des méthodes perfectionnées, obtenait des rendements de vingt minots à l'arpent pour le blé, 20 pour le seigle, 40 pour l'orge, 30 pour l'avoine et 200 pour les patates.¹⁴ Autour des villes où beaucoup d'habitants se spécialisaient dans la culture de la patate et de l'avoine les rendements atteignaient 28. De son côté, le commerçant de bois, W. Patton, qui avait acheté des terres épuisées depuis longtemps, obtenait sur un espace de cinquante arpents un rendement de 31 minots et plus de 2000 bottes de foin.¹⁵ On peut donc parler d'un effondrement des rendements agricoles après 1802, qui rendait plus aiguë la nécessité d'une revision des pratiques agricoles. En 1824, Romuald Trudeau écrivait :

« Un quart de minot semé le printemps dernier par Monsieur Michel Fournier de la Rivière du Chêne a rapporté onze minots et demi de bled superbe. Exemple rare d'une pareille augmentation ! et qui prouve que si nos agriculteurs se donnoient la peine de cultiver leurs terres avec plus de soin, ils seroient bientôt en état de pouvoir au moins doubler le produit de leurs récoltes ordinaires ; mais non, il faut en convenir à la honte du plus grand nombre, ils se contentent, ils se hâtent même de confier à une terre bien souvent ingrate, une certaine quantité de froment, et ne s'en occupent plus. Ils laissent la nature faire la besogne toute seule, pendant ce temps ils passent un temps précieux soit en chicanes et en procès, soit à ivroger chez eux ou dans les auberges, soit à danser et à se divertir. »¹⁶

On peut dire que la source principale des malheurs agricoles résidait dans le régime agraire du Bas-Canada. A l'origine, les immigrants, porteurs d'une tradition agricole, avaient implanté au Canada la pratique de *l'assolement triennal*, étroitement associée dans la métropole à la production annuelle des céréales. Mais l'arrivée d'un plus grand nombre d'immigrants peu au fait de ces habitudes avait provoqué une désintégration de cette méthode d'assolement. Quand les observateurs disent au 19^e siècle que les habitants ignorent toute rotation de culture, ce n'est là qu'une vérité partielle. W. Evans disait en 1850 : « les Canadiens français divisent les terres en deux parties, semées alternativement sans semer de graines de foin sur la partie en pâturage. »¹⁷ Il y a bien là le principe d'une rotation de culture. En général, le paysan en arrivait, après avoir réservé une portion de sa tenure pour le bois de chauffage, à ensemençer chaque année deux parcelles de sa terre : une en blé et l'autre en produits secondaires. La troisième était laissée en jachère ou en pâtu-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, « 1823-24 », ap. R.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, « 1850 », ap. TT.

¹⁶ R. Trudeau, *Mes Tablettes*, vol. I, p. 77s.

¹⁷ JALBC, « 1850 », ap. TT.

rage. Mais le paysan bas-canadien ne respectait pas la loi fondamentale du régime triennal, à savoir le principe de la rotation annuelle. Un témoignage de 1850, corroboré par des centaines d'autres, est particulièrement significatif de l'origine de cet état de choses :

« Le sol primitif possédant par lui-même une richesse extraordinaire, produisant sans engrais ou plutôt produisant par les engrais que les siècles y avaient déposés des récoltes abondantes, rendait en ce sens le travail de l'homme inutile ou de moindre utilité : la virginité du sol et sa durabilité permettait que pendant des années on put retirer de la terre la même récolte. Le blé étant le plus profitable des grains on ne semait que du blé et on semait toute la terre, ne gardant de bétail que juste pour la nécessité, et ne calculant pas dans ce que produisent les animaux l'engrais qu'ils fournissent. C'est ainsi que notre sol s'en est allé s'appauvrissant jusqu'à ce qu'épuisé il a cessé de produire le blé, ou n'a plus produit qu'un grain maladif et sans la force de résister aux accidents. Le mal a surgi si à coup, il était si peu attendu de la classe agricole qui jouissait sans souci des biens du présent, que le découragement a saisi bien des cœurs qui se sont résignés avec l'apathie du désespoir à un mal qu'ils ont cru au-dessus de leur pouvoir de faire cesser. Il n'est pas inutile de signaler en passant que l'abondance des récoltes a produit chez un grand nombre le goût du luxe, qui a fait qu'une grande partie de notre population se trouve aujourd'hui endettée à un fort montant. »¹⁸

En réalité, il s'agissait d'un assolement à trois temps. Le paysan affectait une première parcelle au blé qu'il cultivait au même endroit durant plusieurs années jusqu'à ce que la terre manifeste des signes d'épuisement; il répétait ensuite le même procédé sur la jachère; au troisième moment, il ensemait la portion réservée aux produits secondaires. Un tel système ne pouvait que provoquer une détérioration progressive des sols. Le manque d'engrais attribuable d'abord au nombre réduit de bestiaux et, par la suite, à la mauvaise utilisation du fumier, diminuait la productivité. En 1795, il n'était pas rare de voir un habitant jeter le fumier dans la rivière; en 1830, il en faisait un mauvais usage. [La faible extension des prairies artificielles, des labours trop superficiels, des hersages mal faits, des drainages défectueux, le foisonnement des mauvaises herbes, la qualité souvent inférieure des semences, le déboisement excessif des fermes, quand le bois de chauffage se rarifie, de même que la pratique de laisser la récolte trop longtemps sur le sol après la moisson contribuèrent à faire du sol bas-canadien une terre improductive.] David Handyside, un cultivateur écossais, disait que, depuis trente ans, il avait constaté le déclin graduel de l'agriculture et de sa prospérité. W. Evans a assez bien résumé la situation en 1850 :

« Je crains que le cultivateur en général n'ait quelque aversion pour les innovations dans son genre de vie et dans son mode de culture. Je crains qu'il n'emploie pas les instruments aratoires et autres, les plus propres à ameublir ses terres et à leur donner ce degré de préparation qui seul peut lui promettre de belles et abondantes récoltes. Je crains encore que

¹⁸ *Idem*; voir aussi D. Faucher, *L'assolement triennal en France, Etudes rurales*, « 1961 », p. 7-18.

l'agriculteur néglige trop les engrais et l'élève des moutons et des bêtes à cornes; qu'il ne se rappelle pas assez souvent qu'il y a dans les semences une rotation à suivre par laquelle seule il puisse conserver à ses champs leur puissance de production, et à lui-même et à ses enfants un bien-être et une richesse nécessaires à la prospérité du pays. Je crains enfin que le cultivateur n'ait pas conscience du mal qu'il fait en abattant sans cesse les arbres de la forêt qui s'éloigne de plus en plus des habitations et qu'on ne remplace pas en partie par des plantations judicieusement faites... »¹⁹

(Il serait excessif de croire que les paysans n'ont en aucune façon été sensibles à l'immense besoin qu'on éprouvait d'un renouvellement des pratiques agricoles.) Le mouvement vers la création des sociétés d'agriculture régionales ne venait certes pas des habitants, trop individualistes et routiniers, mais de la minorité britannique. Peu à peu cependant, grâce à l'appui des professions libérales et des curés, ces sociétés vont exercer une certaine influence dans le milieu rural. Partout on verra des signes d'amélioration partielle dans l'un ou l'autre des aspects de la vie agricole : engrais, rotation, labours, hersage, sarclage, semences, équipement de la ferme, réseau routier et élevage. Mais ces progrès furent surtout le fait d'une minorité plus dynamique dans le cadre de la petite propriété ou, le plus souvent, initiatrice d'une concentration de la propriété foncière.

En 1829, le secrétaire de la société d'agriculture de Huntingdon disait :

« Depuis deux ans il s'est opéré une amélioration décidée dans l'agriculture du pays, non seulement parmi les agriculteurs britanniques, mais ce qui est une circonstance d'une grande importance, parmi les cultivateurs canadiens. Il est vrai pourtant que ces derniers n'ont pas marqué pour les travaux et pour la prospérité de la société un intérêt aussi grand que les premiers, néanmoins ils ont manifesté un grand désir de profiter de tous les avantages que la société est si propre à produire. Les principaux perfectionnements canadiens que le comité a à rapporter regardent le labourage et la substitution, jusqu'à un certain point, des patates et du bled d'inde à l'usage presque exclusif du froment. La culture de ces deux comestibles, après qu'elle se sera étendue d'année en année, effectuera d'elles mêmes un grand nombre des améliorations rurales qui sont si fortement à désirer. En même temps, il faut remarquer que les Canadiens ne sont pas encore experts dans l'art de cultiver la patate; ce qu'ils en récoltent est inférieur sous le double rapport de la qualité et de la quantité... Les Canadiens avancent sans contredit dans l'art du labourage; la charrue batarde ordinaire, tirée par deux chevaux s'introduit partout, et quoiqu'on emploie encore généralement des *toucheurs*, il n'y a pas de doute qu'on ne s'en passe bientôt. On aperçoit aussi dans les bestiaux un indice d'amélioration, à laquelle n'ont pas peu contribué les taureaux supérieurs que garde depuis deux ans le seigneur de Beauharnois... »²⁰

¹⁹ JALBC, « 1850 », ap. TT.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, « 1830 », ap. I. Le rapport annuel de la société d'agriculture du district de Québec pour 1820 confirme ces orientations et montre leurs origines. « Le comité a aussi eu occasion d'observer que nos Cultivateurs, qui jusqu'à présent ont été si attachés à certaines règles fixes et à des opinions reçues qui les guidoient presque entièrement dans leurs opérations, ont maintenant fait quelques progrès, en

De tels comptes rendus rassurants se produisent périodiquement; mais le plus souvent ils font état de l'employeur même de la crise agricole.

II. LE RÉGIME SEIGNEURIAL ET LES TENSIONS DÉMOGRAPHIQUES :

Pendant que l'agriculture traverse des moments difficiles, le régime seigneurial se trouve ébranlé par les changements majeurs du temps. L'historiographie canadienne-française a eu tendance à considérer ce système comme une structure immobile, fixée une fois pour toutes selon des lignes fermes et éminemment destinée à protéger le censitaire. La conception du seigneur, simple agent de la colonisation insensible à l'appel des intérêts matériels, relève de cette vision des choses. Évidemment le régime seigneurial appartient d'abord au monde des structures et, comme tel, il vise à inscrire la réalité sous le signe d'une certaine permanence; mais les cadres, même les plus stables à certaines époques, doivent, en d'autres circonstances, subir l'épreuve des réalités nouvelles. Ainsi, au début du 19^e siècle, la croissance du capitalisme, qui tendait à assimiler la propriété foncière à ses lois, mettait directement en cause cette structure traditionnelle. En effet l'ensemble des prescriptions directes et dérivées de ce système visaient à restreindre la mobilité de la propriété foncière et à limiter l'investissement massif de capitaux sur des terres. Aussi les capitalistes en demandaient-ils l'abolition. Par contre, il apparut à ceux que la crise agricole affectait le plus durement, qu'une application rigide de toutes les exigences de la tenure seigneuriale et de toutes les règles de droit qui en découlaient serait particulièrement propre à les protéger contre les capitalistes. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que, dans cette conjoncture défavorable, le régime seigneurial soit devenu un instrument de lutte contre l'Anglais, celui-ci étant le symbole du capitalisme. Pourtant il est des évolutions qu'on ne peut refuser indéfiniment.

En réalité, le fonctionnement du régime seigneurial n'avait jamais, malgré les précautions prises par l'État, échappé à l'emprise de la conjoncture économique. Ainsi, au 18^e siècle, dès le moment où les prix agricoles entrent dans leur phase ascendante, les taux des cens et rentes tendent à s'ajuster d'une façon ou d'une autre, à cette progression. La théorie d'un taux fixe, dans le temps et dans l'espace quand les circonstances ne l'exigeaient pas, n'avait donc de signification que pour ceux qui désiraient restreindre les abus des seigneurs ou défendre la valeur

adoptant les améliorations recommandées par la Société, tel que de semer du Trèfle et du Mil avec leurs moissons vertes; la culture des Navets, des patates et autres végétaux propres à nourrir les animaux l'hiver, sur une plus grande échelle; faisant dans quelques cas, ces moissons vertes faire partie d'une succession régulière de culture : l'avantage qui en viendra à ceux qui cultivent abondamment ces articles pour nourrir leurs animaux l'hiver ne peut manquer de convaincre leurs voisins de la nécessité de cultiver très régulièrement ces végétaux très essentiels et, dans ce climat, plus assurés que le grain ». *Ibid.*, « 1819 », ap. F.

intrinsèque de cette institution. Telle sera la situation au début du 19^e siècle, lorsque les capitalistes auront mis la main sur une forte proportion des seigneuries. Dès lors s'inscrit une tendance irréversible à considérer la seigneurie comme une propriété capitaliste. Cela est vrai non seulement pour les marchands, propriétaires de seigneuries, mais aussi, parfois à un moindre degré, pour les seigneurs de vieille souche. Aucun des seigneurs, pas plus Papineau qu'un autre, n'a été capable d'administrer sa seigneurie selon la théorie des taux fixes et selon les Édits de Marly. L'eussent-ils fait qu'ils auraient été forcés de vendre leurs terres.

Toujours est-il qu'au début du 19^e siècle, l'attitude des seigneurs se transforme considérablement.²¹ C'est qu'eux aussi se ressentent de la crise agricole et qu'ils veillent avec plus de diligence à leurs intérêts. D'abord la montée du commerce du bois, en 1806, les détermine à multiplier les réserves dans les contrats de concessions et souvent à remettre en vigueur des droits tombés en désuétude. Les places de moulins, le bois de pin, le chêne et parfois le bois de chauffage, lorsqu'il se fait rare, restent le plus souvent sous le contrôle des seigneurs. Grâce au droit de retrait, ces derniers usent plus librement qu'auparavant de leurs prérogatives de premiers créanciers. Fait étonnant, même après 1817, date après laquelle la tendance des prix s'oriente vers une baisse à long terme, les seigneurs continuent à augmenter les taux des cens et rentes ou se contentent de maintenir les taux établis au moment de la hausse. Dans les deux cas, le censitaire est le perdant. On les voit profiter de l'endettement des paysans pour les obliger à consentir de nouveaux contrats de concessions conformes à leur politique nouvelle. Face à la dévaluation inquiétante de la propriété foncière, les propriétaires de seigneuries réagissent en refusant de concéder sur simple demande. Désormais l'obtention d'une terre non défrichée sera une entreprise difficile et ruineuse pour l'habitant. Le règne des pots-de-vin, des ventes fictives, de la dépossession des censitaires établis sans titres mais tolérés pendant un an ou deux, quand ce n'est pas celui du simple chantage s'instaure un peu partout dans le Bas-Canada. A mesure que la pression démographique s'exercera, cette parcimonie s'étalera avec plus d'efficacité. Il est évident que cette attitude contribua à aggraver la situation déjà précaire des classes paysannes. On devra s'étonner que le milieu rural ne se soit pas davantage dressé contre les initiatives des seigneurs. Mais les politiciens, dont plusieurs avaient des seigneuries, veillaient à canaliser l'agressivité populaire contre l'Anglais, contre le capitaliste, cet ennemi des institutions traditionnelles. Faisant figure d'institution nationale, le régime seigneurial devenait intouchable et cela, dans un contexte où il amplifiait les difficultés des classes paysannes et les tensions démographiques.

²¹ Les grandes enquêtes sur l'agriculture qui se multiplient entre les années 1820 et 1854 — n'est-ce pas là le signe d'une inquiétude profonde chez les contemporains ? — font état de cette nouvelle attitude.

La poussée démographique de la fin du 18^e siècle alors que le territoire seigneurial offrait encore d'énormes disponibilités, fut un facteur de prospérité. C'est pourquoi cet accroissement de population s'accompagne d'une fructueuse diversification des occupations. Progrès économique et progrès démographique allaient de pair. À côté des professions libérales dont les effectifs se multipliaient, apparurent les marchands de campagne et les artisans locaux, dont la présence exigea l'aménagement des villages. Mais, dès le moment où le terroir commença à manifester des signes d'épuisement, des tensions démographiques se firent jour. C'est que l'agriculture bas-canadienne, en raison de ses techniques arriérées, ne pouvait supporter une forte concentration de population même sur un vaste espace. L'encombrement des seigneuries, avec ou sans la mauvaise volonté des seigneurs, devenait un événement d'autant plus grave que l'accroissement démographique demeurait extrêmement élevé. Une forte proportion de jeunes se trouvèrent rapidement dans l'impossibilité d'obtenir des terres et ainsi naquit un prolétariat rural formé d'ouvriers agricoles aux prises avec le chômage saisonnier et de chômeurs chroniques qui attendaient tout de l'exploitation forestière. Les premières tensions démographiques apparurent vers 1820. Il en résulta d'abord un mouvement d'émigration des vieilles paroisses vers les plus jeunes; et ensuite débuta l'émigration aux États-Unis. En 1831, les non-propriétaires formaient 27% des effectifs ruraux. Entre 1825 et 1831, près de 40 paroisses virent leur population diminuer alors que douze comtés enregistrèrent des gains inférieurs à 10%.

Ainsi la crise agricole, le régime seigneurial, le surpeuplement des campagnes de même que la confusion politique se conjuguèrent pour produire un profond malaise au sein du groupe canadien-français. La forte immigration britannique après 1824 contribua davantage à ancrer la conviction qu'une menace mortelle pesait sur la société canadienne-française. L'explosion nationaliste qui en sort provient à la fois de l'intériorisation de ce péril et de l'incapacité des classes paysannes d'accepter le défi de la révolution des techniques. D'ailleurs la conjoncture économique ne recélait pas que des éléments défavorables, elle comportait nombre d'invitations au progrès.

III. LA CONJONCTURE :

La hausse séculaire des prix se poursuivit jusqu'en 1816.²² Mais, l'année suivante, on assiste au renversement brusque de la conjoncture internationale de sorte que la tendance à long terme des prix s'oriente

²² Les contemporains ont eu conscience de l'importance de l'évolution des prix sur la vie agricole. Ainsi une enquête faite en 1851 sur le régime seigneurial et son fonctionnement établit ainsi le mouvement à long terme des prix : 1729-1757 «28 ans» : prix moyen du blé 3 livres 10 sols; 1766-1796 «30 ans» : 4 livres 9 sols; 1796-1816 «20 ans» : 10 livres 9 sols; 1816-1841 «25 ans» : 6 livres 15 sols; 1841-1851 «10 ans» : 6 livres 8 deniers. JALBC, «1851», ap. NNN.

vers la baisse. Ce changement occasionne au Canada un climat de difficultés qui pèse lourdement sur la vie économique. Tous les secteurs en sont affectés. Les commerçants qui voient décroître avec régularité leur marge de profits ont un intérêt majeur à réduire leurs frais. Dans ce contexte, la baisse des salaires apparaît comme une solution temporaire inapte à résoudre les problèmes fondamentaux de l'entreprise. Dans un pays encore dominé par le capitalisme commercial où le facteur distance était primordial, la question des transports devint d'autant plus vitale que le Bas-Canada jouait de moins en moins son rôle dans le trafic des produits agricoles. C'est pourquoi la révolution des prix ajoutée à la crise agricole menaçait directement la stabilité des classes commerçantes. D'où les appels incessants des marchands anglais en faveur de réformes non seulement dans les pratiques agricoles mais aussi dans les structures économiques, sociales et juridiques du Bas-Canada. La concurrence américaine rendait encore plus urgente l'amélioration des moyens de transport et en particulier la canalisation du Saint-Laurent. Mais le Canada était un pays sous-développé et les capitalistes éprouvaient un pressant besoin de capitaux qui ne pouvaient venir que de la métropole à un moment peu propice à l'émigration des fonds britanniques. La confusion générale qui régnait alors dans le Bas-Canada, puissant obstacle aux réformes en profondeur, réduisait au minimum la possibilité de canaliser les investissements anglais vers le Canada qui faisait toujours figure de parent pauvre par rapport aux États-Unis. Tout cela créait un climat d'anxiété et d'agressivité parmi les classes commerçantes. Qu'advierait-il du système préférentiel, si nécessaire au commerce canadien dans ces moments difficiles ? Le progrès des idées libre-échangistes en Angleterre et au Canada en même temps que la baisse des prix agricoles laissaient entrevoir à plus ou moins brève échéance la disparition des tarifs protecteurs. En 1822, Bathurst écrivait à Dalhousie :

« Quoique je déplore vivement l'existence de cette détresse, je ne puis m'empêcher de croire que, au moment où les produits agricoles de la mère-patrie subissent une grande dépréciation, on serait mal venu de recommander à la considération du Parlement toute modification des lois actuelles au bénéfice du Canada qui pourrait exporter du blé et, toute proportion gardée, d'autres céréales lorsque le prix courant de 8 boisseaux (un quarter) de blé en Angleterre s'élève à 67 shillings, soit 13 shillings au-dessous du taux d'importation consenti à toute autre partie du monde. »²³

Fait aussi grave, le programme des marchands rencontra une opposition farouche de la part des Canadiens français. Les marchands eurent d'abord contre eux la masse des petits trafiquants régionaux de céréales qui d'une façon ou d'une autre vivaient de la crise agricole. Ces petits spéculateurs, forts en politique et en patriotisme, craignaient que

²³ Bathurst à Dalhousie «14 janv. 1822». *Documents constitutionnels 1819-1828*, p. 97.

la canalisation du Saint-Laurent n'accentue la baisse des prix agricoles et ne détruit leur négoce. Ce sont eux d'ailleurs qu'on retrouve derrière le *parti-patriote* et la rébellion de 1837. Il faut dire aussi que les paysans qui n'avaient jamais perdu espoir de voir renaître la culture du blé dans le Bas-Canada, les appuyaient. Évidemment ils auraient payé le blé moins cher mais ils gardaient la conviction qu'une fois la canalisation réalisée, c'en était fait de la culture du blé sur leur terroir.

Pris dans son ensemble, le programme des marchands heurtait la conscience d'une population qui, parce qu'elle était inhibée par la crise, se cramponnait plus que de raison à ses structures traditionnelles. Face aux incertitudes du présent et aux risques que comportait l'acceptation des défis du temps, elle a choisi de rester sous l'écran protecteur de la tradition attendant presque tout des bonnes grâces du destin.

Ajoutée à la crise agricole, la baisse longue des prix agricoles accentuait d'une façon catastrophique le déclin du revenu paysan. Un texte de 1821 est fort significatif de cette tendance.

« A moins que les habitants du district de Montréal ne se mettent plus généralement à fabriquer eux-même des étoffes pour s'habiller, ils se trouveront bientôt sans moyens de se garantir de l'intempérie des saisons. Les articles qu'ils pourront se procurer avec le prix obtenu pour le peu de denrées nécessaires à la consommation des villes, ne seront qu'un secours momentané; car les prix tomberont bientôt encore plus, tellement qu'ils payeront à peine les frais du transport des denrées au marché; tandis que le prix des marchandises importées augmentera plutôt, l'argent devenant plus rare, car il faudra en envoyer une grande partie dans la Grande-Bretagne pour acheter de nouveaux approvisionnements. »²⁴

Puis il y avait toujours les fameuses années de mauvaises récoltes où tout semble se conjurer contre l'habitant. D'ailleurs elles furent beaucoup plus fréquentes et plus graves après 1800. Celles de 1805, de 1812, de 1816, de 1818, de 1828 et de 1833 furent mémorables. Ce furent de véritables malheurs collectifs dont les conséquences se firent sentir pendant plusieurs années. En 1833, la récolte manque complètement dans le district de Québec.²⁵ Dans les paroisses de Saint-Simon et de Trois-Pistoles, le curé dénombre 406 familles, dont le tiers a de quoi vivre jusqu'à la récolte, le tiers a de quoi subsister jusqu'au printemps et dont un troisième tiers commence à manquer de tout. Ce spectacle peu réjouissant se retrouve dans la plupart des paroisses. Ainsi, à Sainte-Agnès et à la Malbaie, 450 familles sont dans la plus grande détresse. Telle est la situation à Rivière-Ouelle où 208 familles n'ont rien à manger. Au 18^e siècle, le paysan abordait ces années de famine avec un fatalisme résigné; il n'en est plus ainsi au 19^e siècle. Le malheur, quand il tend à devenir une loi, engendre la rancœur et il se trouve maintenant des politiciens aveugles ou intéressés pour canaliser cette agressivité à leur profit.

²⁴ *Gazette de Québec*, «16 oct. 1821».

²⁵ JALBC, «1834», ap. H et T.

Pourtant cette conjoncture n'était pas seulement porteuse de malheurs. Les cultivateurs industriels, capables de se libérer de l'esprit de routine, en firent de fructueuses expériences. A part les années 1822 à 1825, le marché extérieur soit en Angleterre soit aux Indes occidentales fut presque toujours assez largement ouvert aux céréales. L'ampleur des exportations de blé et de farine en provenance de Haut-Canada et des États-Unis le prouve abondamment. Mais la mauvaise qualité de la production bas-canadienne dans son ensemble la défavorisait sur le marché impérial. Il y avait là un défi supplémentaire en faveur de l'amélioration des techniques agricoles.

(D'autre part, le marché local prit des proportions inconnues jusqu'à alors. La diversification de la population, le commerce du bois, le ravitaillement des centaines de navires qui venaient annuellement au port de Québec de même que l'immigration massive étaient des stimulants pour les cultivateurs. Cette masse d'individus avait besoin de pain, d'avoine, de patates, de chevaux, de produits laitiers et de viande. Mais encore là il fallait que l'habitant soit attentif à l'appel du marché et à ses exigences fondamentales sur le plan de la qualité des denrées. Il fallait aussi que le politicien, même au moment où florissait le libéralisme doctrinaire, soit sensible au besoin de protection qu'éprouvait l'élite agricole. En fait ce furent les Américains et les Haut-Canadiens qui profitèrent avant tout de ces possibilités nouvelles.

Cette conjoncture, parce qu'elle appelait une réduction du déficit de la balance commerciale, était initiatrice de certaines industries étroitement liées à l'activité agricole. Ce n'était pas seulement l'industrie limitée à la famille dont on avait besoin; c'était aussi un noyau d'industrie textile. Les circonstances nécessitaient au surplus la mise en place d'une industrie du cuir. Enfin, autant que le sucre d'érable, dont la production croissait d'année en année, les distilleries avaient un avenir prometteur en terre canadienne. (Mais, encore une fois, la routine paysanne, la pauvreté des moyens de transport, les habitudes de consommation de l'habitant canadien-français et l'incompréhension des politiciens expliquent la lenteur des départs et des progrès.)

(Par tout ce qu'elle comporte d'aspects économiques, démographiques, sociaux, politiques et culturels, la crise agricole se situe au centre des principaux problèmes de la première moitié du 19^e siècle. Aussi la révolution de 1837-38 apparaît-elle, en grande partie, comme une réponse détournée aux problèmes posés par l'action conjointe des tensions démographiques et de la crise agricole.²⁶ Cette crise met en lumière,

²⁶ Un contemporain W. Sutherland a fort bien vu la relation qui existait entre l'option révolutionnaire dans le Bas-Canada et la crise agricole : "I verily believe that the almost total destruction of the wheat crops by the wheat fly, which was the case for 6 or 7 years, and just about the period of the rebellion in 1836 and 7, was in one respect an incidental cause of that rebellion. The French Canadian

derrière les deux types d'agriculture en opération dans le Bas-Canada, la présence de deux entités culturelles sans aucun doute distinctes mais offrant une grande disparité dans leur degré d'évolution. C'est pourquoi le professeur Creighton a pu parler, en se référant à la société canadienne-française, de société féodale décadente. Ce qui signifierait que c'est moins la diversité des valeurs que la différence des niveaux d'évolution qui fut la source fondamentale des conflits raciaux. La société canadienne-française ne pouvait plus, sans qu'il en résulte des inconvénients graves, maintenir une agriculture de type archaïque. Sa croissance démographique l'interdisait. Pourtant c'est l'époque où on commence vraiment, et cela dès la première phase d'enracinement de la crise, à parler de la vocation agricole des Canadiens français. Cette valorisation sans discernement de l'agriculture, qui ne visait pas d'abord à son renouvellement mais à définir les bases d'une culture fortement singularisée, apparaît chez l'élite comme une réaction de peur susceptible tout au plus de rassurer les inquiets et d'aveugler la masse des myopes.

Ce n'est pas que cette crise soit le seul moteur des événements de cette époque troublée. D'autres facteurs essentiels, économiques ou autres — on ne doit pas oublier non plus l'action des personnalités de premier plan ainsi que la possibilité d'options diverses — sont intervenus pour établir des orientations spécifiques; (mais il reste finalement que la question agraire a préoccupé tous les esprits, même ceux qui essayaient de se rassurer en se disant qu'après tout notre population paysanne était la plus morale au monde. Papineau était de ceux-là.)

La grande sensibilité des contemporains à ces réalités prenantes que sont les crises et les explosions de prospérité se reflète au plus haut point dans l'historiographie canadienne-française. (En effet celle-ci traduit assez bien les réactions émotives des classes dirigeantes canadiennes-françaises face aux oscillations de la vie économique.) Il n'est donc pas étonnant de constater, après avoir confronté les jugements des historiens avec les séries chiffrées, que les bons gouverneurs ne viennent qu'en période de prospérité, réelle ou artificielle, et que les méchants ne se montrent qu'en temps de crise et plus particulièrement de mauvaise récolte. Une telle simplification des choses résulte à la fois du mépris de l'économique et de l'idéalisation du fait politique. C'est pour avoir sous-estimé la signification des bouleversements économiques du temps et avoir accepté sans critique l'interprétation de certains contemporains, que notre historiogra-

peasantry had always been in the habit of consuming a great deal of wheaten bread in their families. But by the wheat fly they were obliged to feed up on the inferior grain, oats and potatoes. I have myself observed among them the discontent this at first occasioned, and altho they could not blame the Government on this account, still when a man is suddenly reduced to more uncomfortable circumstances than customary, he is the more ready to receive the impulse of dissatisfaction infused into him by discontented and designing demagogues and their numerous emissaries". *On the Present Condition of United Canada as regards to Agriculture, Trade and Commerce*, «1849», p. 7.

phie a été entraînée à exagérer le rôle des faits politiques et constitutionnels. Le temps semble venu de chercher à saisir les intérêts et les motivations réelles que masquent les idéaux, politiques ou autres, et les pétitions de principe. En élargissant ses perspectives, notre histoire politique y perdra en options désintéressées mais elle y gagnera considérablement à devenir plus humaine.

SIR GEORGE PREVOST'S CONDUCT OF THE CANADIAN WAR OF 1812

J. Mackay HITSMAN

Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Ottawa

Canadian historians have unfairly condemned Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost's conduct of the War of 1812. Obsessed by Prevost's ineptness as a field commander before Plattsburgh, and his curbing of rash or incompetent subordinates on earlier occasions, they failed to recognize or appreciate the extremely competent defensive strategy displayed in his overall direction of the war. This resulted in Canada being kept safe from a numerically much stronger enemy during two and a half years of fighting.

Much of their muddled thinking can be traced to *The Letters of Veritas*, which began appearing in *The Montreal Herald* on April 7, 1815. These ten letters, republished as a pamphlet in July, purported to be "a succinct narrative of the military administration of Sir George Prevost, during his command in the Canadas; whereby it will appear manifest, that the merit of preserving them from Conquest belongs not to him". This partisan effort formed the basis for the contention, in *The Quarterly Review* (London, July, 1822), that the British Army should have shown to greater advantage. Prevost's former Civil Secretary replied with *Some Account of the Public Life of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. particularly of his services in the Canada's; including a reply to the strictures on his military character, contained in an article in The Quarterly Review for October, 1822*¹ (London, 1823). Unfortunately, however, this spirited defender did not make the most of Prevost's personal papers and his was a dull volume.

George Prevost was a French-speaking Swiss Protestant and eldest son of one of the original officers appointed to the 60th (or Royal American) Regiment of Foot. Born on May 19, 1767, he distinguished himself in the West Indies during the opening years of the War with Revolutionary France. On St. Vincent he was wounded twice while leading his battalion. In 1798 he became military governor of Dominica. Three years later he was created a baronet for defending this island against a French expedition. His promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general followed. In 1808 Prevost was appointed lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia. Later that year he served as second-in-command and principal planner of the operations which resulted in the capture of Martinique.²

¹ Should read "The Quarterly Review for July, 1882".

² *The Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle*, LXXXVI, Pt. 1 (London, 1816), 183-184. See also *Dictionary of National Biography*.

On September 14, 1811, Prevost arrived at Quebec to assume the duties of Commander of the Forces and Governor-in-Chief of British North America. One of his early decisions was to appoint the capable but impulsive Major-General Isaac Brock as Administrator of Upper Canada while Lieutenant-Governor Francis Gore was absent on leave in England. Prevost and Brock were disturbed by the reports emanating from Washington. The slogan "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights" aptly expressed a growing feeling that Britain must rescind its obnoxious Orders-in-Council or face the prospect of war, with Canada as the obvious battle ground. The regular troops and fencibles in Canada numbered only 5,500 all ranks.³ The Provincial Marine, under military control, was small and incompetent. The militia of Lower Canada numbered upwards of 60,000 on paper, "ill armed and without discipline"; the number in Upper Canada was calculated at 11,000 men, "of which it might not be prudent to arm more than 4,000", since large numbers of inhabitants were recent immigrants from the United States.⁴

Early in 1812 Prevost authorized the recruiting of a regiment of Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles from all the Scottish settlements in British North America and a Provincial Corps of Voltigeurs in Lower Canada. His conciliatory attitude towards the French-speaking Canadians, who had been alienated by Sir James Craig's "reign of terror", induced the Legislature of Lower Canada to provide a Select Embodied Militia of 2,000 young bachelors. The strong American element in the Assembly of Upper Canada did its best to frustrate Brock and authorization was given only for the addition of flank companies of trained volunteers to each sedentary militia battalion.

British plans for defence had long been based on a simple premise: so long as the Royal Navy ruled the North Atlantic and Quebec was held by a competent garrison, "any American attempt to conquer the colonies must be impotent and abortive".⁵ An enemy advancing down the Lake Champlain route into Lower Canada would not have time to reduce both Montreal and Quebec before the campaigning season was ended by the approach of winter. Spring would bring up the St. Lawrence a powerful fleet and an army capable of recapturing whatever had been lost. During the crisis occasioned by the Chesapeake Affair of 1807, Craig had suggested that the militia of the Montreal district and any regulars not needed at Quebec might retire into Upper Canada. These, and what regulars and militia Gore could spare, might harry the rear of the Americans who would be moving down river after capturing Montreal.⁶

³ Public Record Office, W.O. 17 Series contains relevant monthly strength returns.

⁴ P.R.O., C.O. 42/146, Prevost to Liverpool, May 18, 1812.

⁵ C.O. 42/318, Simcoe to Dundas, Feb. 23, 1784.

⁶ C.O. 42/136, Craig to Gore, Dec. 6, 1807.

Gore had agreed. Since the Americans had no naval vessels on the Great Lakes to counter those of the Provincial Marine, he would be able to defend Upper Canada against any "partial or sudden incursion".⁷

On May 18, 1812, Prevost sent off a lengthy despatch to London. This was an astute appreciation of the military situation and detailed the policy he intended to follow should war come. He pointed out that Kingston was exposed to sudden attack which, if successful, would cut all communications between Lower and Upper Canada. Montreal possessed no fortifications and its defence must depend upon a field force on the south shore, holding a line stretching from La Prairie to Chambly, plus naval command of the St. Lawrence and Richelieu Rivers.

Continuing he wrote:

Quebec is the only permanent Fortress in the Canadas. It is the key to the whole and must be maintained: — To the final defence of this position, every other Military operation ought to become subservient, and the retreat of the Troops upon Quebec must be the primary consideration....

In framing a general outline of Co-operation for defence with the forces in Upper Canada, commensurate with our deficiency in Strength, I have considered the preservation of Quebec as the first object, and to which all others must be subordinate: — Defective as Quebec is, it is the only post that can be considered as tenable for a moment, the preservation of it being of the utmost consequence to the Canadas, as the door of Entry for that Force, the King's Government might find it expedient to send for the recovery of both, or either of these Provinces, altho' the pressure of the moment in the present Extended range of Warfare, might not allow the sending of that force which would defend both, therefore considering Quebec in this view, its importance can at once be appreciated.

If the Americans are determined to attack Canada, it would be in vain the General should flatter himself with the hopes of making an effectual defence of the open Country, unless powerfully assisted from Home: — All predatory or ill concerted attacks undertaken presumptuously without sufficient means can be resisted and repulsed: — Still this must be done with caution, that the resources, for a future exertion, the defence of Quebec, may be unexhausted.⁸

Prevost would have been shocked had he known how little planning there was in Washington, either before or after a sharply divided Congress had made possible President Madison's declaration of War on June 19, 1812. The general view was that Canada could be had for the marching. Yet the United States Army had an actual strength of only 6,744 regulars, despite the large increases recently authorized by Congress. There were the sizable state militias, but these were untrained and many questioned

⁷ C.O. 42/136, Gore to Craig, Jan. 5, 1808.

⁸ C.O. 42/146, Prevost to Liverpool, May 18, 1812.

whether they could legally be sent beyond the borders of their respective states.⁹

News of war reached Quebec on June 25th. Prevost immediately cancelled the scheduled sailing of the 41st Foot to England and the 100th Foot to Halifax. The regular infantry in Lower Canada was concentrated in front of Montreal. The recently organized four battalions of Select Embodied Militia joined them. Garrison duty at Quebec and Montreal was, for the moment, left to local sedentary militia units.

Lord Bathurst's despatch of August 10th put the stamp of approval on Prevost's policy. Although the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies hoped that war with the United States could be brought to an end, Prevost was to do the best he could with what men and munitions could be spared him. "Your own Military Experience and local information will make you the best judge of the mode in which those means can be applied with the greatest Prospect of ultimate success", Bathurst wrote. "It is sufficient for me to express my concurrence in the general Principles upon which you intend to conduct operations, by making the Defence of Quebec paramount to every other consideration, should the Threat of Invasion be put into Execution".¹⁰

Tension eased somewhat when the enemy failed to appear on the borders of Lower Canada. The two replacement regiments and small reinforcement drafts for other British regiments were, however, the only augmentation of regulars possible before the spring of 1813. Even this "scanty reinforcement", Prevost wrote Brock, did not look as well in the flesh as on paper, since the 103rd Regiment was composed of "about 750 very young Soldiers and Boys."¹¹ In an earlier letter he had emphasized the merits of a defensive strategy:

Our numbers would not justify offensive operations being undertaken, unless they were solely calculated to strengthen a defensive attitude — I consider it prudent and politic to avoid any measure which can in its effect, have a tendency to unite the People in the American States. — Whilst dissension prevails among them, their attempts on these Provinces will be feeble; — it is therefore our duty carefully to avoid committing any act, which may, even by construction, tend to unite the Eastern and Southern States, unless by its perpetration, we are to derive a considerable and important advantage.¹²

By the simple expedient of not forwarding troops to Upper Canada, Prevost hoped to ensure that Brock might not attempt anything rash. During the entire campaigning season of 1812, and despite repeated

⁹ James Ripley Jacobs, *The Beginning of the U.S. Army 1783-1812* (Princeton, 1947), 380-381.

¹⁰ P.R.O., C.O. 43/23, Bathurst to Prevost, Aug. 10, 1812.

¹¹ Public Archives of Canada, Upper Canada Sundries, 1812, Prevost to Brock, July 27, 1812.

¹² P.A.C., Brock Papers, Prevost to Brock, July 10, 1812.

requests for reinforcements, less than 500 regulars were sent to join the 1,500 troops scattered about Upper Canada.¹³

Initially Brock agreed that the weakness of his garrisons prevented him from taking the offensive.¹⁴ Brock's letters to Captain Charles Roberts at Fort St. Joseph vacillated, but finally authorized him to use his own discretion about attacking Michilimackinac.¹⁵ News of Roberts' capture of its American garrison, which had not heard about the declaration of war, encouraged Brock to undertake the reduction of Detroit. The result was another bloodless victory. The western Indians were now convinced that the British meant business and the inhabitants of Upper Canada were encouraged to think that a successful defence of that province was possible.

Upon receipt of word that the controversial British Orders-in-Council had been suspended, Prevost had sent his Adjutant General, Colonel Edward Baynes, to conclude an armistice with General Dearborn. This elderly political general seems to have agreed with Prevost's view that the United States would not now persist in war and he consented to a cessation of hostilities pending a reference to Washington. "I am enabled", Prevost reported to Bathurst, "to improve & augment my resources against an Invasion, whilst the Enemy distracted by Party broils & intrigues are obliged to remain supine & to witness daily the diminution of the Force they had so much difficulty in collecting."¹⁶ The confidential study later prepared for the Duke of Wellington demolished the arguments of Prevost's critics:

It has been said that General Brock, after his return to the Niagara frontier, on the 24th August, might have immediately taken Fort Niagara, which would have had the happiest effects upon the campaign, if not upon the war. General Brock's force was not more than 1,200 men upon the Niagara River, one-half of whom were militia. The Americans had 6,300. Offensive operations were, therefore, not likely to have been undertaken by the British. The capture of the fort at Niagara could not, moreover, at any rate, even if it had taken place, have prevented the Americans from passing the Niagara, above the Falls, between the Chippeway and Fort Erie, or below the Falls, from Lewis Town to Queen's Town. In fact, it would, in General Brock's possession, have been rather an inconvenience, compelling him to deprive himself of 300 or 400 men from his already too small disposable force for its garrison. In defensive warfare, delay is everything. The war was essentially defensive on the part of the British.¹⁷

¹³ A. M. J. Hyatt, *The Defence of Upper Canada in 1812* (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1961), 124-125.

¹⁴ P.A.C., C/676, Brock to Prevost, July 3, 1812.

¹⁵ C/676, Roberts to Brock, July 12 and 17, 1812.

¹⁶ C.O. 42/147, Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 24, 1812.

¹⁷ Maj.-Gen. Sir James Carmichael-Smyth, *Precis of the Wars in Canada, from 1755 to the Treaty of Ghent in 1814. With Military and Political Reflections* (London, 1862), 141-142.

Despite the open hostility of New England and other Federalist strongholds to the war, the United States persisted in being a belligerent. The armistice was not ratified and hostilities were resumed early in September. The resounding victory over the Americans at Queenston Heights on October 13th, however, ensured the safety of the Niagara peninsula for the balance of 1812. Dearborn's much-heralded advance against Montreal fizzled out on November 23rd, after his militia refused to enter Lower Canada.

The emphasis placed by Prevost on maintaining command of the Great Lakes caused the British Government to put the Admiralty in charge of naval operations for 1813, and sent Captain Sir James Yeo to Upper Canada. Although Prevost's strength was to be almost doubled by the despatch of one cavalry regiment and seven infantry regiments to Canada, the enemy could be expected to increase at a still greater rate during 1813. Hence the relevancy of the opinion expressed by the then Marquess of Wellesley in a letter written to Bathurst from Portugal:

I am very glad to find that you are going to reinforce Sir G. Prevost, and I only hope that troops will go in time; and that Sir George will not be induced by any hopes of trifling advantages to depart from a strong defensive system. He may depend upon it that he will not be strong enough either in men or means, to establish himself in any conquest he might make. The attempt would only weaken him, and his losses augment the spirits and hopes of the enemy, even if not attended by worse consequences; whereas by the other system, he will throw the difficulties and risk upon them, and they will most probably be foiled.¹⁸

Following the American capture and burning of York in late April, Prevost hastened to Upper Canada. He wrote Bathurst:

"The growing discontent & undissembled dissatisfaction of the Mass of the People of Upper Canada, have compelled me for the preservation of that Province to bring forward my best and reserved Soldiers to enable me to support the positions we hold on the Niagara and Detroit Frontier. I have been also induced to adopt this measure from the further consideration that the Militia have been considerably weakened by the frequent desertion of even the well disposed part of them to their farms, for the purpose of getting seed into the ground before the short summer of this Country has too far advanced."¹⁹

Intelligence received by Prevost at Kingston on May 26th that Commodore Chauncey's fleet was once again absent from Sacket's Harbor was too good an opportunity to miss for creating a diversion. Had the landing of the troops from Sir James Yeo's vessels not been delayed by an off-shore wind, success might have been achieved. As it was, the

¹⁸ Lieut. Colonel Gurwood (comp.), *The Despatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, The Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818* (London, 1838), X, 108.

¹⁹ C.O. 42/150, Prevost to Bathurst, May 26, 1813.

defenders of Sacket's Harbor received some reinforcement and a doughty new commander in Major-General Jacob Brown of the New York militia. Prevost's decision that the attack against the forts could not succeed and that withdrawal was indicated ²⁰ is supported by General Brown's despatch. "Had not General Prevost retreated most rapidly under the guns of his vessels", Brown wrote, "he would never have returned to Kingston."²¹

Prevost complained in a despatch of June 23rd.

"The support I have received from the General Officers in Command since the death of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, I am sorry to say has not always corresponded with my expectations. Circumstances indicating an insufficiency on the part of Major-General Sir R. H. Sheaffe to the arduous task of defending Upper Canada, have induced me to place Major-General De Rottenburg in the Military Comd and Civil administration of that province... except Sir John Sherbrooke [in Nova Scotia] the Major-General is the only General Officer of high character and established reputation serving in the Army in the North American Provinces, to whom I could entrust this important duty, without embarrassing myself with it to the prejudice of the other possessions of His Majesty committed to my care."²²

Prevost's situation was not helped by the fact that he was younger than Generals de Rottenburg, Sheaffe and Sherbrooke. The responsibility of command also made for loneliness in an otherwise "amiable, well-intentioned and honest" administrator.²³ There was, of course, every reason to deal harshly with Major-General Henry Procter. After command of Lake Erie was lost to the Americans on September 10, the Detroit frontier had to be abandoned, but Procter's conduct of the battle near the Moraviantown was inexcusable. Fortunately, mismanagement and timidity continued in the American higher command. The two-pronged thrust towards Montreal evaporated after General Wade Hampton's advanced guard was defeated at Chateauguay on October 26th and General Wilkinson's army suffered a comparable reverse at Crysler's Farm on November 11. Continued pressure in the Niagara Peninsula by a reinforced British force under a new commander, Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond, forced American withdrawal before the end of the year.

Early 1814 again found the Americans without any well-conceived plan for offensive operations. As a direct consequence of the defeat and abdication of Napoleon in April, nearly 13,000 British troops were ordered to Canada. Bathurst's secret instructions of June 3rd stated that

²⁰ P.R.O., W.O. 1/96, Prevost to York, June 1, 1813.

²¹ Brown to Armstrong, June 1, 1813 is printed in Franklin B. Hough, *A History of Jefferson County in the State of New York, from the earliest period to the present time* (Albany, 1854), 490-491.

²² C/1220, Prevost to York, June 23, 1813.

²³ *Dictionary of National Biography*.

this augmentation would enable Prevost to undertake offensive operations before the campaigning season of 1814 ended:

At the same time it is by no means the intention of His Majesty's Government to encourage such forward movements into the interior of the American Territory as might commit the safety of the Force placed under your command. The object of your operations will be; first, to give immediate protection; secondly, to obtain if possible ultimate security of His Majesty's Possessions in America. The entire destruction of Sackett's harbour and the Naval Establishments on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain come under the first description.²⁴

Subsequent occupation of the Niagara and Detroit areas would ensure the second.

On June 21st Drummond wrote Prevost, requesting reinforcements to meet an American threat building up along the Niagara frontier and suggesting that the enemy would be unlikely to attempt anything from Plattsburgh. "Very much obliged to Genl. D. for his opinion", Prevost scribbled on the letter; "unfortunately for him it is not founded on fact as not one soldier intended for U.C. has been prevented moving forward by the Enemy's Demonstrations in the vicinity of Odle Town".²⁵ [sic]

On July 12th Prevost replied to Bathurst that the Americans would possess naval superiority on Lake Ontario until September, when H.M.S. *St. Lawrence* of 102-guns would be completed at Kingston. He was sending three regiments to aid Drummond in Upper Canada. Had reinforcements arrived a month or six weeks earlier, while Yeo's fleet still had the naval advantage on Lake Ontario, it would have been possible to prevent the American advance into the Niagara peninsula. (This would have made unlikely the hard-fought engagement at Lundy's Lane on July 25th). So soon as the whole reinforcement arrived from Europe, Prevost would implement his secret instructions. Until complete naval command was obtained over Lakes Ontario and Champlain, however, he would have to remain on the defensive.²⁶

The British Government's belief that a force of British regulars from Kingston could overwhelm Sacket's Harbor from the landward side and secure naval superiority on Lake Ontario by destroying Chauncey's base,²⁷ while his fleet remained in being, was absurd. It also conveniently ignored the problem of how the troops were to pass over the intervening water obstacle. On the other hand, Plattsburgh could be reached by an army marching on foot from the frontier of Lower Canada. Therefore, Prevost began to move forward on August 31st, despite the fact that work-

²⁴ C.O. 43/23, Bathurst to Prevost, June 3, 1814.

²⁵ C/683, Drummond to Prevost, June 21, 1813.

²⁶ C.O. 42/157, Prevost to Bathurst, July 12, 1814.

²⁷ *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington*, K.G. Edited by his son, The Duke of Wellington (London, 1862), IX, 221, 267 and 290.

men were still completing the new flagship of Captain George Downie's accompanying naval squadron. Even without his three brigades of Peninsular War veterans, Prevost's force outnumbered the American garrison of Plattsburgh. He would, however, have been wiser to have remained in Montreal and delegated command to a subordinate more experienced on the field of battle. After hounding Downie into action for a supposed combined operation on September 11th, Prevost kept his army idle while the British ships were battered into submission in Plattsburgh Bay.²⁸ Since there was nothing to stop the American fleet sailing up Lake Champlain to Burlington, if the British did capture Plattsburgh, further operations would be pointless. "Under the circumstances", Prevost reported to Bathurst, "I had to determine whether I should consider my own Fame by gratifying the Ardor of the Troops in persevering in the attack, or consult the more substantial interests of my Country by withdrawing the Army which was yet uncrippled for the security of these Provinces".²⁹

The retreating Peninsular veterans had not been happy about being sent to fight in a mere colonial war, under a general who had made his reputation in the West Indies, instead of being allowed to enjoy life in an army of occupation or some leave at home. Officers had been further alienated by petty matters. The otherwise strict Wellington had never worried about "fancible" attire being worn on active service, but a General Order of August 23rd had made Senior Officers responsible that the "Established Uniforms of their Corps" were "strictly observed by the Officers under their Command."³⁰

"It is very obvious to me that you must remove Sir George Prevost", Wellington wrote Bathurst on October 30. "I see he is gone to war about trifles with the general officers I sent him, which are certainly the best of their rank in the army; and his subsequent failure and distresses will be aggravated by that circumstance; and will probably with the usual fairness of the public be attributed to it".³¹ Although Wellington had no objection to going to North America, he felt that his services could be better utilized in Europe. His letter of November 9 to the Prime Minister is most interesting :

That which appears to be wanting in America is not a General, or General Officers and troops, but a naval superiority on the Lakes. Till that superiority is acquired, it is impossible, according to my notion, to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep the enemy out of the whole frontier, much less to make any conquest from the enemy,

²⁸ See account in Captain A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812* (London, 1905), II.

²⁹ C.O. 42/157, Prevost to Bathurst, Sept. 22, 1814.

³⁰ Copy in P.A.C.

³¹ *Historical Manuscripts Commission. Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst, preserved at Cirencester Park* (London, 1923), 302.

which, with those superior means, might, with reasonable hopes of success, be undertaken. I may be wrong in this opinion, but I think the whole history of the war proves its truth.... The question is, whether we can acquire this naval superiority on the Lakes. If we can't, I shall do you but little good in America; and I shall go there only to prove the truth of Prevost's defence, and to sign a peace which might as well be signed now....

Considering every thing, it is my opinion that the war has been a most successful one, and highly honourable to the British arms; but from particular circumstances, such as the want of the naval superiority on the Lakes, you have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success, and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory of the enemy on the point of attack [Fort Erie and Fort Malden]. You cannot, then, on any principle of equality in negotiation, claim a cession of territory [northern Maine, Fort Niagara and Fort Michilimackinac] excepting in exchange for other advantages which you have in your power.³²

Wellington's views found acceptance. The Treaty signed at Ghent on Christmas Eve, 1814, restored the territorial *status quo ante bellum*. Prevost's conduct of the war received official approval,³³ but his recall had already been deemed necessary to placate public opinion.

³² *Supplementary Despatches*, op. cit., 425-426.

³³ *The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, for the year 1814* (London, 1815), 191. See also *The Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle*, LXXXVII, Pt. 1 (London, 1817), 83.

GENERAL SIR PATRICK MacDOUGALL THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE DEFENCE OF CANADA

Jay LUVAAS
Allegheny College

In 1844 Captain Patrick Leonard MacDougall arrived in Toronto to join his new regiment, the Royal Canadian Rifles. Quite likely he already felt an attachment to the colony, for his father, Sir Duncan MacDougall, had at one time commanded the 79th Cameron Highlanders at Montreal and Quebec. But there is no reason why MacDougall should have anticipated the extent of his future involvement in Canadian affairs, nor could he have foreseen how twenty years' cumulative service in Canada would shape his own military thinking.¹

We know only the broad outline of MacDougall's military career. He served with his regiment in Toronto and Kingston for ten years before returning to England in 1854 as Superintendent of studies at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. The following year he went to the Crimea, where he participated in the expedition to Kertch and later attended Lord Raglan in the trenches during the unsuccessful British assault on the Redan. After the war he resumed his duties at Sandhurst, and for the rest of his active career his sword was used only for ceremonial occasions: his principal weapon was his pen.

MacDougall's concern for the future of Canada had already prompted him to write in 1848 a scarce work entitled *Emigration; its advantages to Great Britain and her colonies together with a detailed plan for the formation of the proposed railway between Halifax and Quebec, by means of colonization*. In 1856 he completed *The Theory of War*, which was translated into French and German, republished in England in 1858 and again in 1862, and was regarded as the foremost military text in the English language until the appearance of Hamley's *Operations of War* in 1866. MacDougall was not yet a theorist, but the Crimean War had convinced him of the need to sharpen the education of the British officer and he hoped to stimulate interest in the theory of war by presenting in one book the basic views expounded in the more unwieldy volumes of Baron Jomini, the Archduke Charles, and Major General Sir William

¹ MacDougall was born August 10, 1819, at Boulogne-sur-Mer, France. He entered the army in 1836, serving briefly with the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, the 79th Cameron Highlanders, and the 36th Infantry of the Line before attending the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, 1840-1842. Robert Hamilton Vetch, "MacDougall", *Dictionary of National Biography: Supplement* (Oxford, 1921-1922), 993-994; *Canadian Illustrated News*, October 26, 1878.

Napier.² *The Theory of War* was followed in 1857 by a pamphlet entitled *The Senior Department of the Royal Military College* in which MacDougall again stressed the need for proper instruction for staff officers and which probably led to his selection as commandant of the Staff College when it was founded later that same year.³ In 1858 MacDougall prepared a critique of the campaigns of Hannibal for the benefit of military students; he also published his lectures on Napoleon and Marlborough in the newly established *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*.⁴

MacDougall relinquished his post at the Staff College in September, 1861. Two months later he found himself suddenly involved once again in Canadian affairs when the *Trent* crisis threatened to explode into war between Great Britain and the United States. Confronted with the urgent need to improvise a strategic plan in the event diplomacy failed, the War Office turned for advice to MacDougall and one or two others who were personally familiar with the type of forces available for the defence of Canada.

MacDougall submitted his thoughts "On the Prospect of War with the United States" early in December, 1861. In his opinion the key to the successful defence of Canada was in the hands of whichever nation controlled the Great Lakes. Five years earlier he had privately called the attention of the Secretary of State for War "to the paramount importance of England being supreme on the lakes"; now he maintained that if Britain could gain control of the Great Lakes "two thirds of the troops . . . required for the defence of Western Canada could be spared to reinforce the line of the St. Lawrence". Estimating the number of troops available in the event of war at 75,000 volunteers and 8,000 regulars, MacDougall evidently believed that Canada could be defended with the aid of entrenched positions at strategic locations and utilization of the telegraph and railroad to enable rapid concentration at threatened points. He assumed naturally that the Royal Navy would provide indirect aid by destroying the Union fleet and menacing the major cities along the eastern seaboard. He was even hopeful that the British would be able to invade Maine, which would enable them to reinforce the army in Canada more rapidly and might divert a significant portion of any army the Americans could assemble for an invasion of Canada. And if the

² Lieut. Col. P. L. MacDougall, *The Theory of War illustrated by numerous examples from Military History* (3rd ed., London, 1856), VIII-IX.

³ Vetch, "MacDougall", 993; Major A. R. Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College* (London, 1927), 91-110.

⁴ MacDougall, *The Campaigns of Hannibal arranged and critically considered, written expressly for the use of students of Military History* (London, 1858); "On Napoleon's Campaign in Italy in 1796", *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*. III (1859), 195-207; "The Military Character of the great Duke of Marlborough", *ibid.*, 257-270.

Americans chose to advance on Montreal through Vermont, their strategic flank would be seriously threatened by a British army in Maine.⁵

In most respects MacDougall's proposals for the defence of Canada do not differ appreciably from those suggested a few days later by Sir John Fox Burgoyne, Inspector General of Fortifications and one of the best strategists in the army. Burgoyne likewise advocated an invasion of Maine if at all possible, and both professed to believe that given "sufficient troops, a system of fortifications and command of the lakes", the British could defend Canada successfully. Unfortunately none of these conditions had been established at the time of the *Trent* crisis, and by the time reinforcements could be rushed to North America the threat of imminent war was over.⁶

As a soldier MacDougall did not feel competent to suggest precisely how command of the Great Lakes might be secured: he knew only that this was fundamental to the successful defence of Canada. But his earlier experience in Canada did inspire a definite and farsighted proposal for increasing the efficiency of the volunteer militia. Instead of keeping the British regulars intact and treating the militia as a separate force — a mistake that the expanding Union army already had committed — MacDougall suggested that a regiment of volunteer militia should be attached to every regiment of regulars. If this were done, he predicted, "in a very few weeks" the volunteers "would not be much inferior to regulars in manoeuvring". He also urged that drill sergeants be sent immediately from England and that regular officers and those living on half-pay in Canada should provide the leadership for the volunteer regiments. Manifestly this could not be achieved in time to meet the immediate crisis, but it is interesting to note that an organization quite similar in principle to this enabled Canada to mobilize sufficient forces on short notice to meet the Fenian invasions in 1866 and 1870.⁷

MacDougall's activities during the next three years remain something of a mystery. We know that he visited Canada in 1862, but in what capacity the sketch in the *Dictionary of National Biography* does not make clear. That he continued to show concern over the military situation in North America is indicated by the fact that while on board

⁵ MacDougall, "On the Prospect of War with the United States", National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth, Sir George Cornwall Lewis Papers, Harpton Court for the defence of Canada submitted by MacDougall and Sir John Fox Burgoyne Papers 2943. I am indebted to Professor Bourne for calling attention to the schemes and for kindly providing transcripts from the Lewis Papers. For a penetrating analysis of the military problems connected with the defence of Canada, see Kenneth Bourne, "British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862", *English Historical Review*, LXXVI (October, 1961), 600-632.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 610; Burgoyne, "Thoughts on War with the United States, as regards operations by the land forces", Lewis Papers 2984.

⁷ MacDougall, "On the Prospect of War with the United States".

ship he wrote two pamphlets which subsequently were published: *Forts versus Ships* and *Defence of Canadian Lakes and its influence on the General Defence of Canada*. We know, too, that he returned to Canada early in 1865 as Adjutant General of Militia, but there is no evidence to indicate where he had been during the intervening years. The mystery deepens when we read that during this period MacDougall prepared a two volume biography of his father-in-law, Napier, the celebrated historian of the Peninsular War, but that the work actually was published over the signature of H. A. Bruce (later Lord Aberdare), who had married another of Napier's daughters. Bruce explained that his editorial services were required because the author had written the book from overseas. Rereading the volumes in the twilight of his own career, Lord Wolseley suggests another reason why MacDougall had preferred to remain anonymous: MacDougall's name, he wrote to Lady Wolseley, "was not a good one when the book was written". Perhaps it should be pointed out that most of what we know about Napier comes from MacDougall who, in addition to the biography, was also responsible for the obituary that had appeared in the *Times* and two favorable reviews of his own book.⁸

In Canada MacDougall also availed himself of the opportunity to study the Civil War campaigns which, according to Wolseley, were followed by British soldiers with "breathless interest and excitement".⁹ Today the conflict emerges as the first of the modern wars; the first great war waged by modern democratic states with the products of the industrial revolution; the first in which steam and iron were used by both sides to transport and supply huge armies over vast areas. It also represents a prophetic departure in tactics, for the traditional formations used in Europe could not be adapted to requirements in America, where relatively untrained troops, many of them armed with rifles of unprecedented range and accuracy, grappled with each other over rough and often thickly wooded terrain. European soldiers at first did not know what to make of this strange conflict: only after military observers had returned with technical information in 1862 and 1863 was it possible for the professional soldier to appreciate the clumsy efforts of the improvised armies and comprehend the real meaning of the transformation in tactics.

⁸ Vetch, "MacDougall", 993; Lord Monck to the Right Hon. E. Cardwell, June 14, 1866, quoted in Capt. John A. Macdonald, *Troublous Times in Canada: a History of the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870* (Toronto, 1910), 134-137; Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, Field Marshal Sir Garnet Wolseley Papers, Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, April 17, 1894.

⁹ Wolseley, "An English View of the Civil War", *North American Review*, CXLIX (September, 1889), 725. For the reactions of English observers and military students of the Civil War, see R. A. Preston, "Military Lessons of the American Civil War: the Influence of Observers from the British Army in Canada on Training in the British Army", *Army Quarterly*, LXV (January, 1953), 229-237; Jay Luvaas, *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance* (Chicago, 1959), 14-51, 100-119.

When MacDougall completed the manuscript for his *Modern Warfare as Influenced by Modern Artillery* in the summer of 1863, he became the first European soldier to incorporate many of the lessons of the Civil War into a military text. Much of the book was still based on examples from Napier's classic *History of the War in the Peninsula*, but wherever possible MacDougall tried to analyse the experience of the American armies, even though "the conclusions of one day" were "often overthrown by the events of the next".¹⁰

From the confusing and often contradictory accounts of Civil War battles one hard fact could be deduced: modern firepower had forced a momentous change in tactics. The breech-loader, quick and simple to load, had doubled the firepower of infantry, and MacDougall ridiculed the arguments of those who, like the Confederate General Robert E. Lee, objected to this new weapon on the ground that it would cause soldiers to consume ammunition "in a reckless and aimless manner under the excitement of battle". Discipline would prevent this, he argued: the only legitimate question was whether firing should be "more in volleys by word of command and less by independent files".¹¹

The effect of improved firearms and the new rifled artillery was to give an enormous advantage to the defence. Infantry in the future would have to advance in extended order to offer the smallest target possible and it would have to move swiftly through the fire zone; cavalry would find its role in battle diminishing, "for its only power lies in the offensive" and there would be little opportunity for cavalry to charge infantry armed with modern weapons. MacDougall did not share the enthusiasm of his friend Colonel G. T. Denison, a Canadian militia officer, for mounted infantry; but at the same time he realized that increased firepower would no longer permit the massed assaults of Seydlitz and Murat in which dense formations of horsemen had charged knee to knee into evaporating infantry formations.¹² Pointing to the great battles of the Civil War, MacDougall observed "that no open positions have yet been successfully attacked; the assailants have always been repulsed, though in several cases very superior in numbers". So great, in fact, was the advantage given to the defence by modern artillery that MacDougall predicted that even offensive warfare "must in future consist in taking up such positions as shall oblige the enemy to attack, on account of the deadly fire to which

¹⁰ MacDougall, *Modern Warfare as Influenced by Modern Artillery* (London, 1864), 11. Part of this work was written in the fall of 1862; the entire manuscript was completed early in the summer of 1863. *Ibid.*, VII, 28 n.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 428-430. Lee's aversion to the breech-loader is mentioned in Lieut.-Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, *The Campaign of Fredericksburg, November-December, 1862: A Tactical Study for Officers* (3rd ed., Aldershot, n.d.), 131. Henderson notes that Lee was "speaking of troops whose standard of discipline was not a high one..."

¹² MacDougall, *Modern Warfare*, 135-136, 414. See also Colonel G. T. Denison, *Modern Cavalry: Its Organization, Armament, and Employment in War* (London, 1868), 30-31, 73-75.

troops advancing to the attack of a position over open ground are now exposed . . .” The battle of the future would be decided “principally by artillery”, and there would be increasingly less combat at close range. And if this were so, MacDougall argued, then the difference between volunteers and regulars would diminish accordingly. When the outcome of battles had depended upon discipline and the speed with which soldiers could reload and move from one formation to another, volunteers manifestly were inferior to trained infantry of the line. But in a strong defensive position, armed with breech-loaders and supported by modern artillery, there was no reason why volunteers should not be nearly as effective as regular troops. In any event, “The attack of such a position must either partake of the nature of a siege . . . or it must be made by night . . .”

As for siege warfare, developments during the Civil War indicated a more striking departure still from practices in the Peninsular War. MacDougall conceded

... that at an enormous cost a fortress may be so protected that to break it will be impossible. On the other hand, any town may with certainty be destroyed by shells from a great distance, and this fact destroys the utility of many of the strongest European fortresses. No town will ever again be surrounded by a fortified enceinte; and the important places will be protected by a series of detached forts, mounting the heaviest ordnance, and of area so contracted as to present a small mark for shells . . . In short, entrenched camps will take the place of regular fortresses. It seems not improbable that in future warfare the blockade will supersede the regular siege, and that history will be spared the recital of the appalling slaughter of a Badajos or San Sebastian.¹³

No European soldier in 1864 perceived more clearly than MacDougall the changing nature of warfare, and none was more clearly influenced by the American Civil War. As late as 1856 MacDougall had asserted that “the modern improvement in small arms renders it probable that the fire of the infantry will in future form the most important element in the decision of a battle”; in 1864 he predicted that artillery would be the determining factor. In *The Theory of War* MacDougall had stated that “no formation of infantry can resist the shock of horses ridden . . . in earnest”; in *Modern War as influenced by Modern Artillery* he insisted that firepower had nearly destroyed cavalry as an offensive arm in battle. After Sebastapol he had observed that “the Russian earthworks were so knocked about by our fire that our soldiers could mount them without the aid of scaling ladders . . . if these works had been provided with deep ditches and masonry revetments . . . it never would have been taken by assault”; after Vicksburg he placed his faith in entrenched camps rather than regular fortifications.¹⁴ When the time

¹³ MacDougall, *Modern Warfare*, 13-17, 414-431, *passim*.

¹⁴ MacDougall, *Theory of War*, 41-43, 114, 239.

came to analyse the tactical lessons of the Franco-Prussian war, MacDougall could see no evidence to upset his predictions based upon his tactical deductions of the American Civil War.¹⁵

MacDougall's experiences as Adjutant General of Militia in Canada from 1865 to 1869 also influenced his military thinking and may even have helped to guide British military policy in the 1870's. In the wake of the *Trent* crisis some emergency measures had been taken to improve the quality of the militia,¹⁶ but as late as 1864 there were complaints that "not one single company has been organized, or received even the miserable six days' drill which is the maximum *permitted*". Despite four years' warning there was not a single battalion of organized militia in all Canada ready to take the field: it would take six weeks at least, one critic estimated, to assemble an adequate defensive force, and this at a time when the United States had just become a military power.¹⁷

MacDougall faced the task in 1865 of shaping the Canadian militia into an efficient military organization, and according to Wolseley he was admirably equipped for the job. Wolseley described the new Adjutant General as a "very able, highly educated" soldier who

...was gifted with the most charming, the most fascinating manner towards all men—by no means a poor recommendation for any one who has to get on well with politicians... our Canadian comrades had not then become aware of the fact that, since our war with Russia, a new army school had arisen amongst us, by whom the study of their profession, both as a science and an art, was recognized as all important.

No man knew better than General MacDougall the difference... between the educated officer and the ordinary amateur in uniform, and the best of the Canadian Militia soon came to recognize their new commandant's military worth, and the value of the new system he introduced.¹⁸

The heart of MacDougall's new system was the forming of independent companies into battalions. Defects in the existing structure had been revealed in March 1866, when it became necessary to call out 10,000 of the Volunteer Force to guard the frontier against a threatened invasion by the Fenians. Within twenty-four hours 14,000 volunteer militia had

¹⁵ MacDougall, *Modern Infantry Tactics* (London, 1873), *passim*.

¹⁶ In 1863 two militia acts were passed, one to facilitate the mobilization of the Sedentary Militia (comprising all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 60), and another to increase the size of the volunteer Active Militia which had been established in 1855 to provide a force equipped and trained to deal with a sudden emergency. See George F. G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers 1604-1954: the Military History of an Unmilitary People* (Toronto, 1954), 209-216.

¹⁷ Sir Richard John Cartwright, *Remarks on the Militia of Canada* (Kingston, 1864), 607. The historical development of the Canadian militia is treated in C. F. Hamilton, "Defence, 1812-1912", in Adam Shortt and Arthur Doughty, eds., *Canada and Its Provinces* (Toronto, 1914), VII, 379-460; and Colonel Walker Powell, "The Militia System of Canada", in J. Castell Hopkins, ed., *Canada: An Encyclopaedia of the Country* (Toronto, 1898), IV, 415-422.

¹⁸ Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life* (Westminster, 1903), II, 230-231.

responded, and an even larger force was mobilized again in June when the Fenians actually raided the frontier. MacDougall was pleased with both the number and the quality of the volunteers who had been mustered into service on these occasions: what was lacking, he discovered, was an effective organization. Most volunteers belonged to isolated companies drawn from the rural areas, and it had been necessary to form these into provisional battalions and to improvise a staff for each "in a hurry, and at an obvious disadvantage."¹⁹

MacDougall tried to avoid this confusion in the future by organizing all companies into permanent battalions and, wherever possible, assigning to each a county designation and permanent headquarters. His localization of the militia was an immediate success. Battalion adjutants reported that the new organization was "a source of strength", an aid "to unity of action and equipment", and "of great benefit, imparting a true *esprit de corps* . . . and far greater efficiency into the force of each County". In Wolseley's experience the battalions varied in efficiency "in direct proportion to the number of old army officers, and of those who had graduated at the Military Schools" in each.²⁰ The military schools had been established by MacDougall the previous year at every military station where there were regular troops. The most promising graduates had been "drilled and given some practical knowledge of military duties" by Wolseley at the La Prairie camp near Montreal: in Wolseley's estimation, "they made excellent officers".²¹

MacDougall's system of organization, which had made it possible to assemble masses of volunteers "within a few hours . . . on any given point over a line of more than 1,000 miles", proved equal to the task of resisting the Fenian invasions, but MacDougall believed that if necessary it should also be capable of waging regular warfare with the United States. To this end he organized the entire volunteer force into brigades in the fall of 1866: seven field brigades were created, each comprising one battalion of regulars and three of militia, to serve as the advanced guard of the Canadian army. The remaining militia battalions were organized into brigades by districts, to be employed in time of emergency guarding strategic points along the frontier and the various lines of communication and supply. MacDougall also recommended the establishment of depots in each district to accommodate the 100,000 men he

¹⁹ Only the Volunteer companies from the principal cities had been formed into battalions by March, 1866. Canada. Department of Militia and Defence, *Report on the State of the Militia of the Province of Canada, for the year 1867* (Ottawa, 1868), 1.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 15, 18, 29, 34, 105; *Report for the year 1866* (Ottawa, 1866), 16-21; Lt. Col. Davis, *The Canadian Militia: Its Organization and present condition* (Caledonia, Ont., 1873), 5; Wolseley, *Story of a Soldier's Life*, II, 147-148.

²¹ Wolseley, *Story of a Soldier's Life*, II, 147-148.

believed would be available in the event of war, each depot to be protected by entrenched camps where the fighting population might rally.²²

The amalgamation of militia battalions with the regulars had much the same effect in Canada in 1866 as a similar policy had had in France in 1793, when the newly raised battalions of volunteers and conscripts had been attached to old regiments of the line in the proportion of two to one. A few years after MacDougall had returned to England, a militia officer explained why his system had worked so well:

...the Volunteer Militia had models to guide them, and derived proportionate advantage from their superior knowledge. Moreover, the Regular officers in command, took all pains to create a healthy feeling of emulation whenever their Regiments and the Volunteers were brigaded together, and the prestige of victory was in the confidence felt by the men, as long as they knew they were to fight alongside the Regulars. Look at the moveable columns of Colonel MacDougall. Why, they were ready to go anywhere, and try to do anything, although there was only a wing of a Regular Regiment, and a couple of guns to each brigade. They knew that they would be properly led, that they were under the command of professional soldiers, and would have the advice and assistance of men whose trade was war.

When the decision was made in 1871 to withdraw British troops from North America, one underlying cause for concern was the fear that the militia would deteriorate without the support of the regulars: where, it was asked, are the officers and men needed to give proper seasoning to the militia.²³

MacDougall returned to England in 1869, where he soon became involved in the far-reaching army reforms associated with the name of the new Secretary of State for War, Mr. Edward Cardwell. Significantly, he was named chairman of the influential "localization committee" which worked out the basic scheme ultimately adopted for the localization and fusion of regular, reserve and auxiliary forces in England.

The possible influence of events in Canada since 1866 upon the Cardwell Reforms has never been fully explored. Although essentially English in origin and designed to correct evils peculiar to the British army, these reforms bear a superficial resemblance to practices in the German army, particularly some features of the newly adopted short service and enlistment on a territorial basis.²⁴ But a good case can be

²² *Report for the Year 1866*, 24-25; *Report on the State of the Militia for 1867*, 12-13. MacDougall's views on the defence of Canada after the Civil War had ended are found in his unsigned article entitled "Canada: the Fenian Raid and the Colonial Office", *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, CVIII (1870), 493-508.

²³ *Ibid.*, 497-499; Davis, *Canadian Militia*, 11. For a general treatment of the problem see C. P. Stacey, "Britain's Withdrawal from North America, 1864-1871", *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXVI (1955), 185-198.

²⁴ Army manoeuvres were instituted in the British army in 1871, and even the Prussian *Pickelhaube* replaced the French *kepi* as standard headdress in most British Regiments. Sir George Arthur, *From Wellington to Wavell* (London, 1942),

made for the argument that the localization of the British army came not from Prussia, but instead had its roots in MacDougall's reforms of the Canadian militia in 1866. Two of the five members of the MacDougall committee — Wolseley and of course himself — were fresh from Canada, where they had seen convincing proof that localization had greatly facilitated mobilization and that brigading regulars with the militia had quickly converted the latter into useful soldiers. According to MacDougall, militia thus brigaded had "learned more in a week than others, not able to partake of the same advantages, did in a month".²⁵

What evidence is there that MacDougall and Wolseley were more influenced by what they had seen in Canada than what they had read about Prussia? Their writings testify that neither had been blinded — as had so many in the British army — by the dazzling Prussian victory over France in 1870. Wolseley was later to advise British officers to "copy the Germans as regards work and leave their clothes and their methods alone", while MacDougall repeatedly protested that German tactics in 1870 were being overrated and that it was unwise to attempt to reproduce the German military system in England because of the fundamental difference in the institutions of the two nations.²⁶ It is likely that both resisted the impulse in 1871 to imitate the Germans, whereas both had faith in the type of organization they recently had fashioned in Canada. MacDougall frequently mentioned the Canadian militia in his later writings. By this time, too, MacDougall was able to synthesize his tactical deductions of the Civil War and his experiences with the Canadian militia, for if modern firepower had diminished the difference between regular troops and reserves wherever entrenchments and artillery could be employed, this gap had been narrowed further by combining both elements in a single brigade.

MacDougall was rewarded for his contribution to the localization scheme by being appointed first director of the Intelligence Department when it was established in 1873. In 1878 he returned to Canada for a final tour of duty, this time as Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in British North America. The five years spent in this capacity fall beyond the scope of this paper, but it is interesting and perhaps significant to note that in 1878 he was called to administer the Government during the time Canada was without a Governor General. He also apparently was

72; General Sir Robert Biddulph, *Lord Cardwell at the War Office* (London, 1904), 189, 212-213; James Laver, *British Military Uniforms* (London, 1948), 21.

²⁵ MacDougall, *The Army and its Reserves* (London, 1869), 20; Wolseley, *Story of a Soldier's Life*, II, 159, 174.

²⁶ Luvaas, *Military Legacy*, 115-117; MacDougall, *Modern Infantry Tactics*, *passim*; *The Army and its Reserves*, 1-5; "The Mobilization of the Army, and National Defence", *Blackwoods*, CXX (1876), 520; "On the proposal to change the Organization of our Field Battalions from 8 to 4 Companies", 8 March 1877, War Office, Confidential Papers 0768; National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, Blackwood Papers, MacDougall to John Blackwood, August 10, 1870.

one of the first in Canada to view the Empire as a partnership of nations with respect to defence. Much has been made of the Canadian offer of troops for the Nile Expedition in 1885, but there was a precedent which seems to have been generally overlooked: in 1879, when relations between Great Britain and Russia were strained as a result of the Russo-Turkish war, MacDougall had made a similar offer. According to the testimony of Sir John A. Macdonald before the Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad, it had been MacDougall's hope "to organize a military reserve force of 10,000 men for general service—not Colonial service merely, but for service in any part of the world". The offer was not accepted for the men never were actually needed, but the significant fact is that the offer was presented.²⁷

MacDougall returned to England in 1883 and two years later he retired from active military service. He died in 1894 after an illness so prolonged and painful that his old friend Wolseley wrote to his wife in anguish: "Oh, how I wish I could be killed in action! I have a horror of dying in bed."²⁸

MacDougall was an administrator rather than a man of action, a thoughtful student of war who apparently preferred to work silently in the shadows. He rendered lasting services to the British army as well as the Canadian militia, yet he is a virtual stranger to both countries today. History has somehow allowed MacDougall to slip quietly out of sight.

²⁷ Vetch, "MacDougall", 994; Alice R. Stewart, "Sir John A. Macdonald and the Imperial Defence Commission of 1879", *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXV (1854), 133-134; *Canadian Illustrated News*, October 26, 1878. I am indebted to Professor R. A. Preston for bringing this source to my attention.

²⁸ Wolseley papers. Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, December 9, 1894.

Mr. GLADSTONE SEEKS A SEAT

J. B. CONACHER
University of Toronto

Gladstone entered Parliament at the age of 23 as a representative of the borough of Newark. He owed his election to the support of the Duke of Newcastle, father of his close friend Lord Lincoln, who held control over some quarter of the less than sixteen hundred voters in the borough.¹ This influence had been briefly challenged in the exceptional election of 1831, but a state of normalcy was restored with the election of the Duke's young nominee at the head of the pole in 1833. The Duke was a reactionary Tory, but he allowed his son's friend to retain the seat for the three following General elections and we may suppose was not displeased to see his protégé become a member of Peel's administration in 1841 and to enter the Cabinet in 1843. He probably approved the young Minister's quixotic action in resigning office over the Maynooth seminary grant in 1845, but he could not understand or condone the subsequent support Gladstone gave the measure as a private member.²

An immediate crisis was provoked when on 22 December, 1845, less than eleven months after his resignation from the Board of Trade, Gladstone accepted the Colonial Office, vacated by Lord Stanley's resignation over the proposed repeal of the Corn Laws. Return to the ministry in these circumstances inevitably put Gladstone at odds with his patron, who was a died in the wool Protectionist. Nor could the issue be evaded since acceptance of office automatically forced the Minister to seek re-election.

Gladstone wrote a straightforward letter to the Duke informing him of the situation and expressing his regret that he differed from his patron both on the question of trade as well as on what he called "one question of higher character" (i.e. Maynooth). While thanking the Duke for his past kindness and generous support, he clearly did not expect it to be continued.³

¹ John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone* (1903), Vol. I, 88-94.

² British Museum, Ad. Ms. 44261, ff. 96-100. Gladstone now accepted the necessity of the Maynooth policy, but felt that he could not retain office in the Government responsible for the measure since it was at variance with the principles enunciated in his book on *Church and State*. Cobden found his explanation incomprehensible as probably did Peel and most of his contemporaries. Gladstone's support of the Maynooth grant had produced an exchange of letters indicating a difference with his patron on this subject.

³ *Ibid.*, ff. 101-102, 22 December 1845. Gladstone's tenure of the Newark seat had never been secure since several years earlier the Duke had indicated that some day he would want it for a member of his family. *Ibid.*

On Christmas eve the Duke replied that it was "utterly impossible" for him to promise the slightest support from any influence that he might possess in the borough. He continued:

You are quite right in thinking that I disapprove of Sir Robert Peel's return to office. I was in hopes that we were clear of him for ever, and that he who has already done such unpardonable mischief and is prepared to do so much more, so that ruin and revolution shall be our fated country's terrible future would not again be permitted to convulse the nation...⁴

Gladstone managed to find two possible interpretations to this letter and was so bold as to enquire whether the Duke intended to put another candidate into the field, in which case he made it clear, he recognized his duty to retire. But if the Duke intended to disclaim interference — a surprising supposition from a young Tory — then Gladstone said he would feel free to seek support in the constituency.⁵ The Duke of Newcastle's answer this time was quite explicit: "I am opposed to your return for Newark, and it is my intention to promote, as far as my influence goes, the return of another candidate who will offer himself."⁶

Consequently Gladstone resigned himself to drawing up an address to his constituents explaining his withdrawal,⁷ which he forwarded to his election committee. These gentlemen, however, rebelling against the tyranny of the Duke, met on 5 January and requested their late member "to offer himself again to the constituency, promising their exertions to secure his re-election". In the meantime a nominee of the Duke appeared upon the scene in the person of a Mr. J. Stuart, who announced his intention to contest the borough since, as he alleged, Gladstone had withdrawn. This greatly annoyed the latter who immediately drafted an eighteen page letter to Stuart⁸, pointing out that he had only withdrawn to avoid opposing the Duke's candidate and that it was futile for Stuart to disavow any intention of displacing him.

This letter nicely reflects the conflicting strains ever struggling in Gladstone's breast, the natural conservative instinct to accept traditional ways and customs as right and proper, and the growing sense of natural justice and individual rights that sooner or later would lead him to challenge accepted custom. The Duke's final letter to Gladstone bluntly indicated that he trusted nothing would induce Stuart to withdraw.⁹ Already the late member for Newark had begun to look elsewhere.

⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 103, 24 December 1845.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ff. 105-106, 26 December 1845.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ff. 107-108, 28 December 1845.

⁷ *Ibid.*, ff. 109-110, Gladstone to Newcastle, 1 January 1846.

⁸ B.M. Ad. Ms. 44363, ff. 131-137, 9 January 1846.

⁹ Ad. Ms. 44261, f. 113, 9 January 1846. It is interesting to note that on this occasion Lord John Manners sent Gladstone a sympathetic letter couched in the language of Young England. While expressing total disagreement with Gladstone's

In this predicament, it was only natural for a young minister to turn to the great expert in these matters, the party's election manager, Philip Bonham. As early as 16 January 1846, Gladstone asked Bonham's assistance in a letter that revealed how sheltered an electoral life he had led for fourteen years. "I am not exactly aware", he wrote, "of the steps that a man in office and out of Parliament should take in order to remove the anomaly by supplying himself with a seat".¹⁰ The veteran may have smiled at such innocence, but the task was to be no easy one, especially with a fastidious client, who was to consider at least sixteen possibilities before the search was concluded.

Yet possible openings were not long in appearing. As early as 6 January some Liverpool merchants, anxious to support the Government's policy of Free Trade and "desirous at this eventful crisis of laying aside all party considerations", invited Gladstone to contest a Liverpool seat. A. H. Wylie, their spokesman, corresponded with him for several weeks with regard to the prospects of his candidature, which was said to be supported by two local newspapers.¹¹ As son of a wealthy Liverpool merchant, Gladstone appeared to be a good candidate, but in the end the proposal fell through, apparently because of the inclination of the Liverpool Free Traders to return one Liberal and one Conservative Free Trader. Lord Sandon, a sitting member for the city, filled the latter category and so left no room for the Conservative minister, although at one stage there was hope that Sandon might be raised to the Upper House. (Actually the latter succeeded his father as Earl of Harrowby in 1847.)

With the chances in Liverpool receding a possible opening appeared in Wigan where a Captain Lindsay expected to be unseated by an Election Committee of the House of Commons. In such an event, he informed Gladstone, it was the wish of both parties that "you should allow yourself to be put in nomination". Neither party felt strong enough to return two candidates. Consequently, according to Captain Lindsay:

The general wish therefore seems to be, that...you should now come forward, and be their member for the remainder of the present parliament; and at a general election you should engage not to stand for the Borough *to the prejudice of any neighbouring or local interest*; the

views he added "but I know your gentleness and toleration too well to fear you will be angry with it". As to Newark he wrote: "...there appears to be a general impression in the Borough that something is wrong somewhere; if so, according to my gloomy view, Newark is but a fair epitome of England at large, handed over to be fought by two furious factions in a struggle that must be fatal, whichever side gains the victory. I see but one mode of ultimate safety, that is in the Queen resuming her crown, and governing according to the theory of the Church, her people. But of course there is no chance of the Queen's doing so... Ad. Ms. 44363, ff. 148-149, 15 January 1846.

¹⁰ B.M. Ad. Ms. 44110, ff. 170-171, 16 January 1846.

¹¹ B.M. Ad. Ms. 44363, ff. 154-156, 169-170, 196-6, 197, 198-199, 204, 207, 6 January -10 February 1846.

meaning of this is in fact *almost* to debar you from standing at a General Election.¹²

Gladstone welcomed this overture and accepted Lindsay's conditions, but suggested "that what has now passed between us in writing should remain strictly private as almost every explanation of this kind, however strictly warrantable in substance, is liable to misconstruction and to the charge of an interference with the freedom of Election".¹³ Indeed Gladstone was both willing and anxious to obtain the Wigan seat, but he warned E. Woodcock, who was promoting his interests in Wigan, not to act precipitately "in anticipation of the sentence of a judicial tribunal".¹⁴ This was well said but too late for on the same day Captain Lindsay reported that some persons were attempting to defend his return.¹⁵ Two days later Lindsay wrote: "I am annoyed exceedingly after all that has been arranged between ourselves that Mr. Woodcock's ill judged proceedings will be the very cause of preventing or at least of delaying what he had undertaken to help in performing, Viz, your becoming a candidate for Wigan." It appeared that a petition had been presented, unknown to Lindsay, asking permission to defend his return. "This petition has for its object", Lindsay wrote, "to *keep you out* and it is got up by the Protectionist party as an annoyance to the Ministers."¹⁶ In the end to Lindsay's embarrassment, he retained his seat and poor Gladstone could do nothing but congratulate him.¹⁷

A few weeks later another interesting possibility developed in the form of a proposal from one, Henry Raikes, who wrote that he knew of a borough in the south of England where "a permanent family or personal interest might be invested by an outlay of from £5,000 to £7,000 in Mortgage on household security". In Raikes' view it was a place "which ought to return a Minister from the trifling nature of the local interests that would be represented", and he offered personally to keep the negotiation open on Gladstone's behalf.¹⁸ Unfortunately there is no further correspondence to be found in connection with this intriguing proposition unless the borough in question was Dorchester of which more below.

In the meantime the great debate on the Corn Laws was proceeding with the Colonial Secretary still outside the House and unable to participate. On 6 June with the end of the struggle in sight he told his friend Lincoln that he was "unhappy and uneasy" about his "want of a seat and total inability to get one by any unexceptional means". He had never

¹² *Ibid.*, ff. 275-276, 10 March 1846.

¹³ *Ibid.*, ff. 277-278, 10 March 1846.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, ff. 306-307, 16 March 1846; see also f. 272, 9 March 1846.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, ff. 304-305, 16 March 1846.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, ff. 321-322, 18 March 1846. Compare Gladstone's minister account in Ad. Ms. 44791, f. 88.

¹⁷ Ad. Ms. 44364, ff. 23-24, 9 April 1846.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 40-41, 21 April 1846.

said anything to Sir Robert Peel on the subject of resigning simply because he did not know what could be done about a replacement, but he had asked Goulburn and now asked Lincoln to let him know should an opportunity arise where his resignation would be advantageous. "I hope you will think that I am right", he wrote to Lincoln, "in preferring an intention of this kind to any direct overture to Sir R. Peel. Offers made to the Prime minister as such assume of necessity something of a formal air: and I have an intense repugnance to making any offer which has the aspect of being made in order that it might be rejected".¹⁹

By the time the Government fell at the end of June, Gladstone had held office for six months without a seat. The change of ministry, of course, necessitated by-elections for the new Ministers and Lincoln suggested to him the possibility of challenging Hobhouse at Nottingham. On reflection, however, Gladstone concluded that he was not entitled to oppose a new Minister under such circumstances. After rehearsing all the arguments against the proposal he concluded with the cryptic remark: "All this is said as you well observe without the smallest reflection on the honour and purity of Nottingham."²⁰

About the same time Gladstone received a letter from another friend, Robert Williams, suggesting that he might come forward to succeed Sir James Graham at Dorchester in the event of an early dissolution. Williams made the offer of support on behalf of his father. "I am happy to say that he most cordially concurs in my suggestion", he wrote, "feeling with me that, setting aside particular political opinions it would be an advantage to our little borough to secure the services in parliament of such a representative as yourself".²¹ Williams indicated that they would have to communicate with Lord Shaftesbury with whom they shared the patronage of the borough but that he anticipated no difficulty there. He also added that election expenses would be £500 inclusive of a dinner, plus "a general liberality towards their public institutions and all that goes on from time to time".²²

This looked promising, but when an early dissolution failed to materialize they mutually agreed to leave the question in abeyance. "You may obtain a seat elsewhere, before a dissolution takes place", Williams wrote to Gladstone; "and when it comes, you may (as you say) be claimed at Newark. [Apparently Gladstone was still unreconciled to his ouster by the Duke of Newcastle]. We on the other hand may have occasion to

¹⁹ Ad. Ms. 44262, ff. 72-73, 6 June 1846.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, ff. 74-76, 29 June 1846. Cf. N. Gash, *Politics in the Age of Peel*, (London, 1953), p. 126, re the venality of Nottingham.

²¹ Ad. Ms. 44364, ff. 241-244, 27 June 1846. The father was presumably Edward Williams of Herrington.

²² *Ibid.* (Gash, *op. cit.*, lists Lord Shaftesbury as the patron of Dorchester.)

dispose otherwise of the seat at Dorchester".²³ This sounded rather vague, but Gladstone informed Bonham, whom he continued to consult, "I think I am provided at the General Election at Dorchester if not elsewhere". In the same letter he alluded to a vacancy at St. Ives and asked Bonham whether there was any reason to consider it a suitable opening.²⁴

Mrs. Gladstone had received the news about St. Ives from the Duke of Wellington who a few days later wrote to her husband to say that he had been offered the seat for a friend, but knew nothing about it other than that the place did not have a good reputation and that the person who offered it, he feared, was not of very good character.²⁵ This was scarcely an attractive prospect for a man with Gladstone's moral values. In any event, Bonham threw cold water on the idea with the news that the Mr. Praed, the late member, had promised to make way for a Mr. Lee at the next election.²⁶

The next prospect, which came only a few days later, sounded more attractive. Lord Westminster's letter to Gladstone regarding the possibility of an opening at Chester reveals some of the complications involved in seat hunting in those days:

Under the impression that you may be desirous of returning to the House of Commons [he wrote] I take the liberty of calling your attention to a vacancy that may possibly soon occur at Chester in consequence of Mr. Byng's illness, which from its not yielding immediately to remedies must at his age be alarming and which, through a fatal termination, would cause my brother's resignation for Chester in order that he might be at liberty to offer himself for Middlesex.²⁷

I cannot enlighten you much as to the state of parties at Chester — the influence of my family can now at best be but slight....

There seems a chance that a person of modest Politics might come in at this moment on my brother's vacancy but it will be necessary for you to make up your mind whether you will risk the expense and [incur?] the trouble of a contest which may arise before you embark in the undertaking.

²³ *Ibid.*, ff. 268-269, 9 July 1846. He wrote again on 13 July regretfully declining an invitation to visit the Gladstones and expressing satisfaction at Gladstone's agreement to leave the Dorchester question open (ff. 276-277).

²⁴ Ad. Ms. 44110, ff. 175-176, 14 July 1846.

²⁵ Ad. Ms. 44364, ff. 278-279, 14 July 1846.

²⁶ Ad. Ms. 44110, ff. 177-178, 14 July 1846. In a further letter he explained away Wellington's mysterious information about the borough. "As to St. Ives", he wrote on 4 August, "I ascertained that Lord Mornington! on the score of a former idle expenditure had offered the seat to his uncle (Wellington) without the possibility of obtaining a single vote against the *united* determination to support the old *Bolton interest* in the person of Ld. Wm. Paulet". (*Ibid.*, f. 153.) Gladstone was fortunate to have such an adviser as Bonham to guide him through this labyrinth!

²⁷ Ad. Ms. 44364, ff. 284-285, 18 July 1846.

In a later letter on 4 August, however, he had to write:

Mr. Dixon [the agent] has been with me in London and I have ascertained that there is such a division of parties in Chester, that although they would unite in bringing in my son as a neighbour we cannot count on any other person being returned *without a contest*.

I believe this to be simply the state of the case, and no disinclination generally towards you — on the contrary many would have supported you zealously. Meanwhile Mr. Byng is himself again — and my brother thinks it worthwhile to take a place at court, and to be reelected for the remainder of the Parliament.²⁸

As a postscript by way of consolation, the noble lord invited Gladstone to shoot over his ground in September.

On the same day the faithful Bonham wrote to enquire whether Gladstone would be prepared to accept an offer at Whitby through the influence of Hudson, the Railway King, but “on the score of *perfect independence*”.²⁹ In a characteristic reply Gladstone expressed his doubts on five grounds, especially on Hudson’s connection with the Protectionists. As to cost he was explicit: “I should not be disposed at this time of the Parliament to go to any great expense, and with illegal expense of course I could not have anything to do”.³⁰ In the end the railway man changed his mind to the relief of Bonham who admitted he “never thought well of *Whitby under the auspices of Hudson*”.³¹ The two correspondents continued to discuss the prospects of an early election and Gladstone still talked of falling back on Dorchester as a “*ratio ultima*”. “Public reasons”, he added, “might make it my duty to stand for some larger place but I cannot tell whether this is likely while it would certainly be far from agreeable”.³²

A few days after making this observation Gladstone received an overture from Aberdeen. A Mr. Wm. Forbes Skene, a liberal Conservative whom Bonham described as “a very respectable professional man from an old family”,³³ wrote to tell Gladstone that it was expected that the Whig member, Mr. Bannerman would resign to accept the Commissionership of Excise. A Mr. D. Fordyce, “an extreme liberal” and a free-churchman, was expected to stand for the vacancy, but Mr. Skene, whose family controlled twenty-two votes, told Gladstone:

... I and many of my friends in town think that if you could be induced to stand on the Conservative interest that you would unite all the other sections of the Conservative and moderate Whigs who are not Freechurch-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 289-290, 4 August 1846.

²⁹ Ad. Ms. 44110, ff. 183-184, 4 August 1846.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, ff. 185-186, 7 August 1846.

³¹ *Ibid.*, ff. 187-188, 14 August 1846.

³² *Ibid.*, ff. 189-190, 21 August 1846.

³³ *Ibid.*, f. 194, 30 August 1846.

men in your support and we are quite ready to start a requisition to you to come forward as a candidate.³⁴

Gladstone's response was cautious, perhaps because of the Free Kirk complications, which Bonham thought would make success doubtful.³⁵ In his answer he made it clear, he told Bonham, "*That I could not stir except upon a requisition of such a nature as to exclude all reasonable doubts of success — nor could I be liable as matters now stand for expenses unless both legal and very limited. . . .*" "It will surprise me much, all things considered", Gladstone added, "if the good folk of Aberdeen show a disposition to be represented by me. But unless they do show such a disposition unequivocally, I am by no means disposed to disturb their peace".³⁶ Skene, for his part continued to write optimistically,³⁷ and offered his own professional services gratuitously, but on September 8 he had to report that "Mr. Bannerman will not retire as soon as expected".³⁸ Thus Aberdeen, like Dorchester, was left up in the air, but it was clear from their continued correspondence that Gladstone found Skene's liberal views congenial.³⁹ Indeed Skene placed more faith in the liberalism of the Peelite Conservative than of the Whig Government.⁴⁰

As late as the following July Gladstone was consulting Lord Aberdeen as to the possibility of contesting the Aberdeen seat in the event of his being defeated for Oxford, but he hesitated to run against a Whig "of moderate views and stable character".⁴¹ In the end, however, as we shall see such insurance was not necessary.

In October Bonham reported two further possibilities, one at Newcastle-under-Lyme in view of the dangerous illness of one of its members, J. C. Colquhoun, the other at Wolverhampton, where Charles Villiers was expected to vacate a seat upon appointment to the governorship of Bombay.⁴² Neither of these openings materialized, however, since Colquhoun recovered and Villiers failed to receive his appointment.⁴³

Nothing daunted Bonham continued the search and one day in November dashed off a breathless note to his client that deserves quotation in full:

I have only a moment to send you a rumour which I am *not* able to authenticate that Sir G. Cockburn has had an apoplectic attack of the most severe kind, at 75 this is serious. I will write to you again Monday.

³⁴ Ad. Ms. 44364, ff. 317-322, 24 August 1846.

³⁵ Ad. Ms. 44110, f. 194, 30 August 1846.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, ff. 192-193, 27 August 1846; Ad. Ms. 44364, ff. 351-352, 27 August 1846.

³⁷ Ad. Ms. 44364, ff. 335-338, 363-368, 26 and 29 August 1846.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 14-15, 8 September 1846.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 18-21, 11 September 1846.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, ff. 34-39, 23 September 1846.

⁴¹ Ad. Ms. 43070, ff. 188-189, 30 July 1847.

⁴² Ad. Ms. 44110, ff. 196-197, 17 October 1846.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, ff. 200-201, 29 October 1846.

If he dies Ld de Grey will have the return for Rippon [*sic*]. Could you manage this? ⁴⁴

Gladstone answered with suitable reserve:

If, as I trust may not be the case, so valuable a man as Cockburn is to be lost whether by death or otherwise to the public service, there will indeed be an opening at Ripon, but I fear that I have no means of putting myself in Lord De Grey's way.⁴⁵

Bonham must have sometimes felt that his client was not the easiest man to help. Nevertheless he continued to issue bulletins on the state of Cockburn's health. On 24 November he was able to report that the physician "was recalled by express messenger to see Sir George who had just suffered a severe stroke of apoplexy",⁴⁶ but on the next day he had to admit that the patient was considered "out of *immediate* danger". Paralysis, however, precluded any further political activity.⁴⁷

On 3 December Bonham wrote again, observing that "poor Sir George is not at all rallying, tho' he may linger for some time".⁴⁸ The important news in this letter, however, was that "'Jeremy' Bradshaw the M. P. for *Canterbury* is in a most hopeless state and his dissolution hourly expected". Since he was no longer acting as a general party manager Bonham could not vouch for the state of the constituency, but knew "of late years it was very conservative". He suggested that Gladstone's name "could not be without effect" there and he had "little doubt that the seat now obtained would be perfectly safe at a General Election and on a footing too of perfect independence".

But Gladstone was a difficult man to please in these matters.

I am afraid [he wrote] of altogether arresting, by my chilling replies, your labours in a field so unprofitable as that of my parliamentary interests — but I suppose the real trouble is, though I have scarcely yet spoken it out to myself, that I feel a great repugnance to introducing myself to leaders of any constituency in the way of solicitation....

The constituency of Canterbury I should suppose from rumour to be a very corrupt one. Ripon would be delightful but is too good to hope [for]. Lord de Grey knows my case.... If he is not disposed to lift the lame dog over the style without my barking to remind him, I do not think the sound of my voice will mend his inclination.⁴⁹

In the meantime he had authorized his wife's brother-in-law, Lord Lyttelton, to look into a possible vacancy in Worcestershire, which he would gladly seize "to put an end in some way to embarrassment", but he did

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 204 (21 November 1846).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, ff. 205-206, 24 November 1846.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 207, 24 November 1846.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 208, 25 November 1846.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 209-210, 3 December 1846.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 211-212, 8 December 1846.

not expect it to come to anything. "I shall indeed very gladly find myself in but if I remain out I do not know that anybody will be much the worse for it."

Early in the new year Wigan again became a possibility with the illness of Captain Lindsay's colleague. Stuart Wortley was one of several friends to bring this to Gladstone's attention: "I write one line to say that poor Standish is lying in a hopeless state and is not likely to survive a week. I don't know whether you have still any thoughts of the case, but Lindsay told me that he thought that unless a native was in the field you would have a very good chance there."⁵⁰ In view of his previous correspondence with Lindsay Gladstone was of the opinion that he could scarcely become a candidate without the concurrence of the two parties "which", he wrote to Bonham, "they can only be likely to give in the improbable contingency of their each being convinced that the antagonist is formidable and the struggle for the seat during the short remainder of the Parliament not worthwhile".⁵¹ Nevertheless Gladstone solicited the assistance of another friend Wilson Patten who sounded out the Liberal agent. The latter was forthcoming but thought his party would "hesitate to allow a member not of their own opinions to be elected now".⁵² Sir John Young, Peel's former chief whip, who was also consulted believed the Radicals were unlikely to allow the seat to go uncontested, but in any event he reported that Standish was "better and in no immediate danger".⁵³ So the prospects at Wigan again faded, but Patten promised that he was keeping his eye on several boroughs in his own county and might have something to propose when they next met.

At the end of March the Dorchester possibility came to a head with a long letter from Williams informing Gladstone of his father's recent death and of his decision to sell the property. He continued:

Now will you buy? Your father seemed inclined towards it once — and I am unwilling to lose the chance of providing the town of Dorchester such a portion. I therefore make you the first offer before communicating with anyone else on the subject. I told you once before I that I considered £50,000 *about* the price — independent of the house and grounds....

With respect to the seat — I am pretty sure you may reckon with it — at the same time there *is* an independent portion of the constituency — which might overpower both my property and Lord Shaftesbury's put together if all *combined* against the two properties. But the principal people of the place are very anxious to avoid a contest, and would probably gladly rally around such a landlord as yourself — whom they would expect, on the other hand, to show himself heartily interested in the borough....

⁵⁰ Ad. Ms. 44365, ff. 106-107, 2 February 1847.

⁵¹ Ad. Ms. 44110, ff. 213-214, 2 February 1847.

⁵² Ad. Ms. 44365, ff. 116-117 (11 February 1847?).

⁵³ Ad. Ms. 44237, ff. 184-187, 17 February 1847.

If you lived in Wollaston House yourself for a month or two in the autumn and Winter — attended sessions and Assizes — and took an interest in the institutions of the town I have no doubt you would easily secure their permanent support — and this approaches almost as near to a close seat as any other in these days.⁵⁴

Gladstone declined the offer as one beyond his reach and so ended the prospects of a safe seat at Dorchester, since Williams was committed to an early sale.⁵⁵

Other possible openings appeared at Leicester, Boston and Scarborough, but none seemed to attract our fastidious seat hunter.⁵⁶ In the cases of Boston and Scarborough, he objected to the necessity of treating, a subject on which he had strong views as may be seen from the following extract from a letter to Sir F. W. French who had suggested the Scarborough seat:

I have always entertained an insuperable objection to what is called treating at elections as well as to whatever resembles political corruption. I am aware indeed that the services of many people may be required in a [contested?] election as well as the use of many articles, and that the expenditure connected with them cannot well be conducted with the same care as that of a domestic establishment. I do not now refer to laxity of this kind within any moderate bounds, but under the name of treating I mean to include all those methods of entertainment which lead to drunkenness and debauchery, and under that of political corruption I could not refuse to class all payments so arranged as in fact though not in form to give the voter a price for his vote. Now I do not know enough of your election at Scarborough to be able to judge whether my views might prove to be in harmony with those of the leaders of the constituency upon these vital subjects, and think it right to put them forward prominently and in the first instance....⁵⁷

Finally the long hunt came to an end when Gladstone found a most congenial haven in his old home — the University of Oxford, where he was nominated on the eve of the General Election. As early as January 1846 Stafford Northcote, who had been his private secretary at the Board of Trade, had raised the possibility of his representing Oxford University should Escourt, one of the sitting members, decide to retire.⁵⁸ Some people felt that Gladstone was a natural candidate for the University seat, but there were two difficulties — his support of the Maynooth grant and the fact that he came from Christ Church, the same college as the senior Oxford member, Sir Robert Inglis, a reactionary but popular old Tory.

⁵⁴ Ad. Ms. 44365, ff. 127-134, 31 March 1847.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, ff. 138-139, 9 April 1847.

⁵⁶ Ad. Ms. 44262, ff. 10304, 20 April 1847.

⁵⁷ Ad. Ms. 44365, ff. 151-152, 30 April 1847, Draft.

In the same letter Gladstone emphasized his determination if he re-entered Parliament to do so without pledges and also indicated that he adhered to a strict rule of making no religious subscriptions in the community "except within the Communion the Church".

⁵⁸ Ad. Ms. 44216, ff. 36-37, 21 January 1846.

Early in 1847 Northcote and others again reopened the question but it was not until May that the way was in the end cleared by Estcourt's decision to retire. Gladstone and his enthusiastic supporters both in Oxford and in London consequently began to make their plans for the coming General Election.⁵⁹

There was, however, one unfortunate snag. Edward Cardwell, a junior colleague of Gladstone's in Peel's administration, was also a contestant for the vacant seat, as well as a nonentity by the name of Round. While there was little difference in their political views, Cardwell was a more acceptable candidate than Gladstone in the eyes of the Low Church interest. At any rate Gladstone's committee, regarding Inglis' seat as safe, concentrated on Cardwell as the main opponent. They acknowledged Cardwell's administrative talent but asked whether he had "any very definite political or politico-religious principles at all", and if so whether they coincided "with those of members of Convocation". The Gladstone election circular posed three choices:

Mr. Round will feel with you, and vote for you. Will he or can he do more? Mr. Cardwell will advocate your claims—unless indeed the obnoxious measure is a Government one, and he is in the Administration; and then which will be more prominent—the member of the University or the rising Politician?

Mr. Gladstone both thinks and feels with you.... Vote for Mr. Gladstone.⁶⁰

Cardwell must have resented these tactics, but when he saw what way the wind was blowing he decided to withdraw and contest instead the important Liverpool seat which Gladstone had investigated the previous year.⁶¹ Gladstone responded to the news with a typically involved but friendly letter.⁶²

This withdrawal enabled Peel to give Gladstone support previously withheld as he explained in a frank letter in which he wrote:

Before I heard of your intention to be a candidate, and under the firm persuasion that the University of Oxford would object to be represented by two members of the same College, I had committed myself to Cardwell—preferring him as the representative of the University to anyone known to me not being a member of Christ Church. His withdrawal restores to

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 43-121 and Ad. Ms. 44365, ff. 163-192. Ad. Ms. 44133, ff. 1-5, for numerous letters regarding the Oxford contest.

⁶⁰ Ad. Ms. 44565, f. 76, 19 May 1847. This broadsheet did not spare poor Cardwell. "Of Mr. Cardwell's talents", it ran, "all are aware. He fitted ably and well a subordinate office in the Treasury, a subordinate position in the House of Commons. He was most useful in the Executive under the guidance of Sir Robert Peel. But we must enquire further, not respecting the Secretary of the Treasury, but the individual Mr. Cardwell,—is the soundness of his own principles as certain as his skill in carrying out those of others..."

⁶¹ Ad. Ms. 44118, f. 8, 21 June 1847.

⁶² *Ibid.*, ff. 9-10, 21 June 1847.

me an unfettered discretion and I shall exercise it with the greatest satisfaction in your favour.⁶³

Gladstone thanked Peel for his "generous" support, generous "because it touches matters on which I stand less near to you than, happily for me, I have stood in the region of opinions purely political". Of his position vis à vis Cardwell he was perhaps not entirely straightforward when he wrote:

It was very painful for me to stand even in seeming opposition to Cardwell: though it was in seeming opposition only for I am pretty confident that I did not hold off from him votes enough to have placed him in a position of reciprocity to Round. If it was otherwise I should regret having deprived Oxford of a very valuable representation.⁶⁴

The story of the Oxford election itself has been told by Morley.⁶⁵ It was a stiff fight but Gladstone beat Round for second place by 997 to 824. Northcote, who acted as Gladstone's agent, reported from Oxford: "The victory is not looked upon as Puseyite; it is a victory of the masters over the Hebdomadal Board."⁶⁶

One need not labour the moral of the story, but may suggest that it provides a nice illustration of how the old order lingered on in the years between the First and Second Reform Acts. In this respect it merely illuminates the thesis presented by Professor Norman Gash in his *Politics in the Age of Peel*. Indeed Gash told part of the story himself, but it seemed that the whole episode is not undeserving of fuller attention than he could give it in a few pages.⁶⁷ It is offered as a piece of Gladstoniana that Morley and other biographers have ignored.

If you did not have local influence in a small borough in those days, then it was a difficult and expensive task to get into Parliament and one that might well involve recourse to methods repugnant to a man of Gladstone's moral sensitivity. It was not until he had become a great national figure that he could contest large popular constituencies such as South Lancashire or Greenwich with hope of success: and by that time we are moving into the era of the Second Reform Act. Newark and Oxford University were suitable seats for the younger Gladstone in the age of Peel and Palmerston.

⁶³ Ad. Ms. 44275, ff. 309-310, 24 June 1847.

⁶⁴ Ad. Ms. 40470, ff. 444-445, 24 June 1847.

⁶⁵ Morley, *Gladstone*, I, pp. 327-336. See also Gladstone's recollections write late in life in Ad. Ms. 44791, ff. 88-9.

⁶⁶ Ad. Ms. 44216, ff. 103-106. The election cost Gladstone £1,328 of which £747 was for printing, advertising, postage, etc., £403 for travelling and £176 for rent, wages, etc. (*Ibid.*, f. 203).

⁶⁷ Gash, *Politics in the Age of Peel*, pp. 235-238.

THOUGHTS ON THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION 1815-1866

Robert SPENCER
University of Toronto

The Confederation or *Bund*¹ of 1815 was a characteristic product of the Restoration era. It was also one of the longest enduring aspects of the Vienna settlement. Yet in the history of Germany it occupies a twilight position. Though representing an important stage in German constitutional development, both on a local and on a national level, it has been overshadowed by its predecessor, the Holy Roman Empire, and by its successor, the Prussian-German Empire of Bismarck and William II. An object of distaste for many Germans, it has also been a neglected area for historical examination. Not until the years after the Second World War, with revived interest in German and European federalism, and reconsideration of the role of conservative forces and institutions in the Restoration era, has there been any real effort towards re-examining the *Bund* and its place in German and European history.

The general history of the *Bund* is familiar enough. But relatively unknown, and all too often misunderstood, are important aspects of its machinery, functions and achievements. In part this can be explained by the complexity of the subject and by the elusive nature of the *Bund's* history. But in addition the obscurity surrounding the *Bund* derives from the fact that the Revolutions of 1848 and Bismarck's creation of the Second Reich are more stirring stories. And while *Vormärz* has been a fruitful quarry for intellectual history, most general works have labelled the period 'the Quiet Years', and have moved quickly from the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, with a brief nod at the Karlsbad Decrees and perhaps a slightly longer pause over the *Zollverein*, to the liberal and national frustrations of 1848. The end of the *Bund* is barely noticed in the celebrations of the victory at Königgrätz. Subordinated to the policies of Metternich and Bismarck, the tale is summed up in Heine's famous doggerel:

O Bund!
Du Hund!
Du bist nicht gesund!

From its earliest years German historians and especially jurists took the *Bund* sufficiently seriously to attempt to produce adequate histories

¹ I use the word *Bund* in view of the difficulty of translating the term, and to avoid the confusion of the *Cambridge Modern History* which lists A. F. Pollard's chapter in the table of contents as 'The Germanic Federation' and heads the chapter itself 'The Germanic Confederation.'

of it. Five years before its demise Heinrich von Treitschke proposed to tackle the subject. In 1879 in the preface to his *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* he wrote that "It was my original plan to write only the history of the Germanic Federation."² Seventeen years and five thick volumes³ later death overtook him, when his projected 'short, incisive' account of the Confederation,⁴ now grown into a large scale *History*, had reached only the eve of 1848. His inability to confine his study to the *Bund* as he had originally intended ought to be sufficient warning to any historian proposing to venture on a subject so difficult to disentangle from the general history of Germany. Perhaps this explains, too, why the historiography of the *Bund* is so meagre. For the English reader with both leisure and determination Treitschke's brilliant pages still provide the most detailed, if hostile, treatment of the *Bund's* first three decades. Apart from A. F. Pollard's brief chapter in the *Cambridge Modern History*⁵ there is little beyond the first two volumes of Sir Adolphus Ward's *Germany*,⁶ knowledgeable but utterly unreadable.

Thanks to the attractions of other fields and to the generally bad press which the Prussian school and its successors have given the *Bund*, the German reader is little better off. Such contemporary works as those of Ilse, Klüber, Kaltenborn, or Aegidi⁷ are enough to deter all but the hardest. Fischer's *Die Nation und der Bundestag*⁸ is now eighty years old, and has been succinctly labelled by a leading constitutional authority as 'inadequate'.⁹ By far the best analysis of the *Bund* is found in E. R. Huber's encyclopaedic *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789*.¹⁰ Though naturally written from a constitutional-legal standpoint, Huber interprets his theme very broadly and includes much political and social analysis. But his first two volumes carry the story only to 1850, and have to deal with a myriad of state constitutions as well as general German developments. And his thousand-page tomes are in a sense self-defeating, for German students understandably by-pass them in favour of older and briefer works which relegate the *Bund* to its accustomed obscurity.

² Treitschke's *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century*. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. (New York, 1915). I, xiii.

³ *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*. (Leipzig, 1879-94).

⁴ William Harbutt Dawson, Introduction to Treitschke's *History of Germany*, I, xi.

⁵ Vol X, *The Restoration*, (New York, 1911), 340-82.

⁶ Sir Adolphus William Ward, *Germany, 1815-1890*, 3 vols., (Cambridge, 1916).

⁷ L. F. Ilse, *Geschichte der deutschen Bundesversammlung*, 3 vols. (Marburg, 1861-62); J. L. Klüber, *Öffentliches Recht des Teutschen Bundes und der Bundesstaaten*. 4th ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1840); L. K. Aegidi, *Die Schlussakte der Wiener Ministerial Konferenzen*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1860-1869); Karl von Kaltenborn, *Geschichte der deutschen Bundesverhältnisse... 1806-1856*. 2 vols. (Berlin, 1857).

⁸ Karl Fischer, *Die Nation und der Bundestag*, (Leipzig, 1880).

⁹ Fritz Hartung, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte vom 15 Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, (Stuttgart, 1950), 175.

¹⁰ Band I: *Reform und Restauration, 1789-1830*, (Stuttgart, 1957); Band II: *Der Kampf um Einheit und Freiheit 1830-1850*, (Stuttgart, 1960).

One of Huber's unique merits is his extensive use of what is the essential source for any study of the *Bund* — the great series of protocols of its central organ, the *Bundesversammlung*.¹¹ Amounting to upwards of sixty folio volumes, their richness is increased by their even more voluminous appendices. Yet a recent bibliographical article could still endorse A. O. Meyer's description of them as 'a published but still unused historical source.'¹² They provide an admirable record not only of the decisions recorded by the *Bundesversammlung*, but of the arguments which preceded the recording of a decision. Though equipped with good contemporary indexes and with an analytical table of contents in each volume, they constitute a difficult source in view of their size and the often technical nature of their language. Moreover, like all protocols, they conceal as much as they reveal. And one is soon driven to the discouraging conclusion that they have to be supplemented by an examination of relevant material in the archives of the constituent states.

Behind the first protocols lay two years of preparation for the new federal structure. The Congress of Vienna, besides being a European congress, was also a German constituent assembly, obligated by Article VI of the First Treaty of Paris to provide for the organization of Germany on a federal basis. Austrian and Prussian joint proposals for a tolerable federal system with a three tiered organization were opposed by Bavaria and Württemberg. But it was Austro-Prussian dissension over the Polish-Saxony question which brought the labours of the five-power German Committee to a halt, and it was Napoleon's alarming return from Elba which turned desultory drafting and redrafting of possible constitutions into swift resolution. By June 8, in remarkably speedy fashion, and with only two formal sessions, the twenty articles of the *Bundesakte* were approved and the first eleven included in the composite Treaty of Vienna — a striking illustration of the degree to which the German question was a European one.¹³ By September, with the delayed and reluctant adhesion of Baden and Württemberg, all but one of the forty-one states marked out by the Congress for reconstitution had joined the new *Bund*. In the rush the tiny possessions of the Landgrave of Hessen-Homburg were overlooked. He did not enter until 1817, and even then survived for the next twenty years without a vote in the *Bundesver-*

¹¹ *Protokolle der deutschen Bundesversammlung mit den loco dictaturæ gedruckten Beilagen*. Useful extracts from the protocols showing the decisions recorded by the *Bundesversammlung* are found in P. A. Guido von Meyer, *Corpus Confœderationis Germaniæ, oder Staatsakten für Geschichte der öffentlichen Recht der deutschen Bundes*. (3rd ed., Frankfurt, 1858-69).

¹² A. O. Meyer, *Bismarcks Kampf mit Oesterreich am Bundestag zu Frankfurt, 1851-1859*, (Berlin, 1927), viii.; H. O. Meisner, 'Die Protokolle der deutschen Bundestages von 1816-1866,' *Archivalische Zeitschrift*, 47, 1951, 1.

¹³ Wilhelm Adolf Schmidt, *Geschichte der deutschen Verfassungsfrage während der Befreiungskriege und des Wiener Kongresses 1812 bis 1815*. (Stuttgart, 1890); F. F. Penny, *The Formation of the German Confederation in 1815*, (Unpublished Thesis, Cornell University, 1931).

sammlung. The Landgrave's brother rulers included the Austrian Emperor, five kings, one elector, seven grand dukes, ten dukes, and a dozen princes. Three foreign sovereigns were members: the Kings of the Netherlands for Luxemburg, of Denmark for Holstein and Lauenberg, and of England for Hannover. This had the odd consequence that until the separation of the crowns in 1837, the English rulers were occasionally obliged to protest against federal resolutions as Kings of England which they had already approved as Kings of Hannover.¹⁴

The Bund's territories stretched from Aachen to the Oder, from the Adriatic to the Baltic and the North Seas. Its population numbered some thirty million, its member states varying in size from Austria's 9.5 million and Prussia's 7.9, down to Liechtenstein's 5,500. Its centre was Frankfurt am Main, one of the four free republican cities which had survived along with the thirty-seven hereditary monarchies in the more rationalized territorial arrangements. In 1815 Frankfurt was a provincial town with only 48,000 inhabitants, a fifth that of Vienna, scarcely more than a quarter that of Berlin. The representatives of foreign powers, who eagerly claimed the right to diplomatic representation at the *Bundesversammlung*, understandably complained of the scarcity and poorness of accommodation available, and regarded the arrival of a courier en route to Vienna or St. Petersburg as a welcome break in a tranquil atmosphere.¹⁵ Within a few miles of the city were the territories of five different states, and it soon became an asylum for all the vagrants of central Germany.¹⁶

Protracted negotiations over the territorial arrangements and a series of preliminary conferences delayed the inauguration of the *Bund*. Not until November 5, 1816, did the *Bundesversammlung* hold its first session.¹⁷ Through the device of assigning to it the task of completing its own machinery, the *Bundesakte* was a mercifully short, almost skeletal constitution.¹⁸ The *Bund* was defined as an indissoluble league — it provided for, in fact, a far looser federal bond than Metternich had been prepared to tolerate in 1814. It was provided with no central organ beyond the *Bundesversammlung*, a form of permanent congress of ambassadors of the constituent states. The familiar picture of two councils is misleading, for what actually happened was that the same representatives met in two different roles. Usually they assembled as the *Engere Rat* or inner council, in which the eleven larger states had a vote apiece,

¹⁴ Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, I, 587,686.

¹⁵ Lamb to Hamilton, 3 February 1817, *FO 30/10*; Lamb to Hamilton, 4 November 1817, *FO 30/11*.

¹⁶ *Treitschke's History of Germany*, II, 692.

¹⁷ Officially known as the *Bundesversammlung*, it came to be referred to even in official documents as the *Bundestag* so strong were the memories of the Reichstag.

¹⁸ The text is now available in E. R. Huber, *Dokumente zur Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, I, (Stuttgart, 1961), 75-81. The English text is available in E. Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, (London, 1875), I, 200-7, 243-48.

the remainder being grouped in a half dozen curial votes. For important matters touching basic laws, or for the admission of new members, they constituted themselves a *Plenum*, in which each state, had a vote and the fourteen largest ones two or more. One representative could and did speak and vote for different states and sometimes on opposite sides of the same question. A resolution in the *Plenum* required a two-thirds majority, but for the most important votes in both forms unanimity was required, so that in constitutional matters each state, and not just Austria, as is so often stated, possessed a veto. This has often been compared with the *liberum veto* in the old Polish Diet;¹⁹ but it is surely relevant to note that the veto in the *Bundesversammlung* was designed to bar the way to alterations in the Treaty under which sovereign states had accepted the federal arrangements. No discussion took place in the *Plenum*, which was merely designed to provide an opportunity for voting on resolutions previously prepared in the *Engere Rat*; but even here there was no real discussion save in confidential sessions where no formal record was kept. The representatives to the *Bundesversammlung* were of course representatives of sovereign states, bound by instructions from their governments. As in the old Empire they made their government's positions clear in a series of formal statements recorded textually in the protocols. Much of the work was done in committees which gave the smaller powers, especially when their representatives were of the calibre of Hannover's von Martens, greater opportunity to express their views. The committees' voluminous reports were usually included as appendices to the protocols.

The *Bundesversammlung* met in the Thurn and Taxis Palace in the Eschenheimer Gasse, where the Austrian representative lodged. It was thus, in Treitschke's scornful phrase, the modest tenant of this princely house. The chancellery staff was provided by the Austrians, and with the permanent presidency provided ample means for Austrian domination of day to day proceedings. The staff maintained two sets of protocols: the official series with appendices for the use of delegates and their governments; and the public series. The decision to publish the protocols as a matter of course distinguished the *Bundesversammlung* from its predecessors. But gradually this unprecedented practice was whittled away. From 1824 'all important and interesting subjects' were buried in Separate Protocols.²⁰ Finally in 1828 Metternich succeeded in burying the affairs of the *Bund* in protocols labelled *loco dictaturae* which were henceforth kept as 'classified' documents. From the start there were also various degrees of secret protocols. This usually meant that military or diplomatic matters were discussed; sometimes, however, only that the protocol officer was not present.²¹ Inevitably there were breaks in

¹⁹ See, e.g., E. Brandelburg, *Die Reichsgründung*, (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1923), I, 74.

²⁰ Meisner, 'Die Protokolle der deutschen Bundestages,' 1-12.

²¹ Fischer, *Die Nation und der Bundestag*, 11.

security, and once it was discovered that *Würst* purchased from a local butcher had been wrapped in secret protocols. The Frankfurt police succeeded in tracing the paper to the residence of the Thuringian representative, whose cook had been selling the protocols for what she presumably judged was a more important function.

At first the *Bundesversammlung* met twice weekly, then weekly. From time to time it appeared as if its vacations were getting longer and longer. But in its first half dozen years and again in the troubled 'thirties it sat for most of the year. No doubt inertia played a part in prolonging the sessions. Often too the Protocols show that the proceedings were perfunctory with representatives endlessly awaiting instructions from their governments. In 1819-20 there were no formal sittings between the acceptance of the Karlsbad Decrees and the conclusion of the Vienna Conferences. But it is of some significance that from start to finish the *Bundesversammlung* at least met on an average of thirty-five times a year, and that its representatives talked enough to fill some 900 folio pages of protocols annually.

At the start the protocols reveal immense activity. The *Bundesversammlung* had to round out its machinery and define its competence — a task of extraordinary complexity in view of the disputes over the extent to which the *Bund* was to be allowed to impinge on state sovereignty. It had to evolve a military organization which would meet the requirements of security, yet satisfy the pretensions of the individual states and avoid interference with the European position of Austria and Prussia. It had to establish a position in the European community and work out satisfactory procedures for diplomatic representation in Frankfurt and abroad. It had to deal with countless claims and petitions arising out of the Empire or the new position of the mediatized princes — petty matters, perhaps, but essential to ensure legal continuity. And it was from the start concerned to preserve the internal tranquility of the federal territory.

After Karlsbad and Vienna, and still more after the 'épuration' of the *Bundesversammlung* in 1823-24, during which obstinate representatives were recalled by their governments, the Diet was reduced to a more obedient instrument of Metternich's policy. But the revolutionary disturbances of the 1830's stirred the *Bund* into new life, and suggest that the term 'the Quiet Years' can only be used ironically or as a device to avoid detailed analysis of the complicated events which took place. The *Bund* was, for example, actively engaged in the constitutional conflicts in Braunschweig, Electoral Hessen, and Hannover. In Braunschweig the *Bundesversammlung* encouraged the conflict by its dilatory stand, but then endorsed and assisted the transfer of the throne to Duke William. It thus rather surprisingly contributed to Braunschweig's earning the reputation as one of the best governed German states. The new Hessen

constitution, proclaimed after the revolution of 1830, aroused no overt opposition when presented in Frankfurt for a federal guarantee, and, though recognized as the most radical in Germany, remained in force. The result was a prolonged series of constitutional conflicts in which the *Bundesversammlung* was closely involved. In the Hanoverian crisis the *Bundesversammlung* regrettably stultified itself by declining to repeat the tactics which had been so successful in Braunschweig, and undoubtedly helped here to pave the way for 1848.

But the sharpest impact of 1830 on German territory was the Belgian revolution which spread into Luxemburg up to the fortress walls. A federal corps of intervention was prepared, interestingly enough composed of small and middlesized states to avoid international complications, and excluding Hannover for the same reason. Before the question was finally resolved in 1839, with the partition of the Duchy and the inclusion of part of Limburg in the *Bund* by way of compensation, it occupied a prominent place on the *Bundesversammlung's* agenda, as the assembly attempted to protect the western frontier, to secure the co-operation of the Netherlands, and to maintain close liaison with the London conference where Austria and Prussia acted as plenipotentiaries for the *Bund*.

Moreover, throughout the 'thirties the *Bund* was preoccupied with fresh measures for preserving internal order against the threat of revolution. A series of newspapers was banned even before the Hambacher Fest of 1832 led to the notorious Six Articles of the same year. In 1833 the comic opera attempt to overthrow the *Bundesversammlung* itself, known as the *Frankfurter Wachsturm* or *Attentat*, led to a prolonged occupation of the city by federal troops. A new Central Investigation Authority was established by the *Bundesversammlung* the same year, and in 1834, following fresh conferences in Vienna, a long series of Secret Articles sought to strengthen the censorship, check constitutionalism, and bar the way to revolution.

The early 1840's were less active. And in 1848 the *Bundesversammlung* attempted to crest the revolution, just as sixty-nine years later did the conservative Third Duma in St. Petersburg, and with hardly more conspicuous success. Now 'épurated' in the reverse sense of 1823-24, the representatives took their instructions from the victorious bourgeois governments in the individual states. In one of its rare *Plenum* sessions, on July 12, the *Bundesversammlung* formally handed over power to the new Provisional Authority, and was elbowed out of the way by the Parliament meeting in the Paulskirche.²²

The failure of the revolution saw the *Bund* reconstituted on pretty much the original basis. This was neither the intention nor the first choice

²² *Protokolle, Plenar-Versammlung*, 12 July, 1848, 755-57.

of Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, the new eighteen year-old Emperor's leading minister. Schwarzenberg rather looked for incorporating all of a reconstructed Austrian state into a great 'Empire of seventy millions'; but after the humiliation of Prussia at Olmütz in 1850 and the failure of the Dresden conferences, he realized that there was nothing to do but to return to the old, 'torn, threadbare coat.' 'In my opinion,' he wrote at the time, 'the old Diet is a cumbersome, outworn instrument, totally unadapted to present circumstances. I think that, at the first shock, from within or without, the shaky structure will collapse altogether.'²³ But he was unduly pessimistic. It took repeated blows over the next decade and a half — his own sudden death two years later, the shattering of the conservative position in eastern Europe through the conflicts of 1854, 1859, 1864, and the undermining of the Habsburgs through the economic power of the Zollverein and the political power of Prussia's leadership of the national movement — to set the stage for the decisive vote on mobilization against Prussia on June 14, 1866, and the subsequent destruction of the *Bund* on the Bohemian battlefields.

W. H. Dawson once wrote of 'the dreary, uninspiring, unheroic annals of the Deutscher Bund.'²⁴ Undeniably its history is one of failure. Success seems to have come, and temporary and transitory at that, against the threat, real or imagined, of revolution or subversion. This defence was in accordance with one of the *Bund's* essential aims.²⁵ Paradoxically, the time and attention devoted to it served to strengthen the central power of the *Bund*. As Metternich had predicted to Gentz before the Karlsbad conferences, 'Now every German prince, even if . . . he dislikes the *Bund*, will find in the Bund the strength which he lacked in himself.'²⁶ Moreover, his *tour de force* in securing unanimous (if unconstitutional) approval of the Karlsbad Decrees shocked particularist opinion in many states into an unwitting defence of constitutionalism. In consequence the Vienna Ministerial Conferences the following year saw Metternich overflowing with declarations of loyalty to the *Bund*.²⁷ And it proved impossible to water down even the 'vague prophecy' of constitutional development implied in Article XIII by an 'authoritative interpretation' in the ultra-conservative sense advocated by Gentz. As a result the constitutions already granted, some of which had been taken under an unprecedented federal guarantee, survived without federal interference. After 1830 the trend towards constitutional government persisted, despite the reaction.²⁸

²³ Cited in H. Friedjung, *The Struggle for Supremacy in Germany, 1859-1866*. Tr. A. J. P. Taylor and W. L. McElwee. (London 1935), 4.

²⁴ *Treitschke's History of Germany*, I, Introduction, vi.

²⁵ Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, I, 596.

²⁶ *Memoirs of Prince Metternich 1815-1829*, (London, 1881), III, 278.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 347-56; L. K. Aegidi, *Die Schlussakte der Wiener Ministerial Konferenzen*, II, 6; *Treitschke's History of Germany*, III, 303-11.

²⁸ See the summary table in Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, I, 656-57.

To meet its limited aim of ensuring 'the external and internal security of Germany and the independence and inviolability of the individual states,' the *Bund* wrangled long over the details of the military organization required to discharge these twin tasks. Eventually, five strong points — Mainz, Luxemburg, Landau, Ulm, and Rastatt were garrisoned, provisioned and maintained as federal fortresses, and in 1821-22 the *Bundesversammlung* succeeded in reaching agreement on a military constitution. This provided for a *Kontingentheer* of 300,000 men, with each state contributing men and money in proportion to its population. Austria, Prussia and Bavaria provided a total of seven army corps. The remaining three were mixed, made up of contingents which ranged upwards from Liechtenstein's legion of 55 men. In case of war the commander-in-chief was to be elected by the *Bundesversammlung*.²⁹ From start to finish military affairs were an important item on the *Bund's* agenda, often as routine housekeeping chores. Real rights existed, and in view of the individual states' determination to preserve them, they had to be respected and taken into account in the formulation and execution of general policies. The military organization of the *Bund*, despite its idiosyncracies and inadequacies, was a real attempt to face up to this situation. In an age of controversy over NATO infrastructure and with our experience of 'alliance armies', we may be disposed to extend a certain sympathy and understanding to the *Bund's* military planners.

If the military discussions led only to this complicated and, mercifully, untried, arrangement, the development of a permanent federal jurisdiction which was defeated at Vienna was watered down subsequently to what Treitschke says bore 'the stamp of the loosest federalism.'³⁰ Nevertheless, even he regarded it as a distinct advance that by the *Austrägal-Ordnung* approved by the *Bundesversammlung* in 1817, conflicts between states were first to be mediated by the *Bundesversammlung* itself, and then referred to the supreme court of one of the states.³¹ Seventeen years later a true federal court was established, consisting of a panel of 34 arbitrators available to arbitrate constitutional disputes within individual states. But the very complicated procedure involved was in fact never used.³² Of greater practical significance were the measures worked out in 1820 and subsequently for the intervention of federal forces, i.e., those of a state or states acting in the name of the *Bund* either to restore order in a state threatened by unconstitutional powers (Federal Intervention) as in Luxemburg in 1830-39 or in

²⁹ The texts of the *Grundzüge* and the *Nähere Bestimmungen der Kriegsverfassungen* of 9 April 1821 and 12 April and 11 July 1822 are now conveniently found in Huber, *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, I, 108-16.

³⁰ Treitschke's *History of Germany*, II, 441.

³¹ Text in Huber, *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, I, 103-5.

³² Text in von Meyer, *Corpus Juris Confœderationis Germaniæ*, II, 3, 6-20; Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, I, 616-18.

Frankfurt in 1833; or to compel a recalcitrant state to fulfil its federal obligations (Federal Execution) as in the case of Braunschweig in 1829-30 or Frankfurt in 1834.

Perhaps the most striking failure of the *Bund*, and what, according to Treitschke, made manifest 'the hopeless futility of the Bundestag', was its inability to abolish or at least minimize the multiplicity of customs barriers which, as early as the fourteenth century, were referred to by an Englishman as *miram Germanorum insaniam*.³³ When the effects of the great famine of 1816 were prolonged, Württemberg appealed for the removal of restrictions on exports of foodstuffs; but this was shipwrecked on the shoals of individual sovereignty, and the country was rescued only by the bountiful harvest of 1817. Subsequent discussions on economic arrangements as foreseen in Article XIX of the *Bundesakte* were barren of result, and the way was left open for Prussia to solve the problem outside the *Bund* and inevitably against it.

In the spring of 1861, ten years after the *Bund* had been revived on Austrian initiative and the year before Bismarck was summoned to Berlin to head the Prussian government, Treitschke went to Munich, intending to write a history of the *Bund* which should be 'completely unrestrained, to show those lazy fools that we lack the very foundation of all political existence — law, power, and freedom — and that there is no salvation but through the destruction of the small German states.'³⁴ When he returned to Leipzig in December, hating Munich and disappointed in his progress (the first volume of what became his *History of Germany* did not appear until sixteen years later), he aimed to make his teaching as well as his writing reveal the shameful weakness of the Confederation. Throughout the early volumes he poured out his scorn on the *Bund* as 'a legalization of particularism.' 'Never,' he wrote of the Congress of Vienna, 'had the destiny of a great nation been played with in a more frivolous manner.' The *Bundesakte* was 'the most unworthy constitution which was ever imposed upon a great nation by workers of its own blood,' 'a gigantic fraud'. The *Bundesversammlung* was 'nothing more than an Austrian provincial board.'³⁵

These criticisms, pungently expressed in a work of great literary merit which was subsequently translated into English, have done much to shape the view of the *Bund* in German and English historical writing. The core of Treitschke's theme lay in the fact that all questions were treated and resolved in the light of their impact on the course of the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. Yet, as his most recent

³³ W. O. Henderson, *The Zollverein*, (2nd. ed., London, 1959), 21.

³⁴ Andreas Dorpalen, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, (New Haven, 1957), 66.

³⁵ *Treitschke's History of Germany*, II, 122, 132, 418, 401.

biographer has shrewdly pointed out, his analysis of the Confederation suffered from 'a basic misconception.'

It had not been set up [Andreas Dorpalen writes] to pursue a positive 'German' national policy, as Treitschke himself repeatedly conceded; the interests of all its member states militated against the creation of a German nation state and so did the Austri-Prussian dualism. Rather, Metternich and his co-founders envisaged a loose organization of sovereign states whose primary task it would be to reconcile or balance conflicting interests... Yet Treitschke's examination of the Confederation sought to show how miserably that body had failed in pursuing a German policy.³⁶

The Austrian President of the *Bundesversammlung*, Count Buol, made this clear in his statement at the first working session on November 11, 1816. The *Bund*, he declared, was not a *Bundesstaat* (federal state) but a *Staatenbund* (a federation of states).³⁷ Wilhelm von Humboldt, who with Hardenberg represented Prussia at Vienna and was briefly Prussian representative at Frankfurt, also recognized that German unity could only be federal in basis. Moreover, as Austrian policy inclined to a looser federalism, Prussian towards a stronger central organization, only some combination of the two was possible. In a famous memorandum of September 30, 1816, he regretted that it had not been possible to do more at Vienna, but saw in the *Bund* a *Staatenbund* with *Bundesstaat* elements. Prussia, he thought, could use the *Staatenbund* as a means towards achieving a tighter federalism, a stronger central authority. In the situation of 1814-15, he wrote realistically, 'it was impossible to do nothing, and impossible to do what was right. What could be achieved between these two extreme positions — this was the true definition of the German Confederation.'³⁸

Nor was Humboldt alone in his belief that the way was still open to strengthen the federalism envisaged in the *Bundesakte*. Despite the absurd complications which kept the representatives of the *Bundesversammlung* idle in Frankfurt for more than a year before it met, hopes ran high and survived the opening sessions in the autumn of 1816. Early in March, 1817, the British representative reported home

The Confederation promises to arrive at a freedom of action, and a consistency, which I, at least, did not expect, and in that case it will develop such a force as to be by far the most powerful political body in Europe, and so situated as to interpose between all the great Powers and to become the chief guarantee of the Peace of the Continent. You will be surprised at the amount of its force when it comes to be stated...³⁹

³⁶ Dorpalen, *Treitschke*, 257-58.

³⁷ *Protokolle*, 11 November 1816, 36f.

³⁸ *Gesammelte Schriften*, XII, (Berlin, 1904), 53-114, and especially 80. Partly quoted in Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, I, 562-63.

³⁹ Lamb to Hamilton, Private, 5 March 1817, *FO 30/10*.

Perhaps Lamb was gifted with less prescience than Sir Charles Webster has suggested.⁴⁰ But it seems clear that the possibility of constructive development was not foreclosed at Vienna.

The *Bund*, as Humboldt had seen, was the consequence of the interaction of political forces which could neither be completely swept aside nor completely satisfied. By the *Bundesakte* it had been assigned a strictly limited aim: the preservation of the internal and external security and inviolability of the *Bund* and its constituent states. This aim it may in fairness be said to have discharged for half a century. Its competence was early shown to be adequate to this task and beyond.⁴¹ Without altering the basic federal structure it could have done more towards securing freer trade, freedom of movement, more efficient judicial organization and so on. But on all of these the causes of failure were political, not constitutional. The attempt to secure the elemental right of freedom of movement, as foreseen in Article XVIII, provides an illuminating example. When the question was raised in an early sitting of the *Bundesversammlung* it quickly emerged that freedom to change one's domicile was linked with the discharging of the obligation to military service. A proposal for a uniform 'portable' service to twenty-seven years, on the grounds that service anywhere involved 'no weakening of the defences of the Fatherland,' failed in view of the more rigid implementation of military obligations in some states than in others. 'What a demand,' commented Treitschke, 'to make of Prussia!'⁴²

In view of its basic aim the military organization of the *Bund* was critical and Treitschke was correct in referring to it as "the nearest and most important of its duties."⁴³ It was not surprising that the small committee established to consider the order of business of the *Bundesversammlung* should set the regulation of military affairs '*vor Allem*.' But there was no suggestion that the *Bund* should attempt to rival other European powers. Indeed, much to the disgust of writers such as Ilse and Treitschke, the report assumed an almost apologetic tone.

It was the essential nature of the *Bund* [it declared] not to seek a leading position in the European states system, but rather to take up a defensive position with dignity and force, so that Germany could never again become a general battleground for Europe.⁴⁴

The *Bund* was thus seen as a '*Shutz und Trutz Bundnis*', a league that would 'inflict no injuries, yet tolerate none.' Moreover, by Article XXXV

⁴⁰ C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822* (London, 1925), 41.

⁴¹ Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, I, 597-98.

⁴² Ilse, *Geschichte der deutschen Bundesversammlung*, I, 163-82; Treitschke's *History of Germany*, II, 442-43.

⁴³ Treitschke's *History of Germany*, II, 425.

⁴⁴ *Protokolle*, 17 February 1817, 59-60, 67-87. Treitschke mistakenly refers to this as the first report of the Military Committee which was not appointed until later. Ilse describes the report as a '*Hauptfehler*'. *Geschichte der deutsche Bundesversammlung*, I, 225.

of the Final Act of Vienna (1820) it was forbidden any but a defensive war, and by Article XXXVII the individual states were forbidden a war in which '*das Recht nicht zur Seite steht*.' Since 1820, then, as Huber concludes, 'there was a binding prohibition on an offensive war alike for the *Bund* and for its member states.'⁴⁵ The only federal war in the entire period of its existence was the war against Denmark in 1848. Despite their explosive nature, neither the revaluations of 1830 nor those of 1848 resulted in a general conflict. The *Bund* stood aside from the Crimean clash. The Franco-Austrian war of 1859 saw a corps of observation mounted on the Rhine, but the conflict did not spread north of the Alps. It is indeed difficult to escape the conclusion that an independent war policy was for the *Bund* an impossibility. So long as the two European powers which it comprised were in agreement the *Bund* was the guardian of European peace which Frederick Lamb had predicted, though hardly in the manner which he had anticipated.

It is this tranquilizing role of the *Bund*, in large measure deriving from its very powerlessness, which provides a final justification for a re-examination of its role in nineteenth century Europe. In a famous essay written in 1816 the Göttingen historian A. H. L. Heeren wrote that the preservation of the loose federative character of Germany was in the highest interests of both Germany and Europe. With astonishing perception he foresaw that a centralized Germany, owing to its situation and resources, would not long resist the temptation to strive for European hegemony.⁴⁶ Heeren's analysis was not entirely original. Over a century earlier, in his *Paix Perpetuelle*, the Abbé de Saint Pierre had noted that

One of the best props of the European system... was the block of German nations lying almost in the centre of Europe, which holds the other parts in check and serves perhaps to safeguard its neighbours still more than its members; a body formidable to foreigners from its size and from the numbers and valour of its people, but useful to all by its constitution which, depriving it of both the means and the will to conquer, makes it a rock on which all conquest splits. In spite of its defects it is certain that so long as the Empire preserves this constitution, the balance of power in Europe will never be broken... Thus the legal system which the Germans study with such care is even more important than they think. It is not only the common law of Germany, but in certain respects it is that of all Europe.⁴⁷

After the destruction of the *Bund* in 1866 there were few who stood aside from the prevailing nationalist hysteria and recalled that the system which the Abbé had praised was now in ruins, and that the dangers to which Heeren had pointed were now very real. In a sober *Memorandum on Peace* which he submitted to the Hohenzollerns in the hour of

⁴⁵ Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, I, 606-7.

⁴⁶ A. H. L. Heeren, 'Die Deutschen Bund in seine Verhältnis zu den Europäische Staatensystem bei Eröffnung des Bundestages,' in *Historische Werke*, II, (Göttingen, 1821), 423, cited in Wilhelm Röpke, *The German Question*, (London, 1946) 152.

⁴⁷ *A Project of Perpetual Peace: Rousseau's Edition of the Essay*, (London, 1927), 33-35.

Prussian's triumph, and which his widow published posthumously, the historian Georg Gottfried Gervinus wrote that

Since the seventeenth century it has been a principle of European policy that the organization of the Germanies must be federal; the German Confederation has been created for the very purpose of forming in the center of Europe a neutral state which would by its federal organization guarantee peace. By the disruption of the Confederation in 1866, two-thirds of German territory has been transformed into a warrior state ever ready for aggression, in which one can see, without being an enemy of Prussia and Germany, a permanent threat to the peace of the continent and to the security of the neighbouring states.⁴⁸

To speak favourably of German federalism before 1919 is to advocate the cause of the often absurd small dynastic states. The system may have lacked the nature of a creed which led James Madison to describe the American variety as 'the best guardian... of liberty, safety and happiness of man.'⁴⁹ But the evidence seems to suggest that it fulfilled a severely practical, and somewhat analogous, function.

Whether it would have been impossible to establish a great supranational coalition, as Konstantin Frantz and a handful of other opponents of Bismarck wished, is a separate question. Yet it is worth noting in passing that no less an authority than Franz Schnabel has argued that there was a good basis for it in the conditions existing in mid-nineteenth century Europe. In the mid-twentieth century we are more apt to be impressed with the possibility than were liberal national historians of a generation or two ago. But at least it is open to us to question whether German political and intellectual leadership of the second half of the nineteenth century was not so obsessed with the virtues of the national state as largely to ignore the dangers inherent in transferring its dynamics from the periphery to the crowded centre of Europe. And consequently there is perhaps some justification for a fresh look at the German *Bund* to see if it is not in fact something more than Dawson's 'organized disunion,' Arnold Brecht's 'a makeshift, a stopgap,' Flenley's 'the sterilized child of particularism,' or Treitschke's 'the interment of the corpse of German unity.' In short, to see it less from the standpoint of unity *manqué*, and more as a constitutional framework, far from perfect as the Abbé de Saint Pierre had noted of the Empire, kept in check by Metternich, yet still capable of constructive development even after 1848 when, as Franz Schnabel has suggested, it was still too soon to assume that the reorganization of central Europe on a national basis had been decided. In any event, to see that it represented an attempt to prolong into the nineteenth century lessons learned in a previous age, until it was overwhelmed by dynamic forces which it sought, and failed, to contain.

⁴⁸ Cited in Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, (New York, 1960), 170.

⁴⁹ *The Writings of James Madison*, (New York, 1910). X, 68. Cited in Arnold Brecht, *Federalism and Regionalism in Germany, The Division of Prussia*, (New York, 1945), 3.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND THE HISTORIAN

R. H. McNEAL
McMaster University

However, one defines that protean term "philosophy of history", it is amply clear, I think, that this subject has been developing at a remarkable rate in recent years. Its general attraction is demonstrated by the imposing number of paperback books that have appeared lately, published by market-wise firms. Its status as a recognized academic specialty is indicated by a substantial number of monographs and by the establishment in 1960 of the journal *History and Theory*, edited by an imposing board of philosophers and historians. And even without statistical data I feel safe in saying that an increasing number of universities are offering and sometimes requiring various courses in this field. The importance of this development seems to me to transcend the proliferation of intellectual specialties that one finds on every side today. It is an implicit or explicit challenge to the great majority of professional historians who normally tend to avoid philosophical commitment or to limit their interest to the more technical side of historical craftsmanship. The historians seem to be not so much divided into contending schools as they are inwardly divided as individuals in their confrontation of this challenge. Increasingly we are ready to recognize that philosophy of history is an important subject, even one that every graduate student in history must study; at the same time a distaste for metaphysics remains, and I think that there is a tendency in the required philosophy of history courses to review the best known schools of the past with a view to dismissing them, so that one may get down to research, content that one is not troubled with the abstractions so dear to St. Augustine, Vico, Hegel, Comte, Croce and Toynbee. At least I do not think that historians are teaching their students to accept any of these philosophies as acceptable theoretical foundations for the working historian. To some extent I agree with such an approach. The bland optimism of Comte's conception of scientific history does not seem justifiable in the twentieth century, and Hegel's Idea and Dialectic do not strike us as relevant to our time. The case of Marxism is superficially different. A vast and wealthy academic establishment produces tons of what purports to be Marxist historical writing, and is at best very fine research. But this exercise in applied philosophy seems to suffer more from its dogmatic assumptions than it gains from any dialectical materialist insight. The unhelpfulness of Marxian philosophy in historical practice is perhaps best illustrated by the inability of Soviet historians to agree readily on the periodization

of Russian history, even though dialectical materialism asserts that the revolutionary transition from one era to another is scientifically demonstrable. Worse still is the inertness of Marxist philosophical thought with reference to history. Plekhanov's book *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895) is probably the last Marxist study of the philosophy of history published in Russia that has any reputation as philosophy. Even though the present generation of Soviet historians and philosophers has escaped the dead hand of Stalin's turgid essay "Dialectical and Historical Materialism", they have published almost no philosophy of history. If there is any sign of revival it is I. S. Kon's book *Philosophical Idealism and the Crisis of Bourgeois Historical Thought* (1959), which is a well-informed critique of such writers as Dilthey, Spengler, Croce and Collingwood. However, no counter-blast could be written about "the crisis of Marxist historical thought" simply because it is impossible for an intellectually moribund movement to experience a crisis.

Whatever the present status of the various philosophies of history of previous generations, I should suggest that there are three tendencies or schools in contemporary philosophy of history that are very much alive and deserve the attention of historians who conceive their profession as a branch of humanistic learning and not only as a craft or technique. One of these schools, which is often called metahistorical, includes an increasing number of writers, of whom Toynbee remains the best known. Partly because these writers deal in specific historical detail and partly because they explicitly challenge the ordinary academic historian, they have received a goodly share of attention, mostly negative. I am inclined to agree with the consensus that we have yet to see the metahistorical work that can satisfy the historian in terms of its general conceptions and its analysis of particular epochs. However, it is my impression that we have not given enough attention to the epistemological problem that the contemporary metahistorians raise. Do we really rest our case along the lines of H. A. L. Fisher's oft-quoted manifesto describing history as "one emergency following another"? If so, is even his narrative *History of Europe* a logical possibility? If not, how far are we to attempt to go?

In the light of this question one may suggest that our interest in Toynbee should not be so much in his main arguments as in the methodological questions that are suggested in his twelfth volume, *Reconsiderations*. Granting "the inadequacy of our means of thought", which Toynbee discusses, and granting the great problem of mastering oceans of data, which Toynbee approached in an individual, unmechanized way that might have been expected to endear him to historians, it seems clear to me that one cannot ignore his brief on "the need for simultaneous cultivation of panoramic and myopic vision" in history. Surely we do

not want to continue the Malthusian output of monographs without some hope that this knowledge can be synthesized sometime on a panoramic level. At the same time it would appear that it is becoming increasingly difficult to prepare a satisfactory panoramic synthesis; the *New Cambridge Modern History* is less well received than Lord Acton's edition, and such multi-volume general surveys as the University of Michigan or the Soviet Academy of Sciences histories of the world seem to be pretty pedestrian summations. Probably Toynbee's warnings on the limitations of the committee approach to intellectual endeavor are relevant to these signs of weakness but can we hope that individual scholars are physically capable of tackling the continually-increasing body of knowledge?

In sum, it seems to me that the field of metahistory cannot be dismissed as erroneous on *a priori* grounds or irrelevant to the work of the ordinary historian. It would be sad to think that the practicing historians are doomed to become less and less competent to deal with universal history while the latter field increasingly drifts off into other hands. Before this goes very much further I should think that historians would want to reconsider what level of generalization their mode of thought can support and what practical aids, beyond the four-by-six file card, may be available to assist historians in dealing with the deluge of data that threatens to drown panoramic thinking.

This is to suggest that the importance of Toynbee lies not in his interpretation of the historic influence of the seas in Holland or the soil in New England but in the challenge that he has issued to reconsider the potentialities of historical thought. Such a suggestion leads toward the second contemporary school of philosophy of history to which I should like to call attention, the critical philosophy of history. Although a number of eminent practicing historians, such as Marc Bloch, Carl Becker, E. H. Carr and Allen Nevins, have commented on the nature of historical thought from the point of view of the historian, and have received considerable attention from their colleagues, the present generation of critical philosophers of history has been substantially ignored by historians. In my opinion this is unfortunate, for the critical philosophers of history bring to the analysis of historical thought a discipline in which few historians are skilled. The possibilities for fruitful collaboration of the historian and the critical philosopher of history seem especially promising because the historian will not find these philosophers condescending, in the manner of Comte or Toynbee, because the ordinary historian has not quickly unravelled the inner mysteries of the ages.

As a start, communications should be improved between historians and the critical philosophers of history. For example, historians could read with interest Professor Dray's book *Laws and Explanation in History*, attempting to decide whether or not they depend in their own work on

something like a "covering law model", as Professor Dray calls it. According to him this theory maintains that historical "explanation is achieved by subsuming what is to be explained under a general law", and on the basis of extended analysis he concludes that such a model ought to be abandoned. In a way this is very easy advice for most historians because they have paid little or no attention to this theory or the considerable philosophical combat that has been going on around it for some years. On the other hand, it seems to me that a number of practicing historians might, upon reflection, say that much of their explanatory writing does rest on some kind of generalization — perhaps some assumption about human nature — which might be called a covering law. At any rate, neither the critical philosophers of history nor the historians themselves seem to have attempted any kind of extended pragmatic inquiry into the matter.

In general I am somewhat puzzled that such philosophers of history as Dray, Gardiner, Hempel, Nagel, Walsh, and White seem to be so non-pragmatic in their approach to the analysis of historical thought. One can read pretty long stretches in this literature without seeing much evidence that these writers have read any history; on the whole they are inclined to illustrate their points with artificial verbal examples or abstract symbols rather than reference to historical writing. Undoubtedly these scholars really have read history and undoubtedly they do need to have recourse to symbolic logic, but I would suggest that they have been arguing with one another too much and with historians too little. One unfortunate result of this isolation seems to be the assumption that history is necessarily a single mode of thought. Even if there are some common denominators applicable to the method of all historians, I should think it quite likely that there are other methodological peculiarities within the various species and levels of historical thought. At any rate I doubt that there has yet been any adequate investigation of the assumption that historical thought is all of a piece and would suggest that a more pragmatic approach to this particular question is especially needed.

Quite a different sort of problem is posed by the contemporary Christian theological philosophers of history, which I should consider the third active school in contemporary philosophy of history. The least that can be said of this school is that it is engaged in vigorous discussion, showing far more vitality than any other traditional school of speculative philosophy of history, certainly more than contemporary Marxism. Naturally such diverse writers as Nicholas Berdiaev, Father D'Arcy, Christopher Dawson, Mircea Eliade, Jacques Maritain, Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich do not present a single point of view, but I think that it is safe to say that they all raise, explicitly or implicitly, the same basic question: "Is the prevailing academic approach to history compatible with Christianity?" In varying degrees they offer a negative verdict, which should

be an important consideration for historians who are adherents of some variety of traditional Christianity. Perhaps it is not too crude a summary of the Christian theological philosophers of history to say that they deplore the unwillingness of contemporary historians to find any divine significance in the past. Mircea Eliade, whose *Cosmos and History* is to my mind the most penetrating contribution to this branch of the philosophy of history, makes an interesting case for the view that it is humanly untenable to go on writing history from what amounts to an agnostic point of view, which he considers inadequate before "the terror of history". At the same time it appears to me that most of these writers are rather hesitant to state clearly the more positive side of their case, the need for Christian philosophers to reinstate some kind of providential view of history. Since the time of Voltaire, the secular view of history has triumphed to such a degree in professional circles that few persons today are willing to reassert the providential view in plain language. But it is hard to see how one can accept traditional Christianity without a providential view of history in some fairly literal sense, for history is the study of the life of man. If the historian says that he is unable to perceive with any sense of certainty the hand of God in the life of man, he would seem to be accepting a deist or agnostic assumption. Or if he attempts to segregate matters of faith and matters of reason, asserting that the study of history is relevant only to the latter category, it seems to me that the historian is coming very close to admitting that faith and reason are not mutually consistent, which is contrary to at least a great part of the Christian intellectual tradition. Surely it is far more plausible to maintain that natural science does not bear directly on Christianity than to maintain that history does not, for history, more than the natural sciences, is intimately involved in the study of man as a human being in much more than a biological sense. This opinion is accepted by Herbert Butterfield, one of the few Christian philosophers of history whose writing does not suffer from lack of familiarity with historical literature. His book *Christianity and History* at least deserves respect for having faced the problem of providentialism, but to my mind Butterfield's solution to this problem only provides a particularly painful demonstration of the dilemma of the Christian historian, especially when he cites the defeat of Germany in 1918 as evidence of God's hand in history.

In sum, I think that the present trend in favor of philosophy of history is justified and desirable, but in need of closer ties to history itself. The development of scholars who are competent to a fair degree in both history and philosophy seems to be the most pressing need; I am thinking not only of my teaching schedule when I suggest that such scholars should relieve amateurs like myself who, in history programs, seem to be doing most of the philosophy of history teaching at present. In other words, I should like to see philosophy of history a basic requirement in graduate programs in history and I should like to see it taught

by persons whose specific competence to handle the subject is as definite as the competence now expected in let us say Canadian or English history. Moreover, I should like to see a good proportion of the weight of this teaching placed on the major problems of the past seventy-five years or so rather than on the earlier classics. The latter certainly deserve their place in the general history of ideas, but it seems to me that the contemporary problems are most relevant to the task that has become basic in this realm: to persuade the historian to look up from his documents and recall that history is not only a series of specialties but also a branch of humanistic learning.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND THE HISTORIAN

W. H. DRAY

University of Toronto

Professor McNeal's paper calls our attention to a crucial point for any useful discussion of the question posed for this colloquium: that the term "philosophy of history" is commonly used to refer to very different sorts of intellectual constructions. McNeal himself would distinguish between *metahistorical*, *theological* and *critical* enquiries about history, and I take it that he has invited — if not, indeed, incited — me to say something further about the approach of the so-called "critical" school. This I shall be glad to do, not only because it is something which has especially interested me, but also because, as McNeal has implied, it is the approach which will probably be the least familiar to this audience. I should like, too, at the end, to hazard a few remarks — as much as I dare — about what I think should be the historian's interest in critical philosophy of history, leaving to Professor McDougall the task of commenting on what has been said about McNeal's other "live" school. But first I should like to say something about the threefold division itself, as our first contributor has presented it, since our understanding of it is bound to provide landmarks for the discussion that is to follow.

Let me begin with the contrast that is drawn between the *metahistorical* and the *theological*. I must confess that the term "metahistorian" has always bothered me a little. It is, of course, a technical term devised by historians themselves — at least in part for the purpose of abusing each other; and I do not want to suggest for a moment that historians are not free to make it mean whatever they please. As I generally find the term used, however, it seems to denote an historian who rises above the specialized, piecemeal enquiries of his more cautious colleagues, and takes the whole of the human past as his subject. What he seeks to discover is *the pattern of that whole*. Now there are, of course, many professional historians who will say that this simply cannot be done: the scale of such metahistorical operations is too vast; the demands upon the learning of the enquirer too heavy. It is no part of my present concern to challenge such a view — still less to dispute Professor McNeal's more moderate conclusion that the job has at least never yet been done satisfactorily. What I do want to point out is that a metahistorian, so described, even if he succeeded, would not be doing *philosophy* at all, in any ordinary sense. For he would be asking himself exactly the same sort of questions about the whole that the more usual historian asks about a selected part; and he would be seeking answers, so far as he

could, by ordinary historical methods. Professor McNeal, I notice, in urging historians not to neglect such enquiries, seems to accept the identification of "metahistory" with "universal history". But that is exactly my point; universal history is *history*.

The contrast between the metahistorical approach, so understood, and the approach of McNeal's theological school is sharp — perhaps sharper than he made it appear. For a theological philosopher of history is not, except accidentally or derivatively, an historian. His aim is not to discover "what happened", even at the most general and comprehensive level of description. It is rather to discern *the meaning of it all* — to evaluate the historical process as a whole, in the way the pure philosopher evaluates reality as a whole, and by so doing to understand, if possible, the place of that process in the general scheme of things. Some so-called metahistorians — Toynbee, for example — have certainly ventured into this rarefied region. But if the distinction Professor McNeal has drawn is to promote clear thinking about the value of various "approaches", I think we should be prepared to say that insofar as they do this, they cease to be mere metahistorians; they join forces with theological philosophers of history. When Toynbee, for example, tells us that history consists of the careers of thirty-odd interconnected civilizations, and that mankind has achieved increasing spiritual insight through the experience of their rise and fall, he speaks as a metahistorian. But when he draws the further conclusion that the *purpose* of the rise and fall of civilizations is to bring man gradually to a knowledge of God through suffering, he rises to issues of a different order. He gives a religious interpretation of what, as metahistorian, he has discovered.

It should perhaps be added that, from the standpoint of the distinction between enquiries into *pattern* and enquiries into *meaning*, there is no important difference between theological philosophy of history and those approaches to history taken by the great metaphysicians, which McNeal rightly regards as now somewhat out of fashion. The chief difference is that the metaphysicians find their answers in the deliverances of speculative reason; the theologians in the affirmations of religious faith. For a Hegel history is meaningful because it displays the dialectical self-development of the World Spirit in time; for a Butterfield because we can see in it everywhere the workings of the providence of God. Clearly both theological and metaphysical philosophers of history ask questions and give answers which transcend the verificatory powers of professional historians altogether. The metahistorian, by contrast, goes beyond the pale of professional history only in the scope of his interests and the rashness of his judgments.

What I have said so far has been intended to clarify the notion of "metahistory" by pushing to its logical conclusion what I take to be the basis of its distinction from theological and metaphysical philosophy

of history. I should now like to try to sharpen our conception of the metaphysico-theological sort of enquiry itself by distinguishing it, in turn, from something else which is often called philosophy of history, and which I think Professor McNeal may have had in mind at certain points. For want of a better name I shall call this *theory of history*, since it aims at a general account of the nature of historical change. In particular, it seeks to elaborate *theories of causation*, which lay bare, as it were, the *mechanism* of history. The Marxist philosophy of history, McNeal would claim, has been tested by countless historians as a "working hypothesis", and found to be inadequate. What he means by "philosophy of history" here, I should think, is almost certainly not Marx's metaphysical beliefs — although it is usually argued that he had them; for these are not the kind of thing we could sensibly expect historians to test. Nor is it likely to be the strictly metahistorical conclusions Marx drew — the contention, for example, that all history can be organized as a five-stage progress from primitive communism to socialism. What most of us would think of in this connection is rather Marx's theory of the causal primacy of substructural factors — a species of economic determinism. And such a theory is philosophical, it should be noticed, in neither the metahistorical nor the metaphysico-theological senses; it is concerned with neither pattern nor meaning. Indeed, if such theories warrant the designation "philosophy" in any sense, I suggest that it can be only in the now archaic one in which theoretical physics was once called "natural philosophy" — the philosophy of any domain being, in this sense, simply its most theoretical part. What is important, of course, is not settling the purely semantic issue; what is important is our recognizing the distinctiveness of the questions raised by what I am calling theory of history. The attempt to answer such questions is neither history nor philosophy, as we ordinarily understand those terms; it is part of a generalizing science, and its success should presumably be judged by the standards appropriate to such a science.

The three kinds of enquiry I have so far considered have one important feature in common: they are all concerned with history as the actual course of events. All aim to say something true about that process itself; either that it has a certain *pattern*, a certain *meaning*, or a certain *mechanism*. What distinguishes the *critical* philosophy of history from all of these, as Professor McNeal has indicated, is its not being concerned with the historical *process* at all, but rather with the historian's study of it. The critical philosopher's subject matter is not events, but enquiry or knowledge. His interest in history is logical and epistemological.

The best known work in this field in English is, I should imagine, R. G. Collingwood's *The Idea of History*. In this work, it is Collingwood's aim to show both what makes historical knowledge *historical*, by contrast, for example, with scientific, perceptual or artistic — and what makes it

knowledge, by contrast with mere opinion or unwarranted belief. And he traces the gradual recognition of historical knowledge as both genuine and peculiar in the consciousness of Western man from Herodotus to the present day. What makes Collingwood a critical philosopher of history is not, of course, his doctrines, which might be characterized as idealist and anti-naturalistic — some might even say “anti-scientific”. What makes him a critical philosopher is his interest in analyzing the nature of historical thinking. This interest, although not his conclusions, he shares with many contemporary positivists and logicians, who usually come to the study of history from investigations of the natural sciences. Unlike Collingwood, these latter tend to claim that there is nothing distinctive about historical enquiry, apart from a lamentable theoretical backwardness, and a dearth of really strong arguments for most of its conclusions — these of course, being features of its *practice* rather than its *idea*. According to most positivists, history is, in idea or concept, the application of our general knowledge of society — ideally, the laws of the social sciences — to the problems of determining and explaining the course of past events. Of these two contending groups, it seems to me that the positivists are to be admired for their logical techniques and their clarity of expression, while the idealists seem the more sensitive to what historians actually do. What the latter, unfortunately, seldom offer, is any precise logical characterization of what makes history a peculiar — Collingwood would say “autonomous” — discipline.

In recent years, the most significant development in critical philosophy of history has been the attempt by philosophers of both persuasions to get down to the *details* of such precise logical characterization. There has been a “shredding” of the general problem of the idea of history, and much vigorous debate on such matters as the sense in which historians aim at explanation, the meaning of causal judgments when human action is involved, what is contained in the notions of historical fact and interpretation, the sense (if any) in which it is proper to expect “objectivity” of an historian, and the relation between the claims historians make about individuals, on the one hand, and institutions, on the other. In the course of this work, the division between idealists and positivists has tended to dissolve into another one, which expresses, I think, the most serious difference of opinion among critical philosophers of history today. What is at issue is really the proper role of the philosophical analyst himself. Is it his task, out of the general resources of logical and epistemological theory, to provide basic concepts and standards valid for any rational enquiry, and then to apply these *a priori* to history as a special case? Or should he rather try to *elicit* such concepts and standards from what is already being done in the field? In other words, is it the philosopher’s job to tell the historian *what he should be doing*? Or is it his job to tell him *what he is doing* — to clarify the idea of the enquiry already implicit in his own best practice? These contrary trends within

the critical "school" might be called the *prescriptive* and *descriptive* approaches respectively. Without being able to develop, in this short statement, certain qualifications that would be needed, let me at least register my own sympathy with what I have called the "descriptive" approach.

Now it is more than a little embarrassing, having said all this, to have to admit to this audience that, to date, critical philosophy of history of neither approach has really got very far. A course in the subject at a university, for example, would at the present time be largely dependent on a rather spotty article literature, most of it having appeared over the past two decades, and a monograph or two on special problems. The bibliography contained in a recently published collection of readings entitled "Theories of History", edited by Patrick Gardiner, gives a good indication of what there is available. This much can be said for this literature: it raises fruitful questions and it is highly discussable. No one prepared to wade through it conscientiously can fail to think hard about the nature of historical enquiry. In particular, he will have to think about the conceptual apparatus historians use, both in the process of their enquiry and in the presentation of their results. And this I think you will agree is not something which professional historians are by nature especially inclined to do.

This leads me to the question that Professor McNeal really wants us to get to: the question why the Professional historian, by contrast with the professional philosopher, should pay any attention to what critical philosophers of history have been doing. Now as I have already said, I am myself deeply interested in such studies. I should like nothing better than to be able to stand here and argue that the future of historiography is at stake; that historians up to now have simply muddled along, not really knowing what they were doing; but that the future is bright because at last philosophers are making their talents available to straighten out their conceptual tangles. I am afraid that I cannot honestly say anything of the kind. The descriptive emphasis of the kind of critical philosophy I would myself advocate makes it especially difficult to defend such an extravagant claim, since it really takes as its datum what historians unreflectively do. I cannot even argue with conviction that a self-conscious grasp of what critical philosophers discover will necessarily help historians to do any better what they are already doing. The relation between theory and practice is a tricky one, and it is just as conceivable that thinking too much about what they are trying to do, rather than just doing it, may lead to a deterioration of their historical work — I simply do not know. I am myself fortunate enough to teach a fourth year class in the subject, into which only honour students in modern history are admitted. At the risk of losing my franchise, let me confess that more than one of them has told me that in the following year, due to a heightened aware-

ness of certain logical problems associated with them, they found themselves breaking into a sweat about using such simple, and just about indispensable, terms as "fact" and "cause". This was not, of course, the purpose of the course. And I cling to the hope that they were not permanently damaged by it.

My reluctance to claim any direct *practical* value for the critical analysis of historical concepts may perhaps come into sharper focus if I call your attention to still a fifth sort of enquiry which is sometimes referred to as philosophy of history — which, in this case, it is important to distinguish especially from critical philosophy of history. This is *historical methodology* — by which I mean a study of the principles, and perhaps the strategy, of historical research. Whether historical method is something that can formally be taught is, of course, a matter which historians themselves dispute; and I should be sorry if Professor McNeal's use of the words "historical method" and "methodology" in very justly chiding critical philosophers for their insensitivity to the *varieties* of history, gave the impression that these philosophers claim any special capacity in this direction. I should myself want to draw a fairly sharp distinction between the study of the *methods*, and the study of the *idea*, of history, and argue that the requirement of a practical justification for the one is not necessarily appropriate for the other. The chief justification for the conceptual sort of enquiry, I should say, is like that of most philosophy; it is of interest for its own sake. The value of critical philosophy is humanistic; it is offered simply as a contribution to the historian's own self-knowledge. It helps to give him perspective on what he is doing, helps him see its logical structure more clearly, and also its relation to other enterprises. If an historian lacks such humane curiosity about his activities, I do not think that any very convincing case for his studying critical philosophy of history can be made out.

There is, I suppose, one slightly more utilitarian argument for the study which is worth a mention. It too is really an argument for philosophical studies in general, as well as in this particular case. The argument is that philosophical reflection on what we are doing simply cannot be avoided by most of us. Historians who have never studied philosophy, or who have studied it only casually, manage nevertheless to raise questions about the nature of their enquiry for themselves — as the contents of so many presidential addresses and inaugural lectures (not to mention Toynbee's *Reconsiderations*) bear witness. Since this reflection is generally unsystematic, to say the least, it is seldom of a high order, and sometimes very bad indeed. In this very academic year I have heard eminent professional historians, in "off duty" talk about their enquiry, apparently driven by their uneasy awareness of philosophical difficulties, saying things that are patently false. I have heard it seriously claimed for example, that it is impossible to distinguish between history and propaganda. And

I have had it put to me that there is no need to raise the difficult question of what is meant by casual connection in historical writing, since historians (appearances to the contrary) never seek the cause of anything. As in many other fields, good philosophy seems to be required, if for no other reason than to drive out bad.

This brings me to my final point: the question how good philosophy of history is to be generated. I agree wholeheartedly with Professor McNeal that, up to now, far too much has been written about history by philosophers who (as he puts it) give little evidence of having read any history. If there is any significance in the fact that he makes this point immediately after mentioning a monograph of mine, I accept the implied rebuke; what I am doing now is preaching. Whether or not there is such a thing as *pure* philosophy — an independent discipline employing the faculty of reason upon the subject matter of “things in general” — is nowadays often questioned by philosophers themselves. But even if there is such a discipline, I think it is clear that critical philosophy of history, as I have tried to represent it, is no such thing. The philosophy of something is stuck with its object. Critical philosophy of history ought to be *about* historiography. Ideally, I suppose, such enquiry would be carried out by philosopher-historians like R. G. Collingwood, just as some of the best philosophy of science has been done by philosopher-physicists. In fact, however, if we really want the subject to develop, I suggest we shall have to settle for philosophers and historians working closely together — perhaps even giving joint courses in the subject, and doing joint research. The two requirements of such co-operation are as obvious as they are rare. Professor McNeal has one of them in mind when he complains that critical philosophers of history talk to each other too much and to historians too little. The other, of course, is that historians be willing to talk back — with the full realization that critical philosophy of history is philosophy, not history; and that philosophy — even what might be called “applied” philosophy — is a difficult and sometimes necessarily technical discipline.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND THE HISTORIAN

D. J. McDougall

University of Toronto

With most of what Professor McNeal has said there will, I think, be no serious disagreement. We are indebted to him, at once for his initiative in prompting this discussion, and for his clear and concise statement on a question that is, or ought to be of interest to us all. As a historian I would also express my thanks to Professor Dray for the aid he has given us in clarifying the ambiguous and somewhat confusing terminology with which the subject is surrounded, and for his judicious estimate of what the philosopher of history can hope to achieve. We are all conscious of the need of an adequate explanation of the ultimate meaning of history, or at the least, of some agreed principles by which we can test the validity of what we are trying to do; and most of us, I suppose, would agree that nothing so far offered by the historicists or the meta-historians is entirely satisfactory.

There are probably few among us who share the optimistic view of many nineteenth-century scholars that a final and complete history of man's life on earth could be written, a history that would explain all and perhaps pardon all, and that would provide mankind with an infallible guide to the road which he had travelled in the past, and which he would, or must travel in the future. History may be philosophy teaching by example, as Carlyle was so fond of proclaiming; but we are less certain than many of our predecessors about what it does teach, and less confident of our ability to reduce that teaching to a neat set of formulas by which the infinitely varied and unpredictable actions of man can be explained. Of one thing only can we be reasonably sure, that whatever wisdom history has to teach, it has had singularly little effect on the generality of mankind.

My knowledge of the literature on this subject is too uncertain to enable me to speak with much confidence on the problems that have been raised. It is, I think, only those who limit the meaning of history to little more than the purely materialist aspects of human life, or who, like Professor Carr, interpret current developments and the events which had led to them as the prelude to a sort of technological utopia operated by persons effectively indoctrinated with theories suited to their condition, who can speak of these matters with complete confidence. My own reading has been too limited and too unsystematic to provide me with anything that can with propriety be described as a philosophy of history;

but, such as it is, it does not persuade me to accept that simple interpretation of the historic record. Any ideas that I have on the subject are perhaps the result of my teaching experience, of my conviction of the necessity of some standard or scale of values by which to judge the events, and more particularly the men with whose actions I have had to deal. It probably amounts to little more than what Professor McNeal has called an assumption about human nature. Yet, on reflection, it seems to me that an assumption about human nature is one of the most useful tools in the historian's kit.

It need hardly be said that it must be tested by common sense and by what we can learn of men's actions, and of the motives which inspire them, in the present and in the past. But so tested, it is perhaps the ultimate foundation upon which most of our judgments are based. It is, I think, indispensable for an understanding of much of the material with which we have to deal: of such theories, for example, as the law of nature and natural rights, or of the endless number of reforms or panaceas, utilitarian, utopian, or pseudo-scientific, propounded in all ages for the solution of human problems. None of the great works which have influenced the course of history and our thinking about it, from Aristotle's ideas about the polis and the good life which it existed to further, to Hobbes' theories about man and society, or Bentham's notions of how best to "rear the fabric of felicity", is intelligible except on the assumption of certain ideas about human nature and what can or cannot be done with it. And it is only by reference to our own assumptions, which we hope are more than simple assumptions, that we can presume to judge the validity of these ideas.

In considering some of the more fundamental issues raised by Professor McNeal, it will be useful to begin with his definition. History is a branch of humanist learning. It is that, but I think it is rather more than that. It is, at least ideally conceived, not merely a branch, it is the essential and comprehensive foundation of all humanist learning. That is to say, it is the record of man's activities, physical, intellectual, artistic and spiritual, as a being endowed by God with reason and with the gift of free will; and able therefore to make decisions, to choose the one course or the other, and, within limits, to act upon these decisions.

Whatever the social or political or other form of unit chosen for study — city state, feudal hierarchy, nation, empire, or civilisation in Toynbee's meaning of the term — each of these is in its essence, in the only sense in which it has meaning for the historian, an aggregation of human beings; and the actions which make up its history, positive or negative in their results, admirable, base, or even criminal in their character, are the products of decisions made by men. In many cases the range of choices is narrowly limited, often by circumstances over which

man has little or no control. But a choice does remain; a decision is made; and that decision enters as one of the events which influence, and may indeed largely determine the history that follows. This seems to me a fundamental datum for any historical inquiry or explanation. Without it I do not see how we can regard history as a truly humanist study.

The essential point is what Isaiah Berlin calls the "reality of choices" and man's freedom to choose. That does not preclude, nor in any sense minimise the importance of evolution, growth and adaptation to changing circumstances in any organized society. Constant change, bringing growth or decline, is the essential characteristic of human history. But the way in which change occurs is not predetermined. That depends ultimately upon human will and human freedom. M. Maritain explains it in what seems to me an apt summary of the historical process: "Man cannot bend history according to his arbitrary will or fancy; but he can cause new currents to surge up to struggle and compound with preexisting currents, forces and conditions, so as to bring about a new orientation", a change of condition or direction that was not determined in advance by what may be called the "evolution of a particular period". It is the function of the historian to discover and to estimate the importance of all the elements, political, economic, social, religious and cultural, of which these currents are compounded. The value of his work will depend upon his ability to understand and to give due weight, and no more than due weight to each of these elements. Above all it will depend upon his knowledge of human nature in all its richness and variety.

That is as far as the historian can go. It is perhaps farther than most of us can hope to go. What cannot be asked of him, what it would in fact be wrong for him to attempt is to determine the extent to which these particular changes are in accord with the will of God, and can therefore be explained as the working of divine Providence in history. This whole problem of divine guidance or intervention in human life is a matter for the theologian, not for the historian. For the historian or the philosopher of history to attempt any such thing would not only be an unwarrantable presumption, an effort to do something that is beyond the range of his technique; it would in fact be to adopt a sort of providential determinism, an *a priori* concept, no more valid and no less subjective than any other form of determinism.

Many Elizabethans, we are informed by Sir John Neale, were convinced that their escape from the perils which surrounded them was due to divine guidance. Oliver Cromwell was no less convinced that the Providence of God had cast upon him and his victorious army the duty of disposing of the "man of blood", and that the "mighty things that have been wrought in our midst are the revolutions of Christ". Burke believed profoundly that the evolution of the European community, and more particularly the English political organism, was in accord with God's plan

for the government of mankind. Hegel persuaded himself, and may have persuaded many of his countrymen, that this plan had reached its perfect consummation in the Protestant Prussian state of the nineteenth century.

These are but a few examples of the efforts of men to interpret the will of God, and to apply their judgments to historic events in what Professor McNeal has called a "fairly literal sense". They could be multiplied endlessly, but the result would be no more satisfactory. To ask the historian to essay the same task is to lay upon him a duty that is not and cannot be brought within his province. To say that is not to question the reality of divine purpose in human life, and therefore in history. It is simply to recognize the limits of what can be achieved by the intellectual processes upon which the historian must rely.

If I read him correctly that is the conclusion which Professor Butterfield, speaking as a "technical historian", wished to impress upon an audience, whose members were trained in a different discipline, and who may have been more disposed to see the judgment of God in such an event as the fall of the German Empire in 1918.¹ His belief in divine Providence as an active force in human life is evident in all his work. There are passages which lend themselves to the view that he regards the defeat of Germany in 1918 as clear evidence of the judgment of God, a judgment that was prolonged and intensified by the failure, or the refusal of the German people to see the "verdict" for what it was, and to make an honest and sincere effort to discover how and why they had "offended Heaven". But the case is not so simple. On a wider view this appears to be a case of moral judgment, a striking example of "that moral retribution which seems to be worked out in the very process of time". The records of history are filled with such cases; and however conspicuous the folly or wickedness of one particular group or nation, it is in the defects and inadequacies of human nature itself that the ultimate cause is to be sought.

"History", says Butterfield, "is always a story in which Providence is countered by human aberration", and the results, like the cause, cannot be confined within definite limits. Looking at the present condition of the world, in particular the divided and chaotic state of Europe after two world wars, he is led to remark that, "if Germany has come to judgment, so have all of us", and with us the "whole of our existing order, and the very fabric of our civilisation". It seems clear however, that he regards this, not as a historical judgment in the accepted sense of that term, but as an opinion based on the conviction that the cause of such disasters lies ultimately in the sin and folly of mankind in general. "Within the privacy of this room", he remarks, "I may say that

¹ H. Butterfield, *Christianity and History*. These lectures were originally delivered to the Divinity Faculty of the University of Cambridge in 1948.

Germany has come to judgment" for the excesses of her Prussianism or militarism. "I know however", he adds, "that I have no right to say any such thing, and I very much doubt whether it would be within the competence of the technical historian to assert it". Most historians would agree. Many, and not least those who share Butterfield's belief in Christianity, would perhaps express the doubt in even stronger terms.

The role of Christianity in history is too large and too difficult a subject to be considered here. To discuss it at length would in any case require knowledge that I do not possess; but one or two points may be suggested. As a necessary element in a generalising theory it may be classified with other so-called "universal religions", and its origin may be explained as a spiritual or psychological reaction among a group conveniently described as an "external proletariat". But this explains very little. Considered simply as a historic phenomenon — although for many of us it is much more than that — it differs in some essential features from any other religion of which we have record. It is a historic religion. Unlike many, if not all the religions which Toynbee identifies with earlier civilizations, it did not emerge from the mists of pre-history. It dates from a particular series of recorded events. Men have differed and will continue to differ in their interpretation of those events; but on one result there can scarcely be any disagreement. They led at once to the creation of a community that has been one of the most powerful forces for change in the entire course of human history.

In a recent essay on History and Christianity Dr. Brookes Otis suggests some of the more profound and far-reaching effects of Christian influence on the societies in which it developed.² The Christian attitude towards nature differed from that of any religious group then known to exist. Nature ceased to be vested with the character of divinity, and to be treated as something awesome and mysterious. The Christian did not identify himself with it. He stood apart from it, regarding it as something to be "observed, utilised and controlled". The attitude towards community life — "the relations of men in all kinds of groupings" — was perhaps less original. But in fostering the idea that their religion involved a "sacred obligation of the community of believers to act as responsible agents of God's justice and love", Christians presented an ideal of human relations very different from that which prevailed almost everywhere at the time. With these was combined the distinctive attitude towards history. Dr. Otis describes this as a "positive view", in which time ceased to be "merely disintegrative", and became "the stuff of the drama of God's plan". These attitudes, spreading with the growth of Christianity, have, in Dr. Otis' judgment, contributed powerfully to give to western

² Brookes Otis, *History and Christianity*, I. The Problem; II. The Answer. Episcopal Church: The National Council. New York. N.D. I am indebted to Professor Wm. Kilbourne for calling my attention to this essay.

culture its distinctive character. The dynamism of western civilization, he declares, is essentially a "Christian creation" — a phenomenon that could not have been produced under the aegis of any of the static and conservative "nature religions", which tended everywhere to confer a "sort of sacro-sanctity" on the existing social and political order. At least it can be said that these "attitudes" are essential ingredients of the intellectual tradition of which we are the heirs. They have entered into, and have deeply influenced the social, political and legal thought of every community into which Christianity has spread; and they have been powerful factors in shaping the institutions which in the past have distinguished European society from that in any other part of the world.

In considering these questions, or in reflecting on the problem of divine Providence in history, it is important to remember that Christianity is not, and was not intended to be a chart or blue-print for any particular type of social or political organization. In the strict and literal sense of the term, only two things were provided: first, the means of salvation for all men, and the rules or precepts by which they could live in peace as sons of God, not primarily as Englishmen or Frenchmen, and could create the conditions necessary for the attainment of that degree of perfection that is possible in this world; and second, absolute freedom to accept or to reject those precepts, to perfect or to pervert the law of justice and love laid down as the model for all.

The utmost that the historian can do is to discover and explain the manner in which men have used that freedom, and the consequences that have followed. And it behooves us to be humble; for, apart from what M. Maritain calls the mystery that lies at the heart of history, we are to remember that the data on which we base our judgments are very limited. We can discover the truth, or what, after much searching and sifting will be accepted as the probable truth, about a great many events in the past. But beyond the events for which we have usable records there lies a vast area of human endeavour and achievement that has undoubtedly influenced what Butterfield calls the "quality of life", which is not the same thing as the material apparatus within which life is lived; and of all that we know very little, and can never hope to know very much. That is one reason, in my own case not the only, nor perhaps the most important reason, for regarding with doubt any idea that history, as we have it or are likely to have it, can give us anything more than a partial explanation of man's past, or can provide us with a philosophy of life, or a religion, or a substitute for religion.

ARCHIVAL LEGISLATION IN CANADA *

Lewis H. THOMAS

University of Saskatchewan, Regina Campus

Archival legislation may be said to include the statutory law and administrative regulation which govern the preservation and disposal of public records and the establishment and functions of a public archives agency. In other words, the objective of archival legislation is to provide for two distinct, but interrelated types of administrative activity, viz. the care and management of public records and, secondly, the creation of a special agency which will permit this, and possibly other duties which are in the public interest, to be discharged as effectively as possible. A model archives act should possess these two features. But if only one is present in a statute, that statute may still properly be regarded as archival legislation. Thus we must regard Alberta's *Preservation of Public Documents Act*¹ enacted in 1925, as a species of archival legislation even though it does not provide for a public archives and simply prevents the destruction of public records except by formal cabinet authorization through an order in council. Similarly, the *Public Archives Act*² of Canada would be covered by this definition despite the fact that it contains no specific provision for the care and preservation of records in federal government offices.

In any realistic definition of archival legislation one must also include executive orders, and perhaps even administrative usage or practice, for the simple reason that in some jurisdictions they create archival services which elsewhere are provided under an act of the legislature. Thus, for example, the Government of Canada in 1914 partially implemented the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the State of the Records of the Public Departments, by an Order in Council (P.C. 1163 of May 4, 1914) which required the preservation of public records unless their destruction were authorized by the Treasury Board, and also authorized the screening of records and the transfer of historically valuable material to the Public Archives.³ In 1945 another federal Order in

* This paper was read before the Archives Section of the Canadian Historical Association at McMaster University, Hamilton, on June 6, 1962. I am grateful for comments by Dr. W. K. Lamb, Dr. Geo. Spragge, and Messrs. G. W. Hilborn, H. Bowsfield, and B. Weilbrenner which have contributed to the accuracy of the citations.

¹ R.S.A., 1955, Chap. 254.

² R.S.C., 1952, Chap. 222.

³ See C. P. Stacey, "Canadian Archives" in *Royal Commission Studies* (Ottawa, 1951), p. 239. I am indebted to Mr. B. Weilbrenner of the Public Archives of Canada for drawing my attention to the federal Order in Council of July 5, 1890 which established a schedule for the disposal of part of the non-current records of the Post Office Department; this Order was based on the practice followed in Great Britain.

Council (P.C. 6175 of Sept. 20, 1945) established the Committee on Public Records whose authorization, in addition to that of the Treasury Board, is required before public records can be destroyed.⁴

Since executive orders and administrative usage or custom are usually not publicized, this form of archival legislation cannot be easily analyzed and assessed. The task is made more difficult because of the lamentable absence of well organized public archives in three of ten provinces (Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Alberta), and the failure of some provincial archives to publish reports on their activities as public records offices. Let us hope that both these conditions will be rectified in the near future.

The present paper, therefore, is mainly based on the information contained in the various federal and provincial archives acts and related legislation, supplemented wherever possible by the contents of executive orders available to the author.

The earliest archival legislation in Canada is the ordinance relating to old French records, passed by the Governor and Legislative Council of Quebec in 1790.⁵ It empowered the Governor in Council to regulate the preservation, arrangement and publication of "Papers, Manuscripts and Records, very interesting to such of the inhabitants of this Province, as hold property under Titles acquired prior to the conquest"; this ordinance also provided for the recovery of such public records as had passed into private hands. The archival activity authorized by this enactment was carried on after Confederation by a branch of the Provincial Secretary's Department⁶, prior to the formal organization of Le Bureau des Archives de la province de Quebec in 1920.

The first statute creating and constituting an archival organization is the aforementioned federal act of 1912, and the most recent is the Newfoundland *Historic Objects, Sites and Records Act* of 1959.⁷ Between these two dates the legislatures of most of the provinces have enacted some form of archival legislation. The following table is reasonably complete:

NEWFOUNDLAND

The Public Records Act, 1951, replaced by *The Historic Objects, Sites and Records Act*, 1959.

⁴ Printed in *Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences*, 1949-1951 (Ottawa 1951) pp. 491-92. This Order in Council has been replaced by one passed on Feb. 16, 1961 (P.C. 212).

⁵ See *Ordinances made and passed by the Governor and Legislative Council of the Province of Quebec and now in force in the province of Lower Canada* (Quebec, 1825), Cap. VIII.

⁶ See Report of the Secretary and Registrar of the Province of Quebec, 1886-87, *Quebec Sessional Papers*, Vol. 21, 1888.

⁷ *Statutes of Newfoundland*, 1959, No. 76.

NOVA SCOTIA

The Public Records Act, 1861, amended in 1914, (R.S. 1954, Chap. 239).

The Public Archives Act, 1929, amended in 1931 and 1944, (R.S. 1954, Chap. 232).

The Public Records Disposal Act, 1958.

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

There is no general legislation relating to archives or public records; *The Treasury Act*, R.S. 1951, Chap. 165, establishes a procedure for the destruction of non-current Treasury records.

NEW BRUNSWICK

The Public Records Act, 1929, amended 1939, (R.S. 1952, Chap. 184).

The New Brunswick Museum Act, 1929, amended 1930, 1934, 1942, 1943, and 1950, (R.S. 1952, Chap. 158).

QUEBEC

An Act or Ordinance for the better preservation and due distribution of the Ancient French Records, 1790, now part of *The Provincial Secretary's Department Act* (R.S. 1941, Chap. 57).

ON^{AR}TARIO

The Archives Act, 1923, (R.S. 1960, Chap. 21).

The Municipal Amendment Act, 1946 (R.S. 1960, Chap. 249, s. 377).

MANITOBA

The Legislative Library Act, 1939, Part II, "Public Records and Archives", (R.S. 1954, Chap. 142). Not yet proclaimed.

An Act to amend the Government Liquor Control Act, 1945.

The Public Records Act, 1955.

An Act to amend the Municipal Act, 1955.

SASKATCHEWAN

The Preservation of Public Documents Act, 1920, replaced by *The Archives Act*.

The Archives Act, 1945, amended in 1947, 1949, 1951 and 1955.

The Registered Documents Destruction Act, 1946, (R.S. 1953, Chap. 363).

An Act to amend the Rural Municipality Act, 1956.

ALBERTA

The Preservation of Public Documents Act, 1925, amended 1961.

The Registered Documents Destruction Act, 1944, (R.S. 1955, Chap. 281).

BRITISH COLUMBIA

The Public Documents Disposal Act, 1936, amended 1953, (R.S. 1960, Chap. 314).

The Public Archives Act of Canada is a brief statute of ten sections as compared, for example, with the longest provincial statute — the thirty-four section Newfoundland act. It remains unchanged since its passage in 1912, save for a minor amendment in 1913. It was designed, as Sir Robert Borden said on the second reading of the bill, "to establish the archives under the authority of an act of Parliament and to give a certain status to the Dominion archivist". "The work of the archives", he continued, "has been carried on in a somewhat systematic and effective way during recent years, but there seems some need of legislative provisions being enacted in connection with it."⁸ This federal statute established the position of Dominion Archivist and defined his duties. It enabled him to acquire "historical material of every kind, nature and description" (sect. 6), and provided that "The Governor in Council may order and direct that any public records, documents or other historical material of any kind, nature, or description shall be taken from the custody of any department of the Government having control thereof and removed to the Archives Building" (sect. 7). While it certainly made the Public Archives of Canada a public record office, it did not explicitly ensure the preservation of public records in offices of origin; nor did it provide for their orderly disposal under the supervision of archives staff.

As already noted, the provisions of this act were supplemented by Orders in Council in 1914, 1945 and 1961. The 1945 Order defined the responsibilities of the departments concerning the care of records, and also enabled the Public Archives to serve more effectively as a public record office than had been possible during the nearly seventy-five years

⁸ *House of Commons Debates*, 1911-12, col. 1440.

since the institution was first organized. One section of the Order reads as follows:

"6. The primary responsibility for the care and maintenance of records and for seeing that the policies of government in respect to disposition of public records be carried out so as to ensure that material of permanent value be not unwittingly destroyed will rest with departments and agencies of government concerned."⁹

As a result of suggestions made by the Massey Commission and by a records management survey committee, a revised Order in Council was issued in 1961, which now governs the care and disposal of federal government records. In addition to vesting control over the destruction of records in the Committee on Public Records, the Order authorizes the Departments to "schedule their records for retirement and eventual destruction or long term retention". The Committee's members include the Dominion Archivist, who is the chairman, ten departmental representatives, and two professional historians recommended by the Canadian Historical Association. The Public Archives supplies the Secretary. It is apparent that as a result of the Order in Council of 1945 there has been a growth of direct and fruitful contacts between the Public Archives staff and the various departments. This illustrates an important point, viz., that when any government archives possesses adequate quarters and competent staff, many departments are quite willing to solve their burgeoning problems of records management in collaboration with the archives.

Because of its national importance the various aspects of federal archival legislation have been described as a unit. It would be both tedious and ineffective to consider provincial legislation in the same way. Instead, we will examine provincial archival legislation under several distinct headings as follows:

- (1) The form of archival organization or administration.
- (2) The types of records preserved in the archives.
- (3) Provisions for public records management and the relation of the archives thereto.
- (4) Miscellaneous provisions of an archival character.
- (5) Non-archival responsibilities imposed on the archives organization.

(1) The Form of Archival Organization

In four of the ten provinces an independent board with corporate status serves as the custodian of the public archives. In Newfoundland it

⁹ See footnote 4 above.

is the Board of Trustees of Historic Objects, Sites and Records, composed of from five to nine members, appointed by the provincial government. The government names the chairman, and the secretary is the Deputy Minister of Provincial Affairs, an *ex-officio* member. The Board of Trustees of the Public Archives of Nova Scotia consists of eight members, six of them *ex-officio* and two appointed by the Board; the *ex-officio* members are the Lieutenant-Governor, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Premier, the Leader of the Opposition, the President of Dalhousie University and the President of the Nova Scotia Historical Society. In New Brunswick, the Board of the New Brunswick Museum is the custodian of such portions of the public records as the Lieutenant-Governor in Council may transfer to it. It should be noted, however, that by administrative practice the Legislative Library shares with the Board the custody of non-current public records. The Board consists of eight *ex-officio* members, and not more than ten others appointed by the government. The former include two cabinet ministers, the Leader of the Opposition, the Presidents of New Brunswick, Mount Allison and Saint Joseph universities, the President of the provincial Teachers' Association, and the Mayor of Saint John. The Saskatchewan Archives Board is the smallest of the four. It consists of five members, two named by the Board of Governors of the provincial university, and an *ex-officio* member — the Legislative Librarian; since its establishment in 1945 the government appointees have been cabinet ministers, and the university appointees have been faculty members.

In only one of these four provinces, Saskatchewan, is the Provincial Archivist named in the statute; there he is described as being "in charge of the archives", and is also designated secretary of the Archives Board, though he is not a voting member. In Nova Scotia, the Provincial Archivist possesses the same responsibilities by virtue of administrative practice.

There is an interesting divergency in the legislation of these four provinces regarding the appointment and status of archives staff. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick the employees are appointed and their salaries determined by the Boards; in the former case they have civil service status so far as superannuation is concerned. In Newfoundland all employees are appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, and the government may bring some or all under the provisions of *The Civil Service Act*. In marked contrast to Newfoundland, Saskatchewan archives staff are appointed by the Board of Governors of the University with the approval of the Archives Board; the latter Board fixes their salaries but they have the status of university employees rather than civil servants.

The variations which we have observed in those provinces where the governing body is an independent board are paralleled in those provinces where the archives is a branch or department of government. In Quebec

the provincial archives is a branch of the Department of Cultural Affairs, in Manitoba and British Columbia it is a division or branch of the Provincial Library. In both Alberta and New Brunswick the Legislative Library has custody of some public records. Prince Edward Island does not possess an organized public archives at present and the situation in Alberta is more or less the same. Of the provinces just mentioned, none has an archives with a statutory foundation, although in the case of Manitoba this could be achieved by proclaiming a part of *The Legislative Library Act* to be in force.

The Archives Act of Ontario resembles the federal act more closely than does any other provincial statute. It establishes the Department of Public Records and Archives as a separate department of government, headed by an officer with the title "Archivist of Ontario". The act confers on the Archivist the status of a deputy minister, and he reports directly to the member of the cabinet to whom the department is from time to time assigned. Like deputy ministers in all jurisdictions he is appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

Whether they are under the jurisdiction of a board or not, the eight organized provincial archives agencies all derive either their sole or chief financial support from annual appropriations by the legislatures. At the present time these appropriations appear in the estimates of the Department of Education in New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and British Columbia, of the Department of Provincial Affairs in Newfoundland, of the Provincial Treasury in Nova Scotia, of the Department of Cultural Affairs in Quebec, of the Department of Travel and Publicity in Ontario, and of the Executive Council in Manitoba.

In concluding this examination of the form of archival organization two points may be made. In the first place it is quite apparent that a successful archives agency can exist without the benefit of a statutory foundation, as the British Columbia, Manitoba, and Quebec Archives bear witness. Nevertheless a statutory foundation is to be desired since it confers an official status, a measure of public recognition, and a suggestion of permanence, all of which are vital for an archival institution. Secondly, it is apparent that the independent board form, as well as the government branch or department form, both work well. The choice seems to have been the result of local circumstances in each province and it would be rash to suggest that one is better than the other. Where the independent board form has been adopted, the objective has been four-fold. It elicits interest and support from the public or from non-governmental organizations, it provides a degree of independence from political pressures and prejudices, and it permits the acquisition of financial support from non-governmental sources. The independent board also has the advantage of greater flexibility in operation, in contrast to a branch of government; an example would be the freedom to establish

the qualifications of archives employees and their salary scales, without being bound by the relatively inflexible rules of the public service. On the other hand, the branch of government form has the advantages of a less complicated administrative structure, and a freedom from the vagaries of opinion sometimes displayed by the members of an independent board.

(2) *Types of records preserved in the archives.*

Most of the provincial archives acts follow the example set by the federal act of 1912 in defining the types of records to be collected and preserved. They make it clear that these institutions are to function both as depositories of public records and as recipients of private papers and miscellaneous historical material, both published and unpublished. The Ontario *Archives Act* contains the most extensive listing of varied types of records which the Archives may acquire.¹⁰ In most of the other acts this objective is achieved by a brief general clause. In Saskatchewan, for example, the Archives may acquire "printed documents, manuscripts, records, private papers and any other material... having a bearing on the history of Saskatchewan".¹¹ Similar clauses are to be found in the Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick acts.

With regard to municipal or local government records, the provincial governments in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are empowered by identical *Public Records Acts*¹² to take possession of such records for historical purposes, and all municipal records in these two provinces are vested in the Crown. Both municipal and school district records may be acquired by the provincial archives under legislation in Newfoundland, Ontario, Saskatchewan and British Columbia.

Court records figure in archival legislation in four provinces. The records of the Court of Sessions and the Inferior Court of Common Pleas may be acquired for historical purposes by the aforementioned *Public Records Acts* of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The preservation of court records in the Archives is more adequately guaranteed in the Saskatchewan and Newfoundland legislation, which provides for the transfer of records originating in any court in the province.

While it is doubtless true that municipal, school district, and court records can be secured by any provincial archives without the benefit of specific legislation, the aforementioned provisions are nevertheless useful. The original custodians of such records are not infrequently indifferent to their historical value, and in some cases resist efforts to prevent loss or

¹⁰ R.S.O., 1960, Chap. 21, s. 5.

¹¹ *Statutes of Saskatchewan*, 1955, Chap. 84, s. 10.

¹² R.S.N.S., 1954, Chap. 239, and R.S.N.B., 1952, Chap. 184.

deterioration. This can be avoided where the hand of the Provincial Archivist is strengthened by statutory authority.

In connection with the acquisition of private papers, the Saskatchewan *Archives Act* contains the following provision:

"11. The Saskatchewan Archives Board may, by agreement with the donor of private papers, place such restrictions on the use of the papers as may be stipulated in the agreement, and the restrictions shall be binding on all persons during the term of the agreement."¹³

The Newfoundland legislature adopted a similar provision in *The Historic Objects, Sites, and Records Act* of 1959, but also extended it to loans of records. In both cases, of course, the objective was to enable the Archives to give firm guarantees to nervous owners of confidential private papers. Again, we can assume that similar contracts could be negotiated without legislative authorization, but there is a distinct advantage in being able to reassure prospective donors or lenders in these specific terms. It will be recalled that the Massey Commission considered this problem, and recommended that the Dominion Archivist "be authorized to receive papers with such restrictions on their use as the owners propose and as he may find reasonable; and that legislation be introduced to give all protection possible under the constitution to such restrictions".¹⁴ So far, however, federal legislation on this subject has not been enacted.

(3) *Provisions for public records management and its relation to the Archives.*

That public records are Crown property, and that they may be recovered from any person wrongfully in possession of them, is a principle of obvious archival significance; it first appeared in pre-Confederation legislation of Nova Scotia and Quebec.¹⁵ In 1914 the Nova Scotia statute was amended to empower the provincial government "to take proper measures" for the permanent preservation of all public documents or records "and for placing them where they will be available for investigation and to students of history".¹⁶ Identical legislation was later enacted in New Brunswick. That certain public records may have passed into private hands is naturally a much greater possibility in the older provinces, whose history dates back to the 17th and 18th centuries. The most recent effort to cope with this problem is the section of the Newfoundland *Historic Objects, Sites and Records Act* which confers on the Board of Trustees the power to "replevin any document, wherever found,

¹³ *Statutes of Saskatchewan*, 1955, Chap. 84.

¹⁴ *Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences*, 1949-1951, p. 341.

¹⁵ See footnote 5 above and *Statutes of Nova Scotia*, 1861, Chap. 23.

¹⁶ *Statutes of Nova Scotia*, 1914, Chap. 6, s. 1.

which has once been or should properly be part of the records of the Government of Newfoundland" (section 27).

One might assume that the problem of coping with the steady growth of government files would first become acute in the older eastern provinces, and would produce pressure for legislation sanctioning the destruction of records which had no further administrative value. But, paradoxically, it was in the three young, westernmost provinces that this type of legislation first appeared. Is this evidence of a greater expansion of government services, and hence of paperwork, in the West? Or is the Westerner verbose and the Easterner sparing of words? Or do Eastern officials relieve the pressure in their vaults by less formal procedures? The explanation is not readily apparent, and perhaps must await the development of comparative studies of provincial administration.

Saskatchewan, whose recent archival legislation has been widely praised by archivists, enjoys the dubious honour of having at an earlier date introduced the first Canadian legislation for the destruction of public records. In 1920 *The Preservation of Public Documents Act* was passed, which required that all public documents should be preserved by the department to whose business they belonged until, if they were over ten years old, their transfer to the archives or their destruction was ordered by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. Legislation in identical terms was passed in Alberta in 1925. In 1936 the British Columbia legislature passed the *Public Documents Disposal Act* which provided a method for the destruction of non-current records. Despite the word "preservation" in its title, the effect of the Saskatchewan statute of 1920 was to facilitate the destruction of records, some of them of historical value, particularly correspondence files.¹⁷ No organized archives which could receive non-current public records existed, and the decision to retain or destroy documents was made by departmental officials exclusively from the viewpoint of administrative convenience. It appears that a similar practice was followed in Alberta.

It was in part because of this unfortunate experience that the Saskatchewan *Archives Act* of 1945 included as one of its terms the repeal of *The Preservation of Public Documents Act*, and the substitution of a procedure whereby the consent of the Provincial Archivist must be secured before any public document is destroyed. This was not, however, the first such provision in Canadian archival legislation. The Ontario *Archives Act* of 1923 had required all public records to be transferred to the archives within twenty years after they had ceased to be in current use and, what was more important, it specified that no record "shall be destroyed or permanently removed without the knowledge and concurrence of the Archivist" (section 6). This was the first occasion in Canada when

¹⁷ See *First Report of the Saskatchewan Archives 1945-46*, pp. 15-16.

by statute the control over the disposal of public records was shared by the cabinet and departmental officials with a professional historian, in the person of the Archivist.

Meanwhile in Saskatchewan it was found desirable to modify the 1945 disposal procedures, which had placed the onus for sanctioning the destruction of documents on the Provincial Archivist and departmental officials. An amendment to the *Archives Act* in 1949¹⁸ created a permanent Public Documents Committee, whose five members represent the specialized knowledge and judgement of the archivist, librarian, accountant, legal counsel, and records management expert. It is this committee which advises the cabinet and the legislature on records disposal programs. This feature of the Saskatchewan *Archives Act* has been adopted, with minor modifications, in British Columbia (1953), Manitoba (1955), and Newfoundland (1959). It is, in my judgement, unfortunate that the documents committee provided by the Nova Scotia *Public Records Disposal Act* of 1958 does not include the Provincial Archivist in its membership.

In Saskatchewan in 1946, on the initiative of the Attorney-General's Department, the legislature enacted *The Registered Documents Destruction Act*,¹⁹ which provides for the destruction or transfer to the Archives of chattel mortgages, lien notes, and similar registered documents over twenty-five years old. These records were creating a space problem in the court houses where they are filed. Archival practice in Saskatchewan has been to select extensive samples of these documents for permanent preservation. Similar legislation had been enacted in Alberta two years earlier,²⁰ but with the significant difference that it did not allow the transfer of any documents to the Archives.

An important aspect of modern public records management is the use of the "scheduling" procedure. This procedure has been defined in one provincial archives report as follows:

"The scheduling of records involves a systematic examination and analysis of files with a view to establishing a date when they may be either destroyed or transferred to the archives. Such a schedule, when approved by the proper authorities, becomes a continuing authorization for the retirement of documents, and stimulates the adoption of better filing methods."²¹

Precedents for adopting this procedure could be found in the records management programs of the British Government, and of the national

¹⁸ *Statutes of Saskatchewan*, 1949, Chap. 119, by which a four-member committee was created, increased to five members by section 5 of Chap. 101 of the *Statutes of Saskatchewan*, 1951.

¹⁹ *Statutes of Saskatchewan*, 1946, Chap. 95.

²⁰ *Statutes of Alberta*, 1944, Chap. 17.

²¹ *Fourth Report of the Saskatchewan Archives*, 1948-50, p. 9.

and some state governments in the United States. In 1949 the Saskatchewan *Archives Act* was amended²² to permit the introduction of the "scheduling" procedure; hitherto the act had only permitted the disposal of accumulations of non-current records by the repeated issuance of special recommendations and Orders in Council. Under the Saskatchewan act a schedule is prepared in the first instance by the officials of a department, whereupon it is submitted to the Public Documents Committee for careful scrutiny. The terms of a typical schedule include directives that after the expiration of specified periods certain classes of departmental records be destroyed and that others be permanently preserved or be transferred to the Archives. Upon approval by the Committee, the schedule comes into effect after adoption by Order in Council, or by resolution of the Legislative Assembly. (If the schedule involves retention periods of less than ten years the Assembly must give its approval).

Since 1949 the scheduling of public records is permitted under legislation adopted in British Columbia (1953), Manitoba (1955), Nova Scotia (1958), and Newfoundland (1959). In Manitoba a special schedule for the Government Liquor Control Commission was enacted in 1945,²³ and in 1955 an amendment to the *Municipal Act* provided a schedule for all municipal corporations in the province.²⁴ In 1956 Saskatchewan provided for the scheduling of the records of rural municipalities;²⁵ to date, however, this excellent principle has not been extended to the records of cities, towns and villages in that province.

Summing up the situation regarding public records management, it can be said that active programs sanctioned either by statute or by executive order exist in the federal government, and in the governments of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia; secondly, it appears that the Archives is directly involved in the formulation of these programs in all cases except Nova Scotia.

(4) *Miscellaneous provisions of an archival character.*

As one reviews Canadian archival legislation as a whole, one finds several interesting or unique provisions which do not fit exactly into the categories already discussed. One of these is the section of the Newfoundland act which permits restrictions on the use of public records comparable to those which can be inserted in a contract with a donor of private papers. The section reads as follows:

"28. - (7) Public documents and court records transferred to the archives under this section are subject to such restrictions respecting

²² *Statutes of Saskatchewan*, 1949, Chap. 119.

²³ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1945, Chap. 20.

²⁴ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1955, Chap. 46, s. 15.

²⁵ *Statutes of Saskatchewan*, 1956, Chap. 23, s. 18.

their subsequent use as the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, upon the recommendation of the Minister having jurisdiction over the department concerned, may by order prescribe.”²⁶

This problem of giving access to historians to any or all public records was considered by the Massey Commission, which made the following recommendation:

“i. That the Archivist be authorized to accept for preservation records which he considers of permanent national importance, and to maintain restrictions on their use which may be requested by the department concerned and which the Archivist considers reasonable; and that, if he should consider restrictions proposed by a department unreasonable, he have the right to refuse the files, which would then be retained by the department.”²⁷

The Commission felt that a distinction could be made “between the degree of access to be granted to the public generally and that to be accorded to qualified students of history and public affairs”. The report very properly emphasized the contribution to the democratic process which the qualified scholar can make by his investigations of modern administrative and political history; these are only possible when reasonable access is given to public records. One would hope, therefore, that this part of the Newfoundland act is administered in a liberal spirit.

A second provision of some importance is the section of the Manitoba *Public Records Act* of 1955 which governs the practice, which is becoming increasingly widespread in Canada, of reducing the bulk of government files by destroying the original papers after a microfilm copy has been prepared. The Manitoba statute regulates the procedure for the certification of a photographic print, and also declares that “a print from the photographic film is admissible in evidence in all cases, and for all purposes, in or for which the public record so photographed would have been admissible...”²⁸ A comparable statute, the Nova Scotia *Public Records Disposal Act* of 1958, simply sanctions the preparation of photographic copies of public records as a space saving technique; this province follows the common practice of relying on the provisions of the provincial *Evidence Act* to guarantee the admissibility of photographic copies of documents in judicial proceedings.

(5) *Non-archival responsibilities imposed on the archives organization.*

It is quite common for a state historical agency in the United States to be a composite institution, functioning as a public record office and also as the administrator of an historical museum, an historical site and marker program, or sometimes even of an archæological program. This

²⁶ *Statutes of Newfoundland*, 1959, No. 76.

²⁷ *Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences 1949-51*, p. 338.

²⁸ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1955, Chap. 57, s. 6, ss. (4).

pattern of organization is much less common in Canada. The New Brunswick Museum might be regarded as an example, were it not that it has functioned as a public record office only to a very limited extent. Newfoundland, however, has adopted this common American pattern of organization and function; the Board of Trustees of Historic Objects, Sites and Records, in addition to its archival duties, has extensive and important responsibilities for maintaining an archaeological, historical, and ethnological museum; for preserving and marking historic sites; and for preventing the removal of historic objects from the province. These are all very worthy activities, but in most provinces it has seemed preferable that they be carried on by distinct and separate agencies, with the Provincial Archivist participating, if at all, only as an advisor or consultant.

The essential problem, of course, is to ensure that each of these historical services is carried out at a proper level of efficiency and adequacy, and to prevent one service from flourishing at the expense of the other. Serious financial and administrative problems are involved where these varied functions are combined in a single agency, and on the basis of Canadian experience one can give only very qualified approval to such a combination. The Dominion Archivist, it is true, successfully administers Laurier House, but the character of this historic structure, and the financial provision for its upkeep made by Mr. King, render it a rather special case. Again, the Public Archives of Canada administers an historical museum, as do the Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia and British Columbia. But it is significant that the Massey Commission recommended that for the purpose of creating an adequate national historical museum, the museum in the Public Archives be transferred to the custody of a separate organization. It should be noted that the Public Archives of Canada has never administered the national historic sites and monuments program, although the Dominion Archivist has always been a member of the advisory board which frames policy on this subject. All in all, therefore, developments under the Newfoundland legislation will be watched with great interest, particularly since it appears that the province of Alberta is establishing an institution along similar lines. It is understandable that a composite or multi-function agency should be favoured in an area where financial resources and professional historical assistance are at a premium. But archivists have a well-founded fear that the unspectacular but vital archives function can too easily be sacrificed in a composite historical agency.

From this review of archival legislation in Canada one can draw several general conclusions. First, the pattern of legislation is as diverse as the country itself; its features reflect the differing historical traditions, governmental practices, and degrees of public interest in history, which characterize the several provinces and regions of the nation. This

diversity should not be regretted. One advantage of the federal system of government is that it encourages different experiments in legislation and administration. So far as archival legislation is concerned, it is obvious that this has taken place, and that the results of innovations have been scrutinized from one end of the country to the other; this is beginning to produce elements of uniformity, particularly in the field of public records management. It is unlikely, however, that this uniformity will ever extend much beyond the more "technical" aspects of archival activity.

One must also conclude that, viewing the country as a whole, the most serious deficiencies in existing legislation continue to be in the field of public records management; in some provinces no adequate legislation on the subject exists, and in others the Provincial Archivist is not given a sufficient opportunity to influence policy. Though it has been possible for governments to create an archives institution without a legislative foundation, it requires a carefully developed statute to establish such an institution as a public record office, with a proper role in public records management.

One final thought. A great variety of centenary projects are being discussed throughout the country. It would be most appropriate for both federal and provincial governments, as a contribution to this celebration, to review the existing state of their archival legislation. The objective should be to make appropriate changes, where necessary, to give all public archives institutions the fullest opportunity to serve Canadian society.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

by T. M. HUNTER

The forty-first Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association was held at McMaster University, Hamilton, on June 6-9, 1962. A beautiful campus, excellent facilities and fine weather contributed to the spirit of the proceedings. The Association is much indebted to the Committee on Local Arrangements, under the chairmanship of Principal E. T. Salmon, and the Programme Committee, headed by Professor G. S. French, for the success of the sessions. A total of 180 members signed the register in Wentworth House.

During the morning and afternoon of Wednesday, 6 June, the Archives Section and the Local History Section held meetings in the Arts and Administration Building. The Archives Section, under the chairmanship of Mr. C. B. Fergusson, looked into the future when Dr. W. Kaye Lamb, Dominion Archivist, delivered *Some Thoughts on the Role of the Archivist in 1967*. Mr. Lewis H. Thomas, University of Saskatchewan, then discussed *Archival Legislation in Canada*. In the evening the Council of the Association met in the Mills Memorial Library, while a Joint Meeting with the Head-of-the-Lake Historical Society, under the chairmanship of Mr. G. W. Spragge, heard Mr. C. M. Johnston of McMaster read a paper on *Joseph Brant, John Norton and the Six Nations*.

The general sessions on the morning of 7 June were divided between Canadian History of the early nineteenth century and British Military History. In the first division, Mr. L. F. S. Upton, University of Manitoba, spoke on *Chief Justice William Smith: American in Two Empires*, being followed by Mr. J. M. Hitsman, Historical Section, Army Headquarters, who examined *Sir George Prevost's Conduct of the Canadian War of 1812*. The commentator was Professor A. L. Burt of the University of Minnesota. In the second division, Professor A. V. Tucker, University of Western Ontario, took as his subject *Army and Society in England, 1870-1900: A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms*. Professor D. M. L. Farr, Carleton University, was the commentator. The afternoon sessions dealt with Canadian History after 1815 and nineteenth century Germany. Professor Fernand Ouellet, Université Laval, spoke on *La crise agraire dans le Bas-Canada (1802-1837)*, while Mr. Alan Wilson, University of Western Ontario, discussed *The Culmination of Bishop Strachan's Feud with the Canada Company*. Professor S. F. Wise, of Queen's University, acted as commentator. Meanwhile, Professor Robert Spencer, University of Toronto, delivered *Thoughts on the German Confederation, 1815-1866*, and Professor Ivo Lambi, University of Saskatchewan, considered *Bismarck and the Monarchical Principle*, with Professor Ezio Cappelletti as commentator.

In the evening the Association gathered for its Annual Banquet and Presidential Address in Fischer's Hotel, Hamilton. The occasion was graced by the presence of The Right Honourable Vincent Massey, P.C., C.H., M.A., D.C.L., Litt.D., LL.D., D. de l'Univ., who was presented with an Honorary Life Membership in the Association.

In his presidential address, *Breakers Ahead and a Glance Behind*, Dr. R. A. Preston reviewed the background of the teaching of history in Canadian universities with particular reference to recent developments in the *exotica*, or non-Western fields. He commented on "the danger of dilution", concluding that "expansion into non-Western fields will mean for Canada, more than will be the case in the United States, a weakening in education in essential western concepts".

On the morning of 8 June, general sessions were resumed with papers on Federal-Provincial relations since 1920, and British party politics from 1850 to 1900. In the Canadian section, Miss Margaret Ormsby, University of British Columbia, spoke on *Premier T. Dufferin Pattullo and the Little New Deal*, and Professor F. W. Gibson, Queen's University, dealt with *Mackenzie King, Ernest Lapointe and the Federal Power of Disallowance*. Professor K. W. McNaught was the commentator. Meanwhile, in the British section, Professor J. B. Conacher and Mr. Trevor O. Lloyd, both of the University of Toronto, delivered papers on *Mr. Gladstone seeks a Seat* and *English Party Politics in the 1880's*, respectively. The commentator was Mr. J. H. S. Reid. In the afternoon, a Joint Meeting of the Association with the Canadian Catholic Historical Association took as its theme: *The Philosophy of History and the Historian: A Colloquium*. Under the chairmanship of Professor P. Zagorin, McGill University, the contributors to the discussion were Professor R. H. McNeal, University of Alberta, and Professors W. H. Dray and D. J. McDougall, both of the University of Toronto.

In the evening a meeting sponsored by the Joint Committee of the Canadian and American Historical Associations was held in the Engineering Building. Dr. A. B. Corey, State Historian, New York, presided and two papers were read. Professor D. G. Creighton, University of Toronto, examined *The American Civil War and Canadian Federation*, while Mr. Jay Luvaas, Allegheny College, described *General Sir Patrick MacDougall, the American Civil War and the Defence of Canada*. Professor W. L. Morton, University of Manitoba, was the commentator.

After a further meeting of Council on the morning of Saturday, 9 June, the General Meeting of the Association was held in the Engineering Building. The Secretary reported that membership of the C.H.A. at the end of May 1962 totalled 1,004, a net gain of 62 members. Plans for closer collaboration of the C.H.A. and the American Historical Association were discussed; further progress in the publication of historical booklets

was noted, and a resolution was passed urging the Government to relax the rules governing the availability of certain official records. The following officers were elected for 1962-1963: President: Miss Hilda Neatby, Saskatoon; Past Presidents: R. A. Preston, Kingston, and W. K. Ferguson, London; Vice-President: Marcel Trudel, Québec; English Language Secretary: T. M. Hunter, Ottawa; French Language Secretary: Bernard Weilbrenner, Ottawa; Treasurer: R. S. Gordon, Ottawa; Editors of the *Annual Report*: J. P. Heisler and Fernand Ouellet; Councillors (to retire in 1965): Georges Guimond, Québec; Miss Margaret Prang, Vancouver; S. F. Wise, Kingston; D. M. Young, Fredericton. (Rev. Adrien Pouliot, S.J., who had given diligent service as French Language Secretary for four years, took Mr. Weilbrenner's position as a Councillor.)

During the afternoon members of the Association were taken on an historical tour of the Niagara Peninsula. The tour included visits to the Stoney Creek Battlefield and the Jordan Museum, where members were guests at a reception given by Jordan Wines Limited.

T. M. HUNTER

English Language Secretary

Ottawa, October, 1962.

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL HISTORIC SITES DIVISION NATIONAL PARKS BRANCH

Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources

One area of historic endeavour neglected on a national scale has been the systematic documentation of Canada's old buildings.

The need for accurate and complete information on old buildings became acute in 1955 when the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada was first authorized to recommend the preservation of buildings because of their antiquity and architectural significance, in addition to their historical importance.

Confronted with a lack of basic data which they could evaluate, or even draw upon for a set of architectural criteria, the members of Canada's senior historical advisory board recommended a National Architectural Inventory. They were supported by the Royal Architectural Institute of Canada which had become concerned with this gap in historical research and, independently, had reached the conclusion that such an inventory,

carried out professionally on a national scale with the support of the federal government, was vital if Canada's priceless architectural relics were to be preserved.

This winter the National Historic Sites Division is undertaking the pilot studies preliminary to a National Architectural Inventory.

At Quebec City, Halifax and Niagara-on-the-Lake research historians and architectural consultants will test procedures recommended for the job by Professor Anthony Adamson, of Toronto, vice-president of the Architectural Institute of Canada, and developed by Consulting Restoration Architect Peter Stokes and A. J. H. Richardson, head of the National Historic Sites Division Research Staff. Professor Adamson was engaged to advise the federal government on the means to carry out such an inventory practically, economically and effectively.

From this winter's pilot studies, the procedures will be re-assessed and revised in the light of the results and experience gained. Then, equipped with a standard form for recording historical and architectural data on old buildings, teams of local researchers supervised by architects will be able to commence the Inventory. The National Architectural Inventory, approved recently by Honourable Walter Dinsdale as a continuing program of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources will provide incalculable benefits. By 1967, Canada's Year of Centennial, it is hoped several thousand of our nation's historical buildings will be partly documented, and of these, several hundred in complete historical and architectural detail. The master files will be retained in the Public Archives of Canada where Dr. W. Kaye Lamb says they will be available according to standard Archives practices to Government agencies, historians, architects, as well as other individuals and organizations interested in authentic historical restorations, or just architectural history will find the records immensely valuable. However the prime purpose of the Inventory will be to provide comparative data to the members of the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada who advise the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources what buildings reach the magic classification "of national historical importance".

Progress toward the National Architectural Inventory has been a major achievement of a year when the National Historic Sites Division has been unusually active in carrying out an expanding federal program of identifying and marking historic sites and enhancing the educational value and public appeal of historic parks by restoration and interpretive presentations.

Furnishings and decor were introduced in the interior of Woodside, the boyhood home at Kitchener of the late Right Honourable W. L. Mac-

kenzie King, to restore its appearance to that of a typical family home of the late-Victorian period. Critics say it is Canada's best historic house museum.

At Fort Wellington, Prescott, Ontario, a restoration of the officers' quarters is nearing completion. The largest reconstruction completed during the year was the Palace Grand Theatre, a replica on the actual site of the famous theatre of Gold Rush days in Dawson City. In addition, the "Keno", a well known Yukon riverboat was restored and dedicated as a National Historic Site on the banks of the river in Dawson where she was originally registered.

Fort Rodd Hill, a former British coastal defence at Esquimalt, B.C., and the historic Fisgard Lighthouse, adjacent to it, were opened to the public in June as a National Historic Park.

Plaques were unveiled during the year at the Adelaide Hunter Hoodless homestead at St. George, near Brantford, Ontario; the Old Government House at Fredericton, N.B.; the Discovery Claim near Dawson as well as one commemorating the gold-rush days in Dawson; the Sir Charles Tupper home at Amherst, N.S.; and to the development of Red Fife wheat at a site near Peterborough, Ont.

A monument of distinctive design, created by the Canadian artist and sculptor, Arthur Price, to symbolize the achievements of the Arctic mariner, Captain Joseph Bernier, was unveiled at L'Islet, P.Q.

Plans were approved to construct a historical museum at Lower Fort Garry National Historic Park, Manitoba. The museum, from the outside, will be a copy of an original Hudson's Bay Company frame building that was located on the site, yet its interior will be fitted out as a modern museum on the theme "What the fur trade has meant to the development of Canada".

Faced with an unprecedented amount of proposals for national historic sites, the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada held two meetings, one in May, the other in November. A number of recommendations were made to Honourable Walter Dinsdale, Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, to whom the Board acts as a historical adviser.

To replace J. P. Palmer, Saint John, who resigned due to the pressure of other duties, Lieutenant-General E. W. Sansom, C.B., D.S.O., of Fredericton, accepted an appointment to the Board as the representative of the Province of New Brunswick. Dr. James J. Talman, chief librarian of the University of Western Ontario, succeeded Dr. A. R. M. Lower, Kingston, as one of the Ontario members.

The other members of the Board remain unchanged. They are: Dr. C. Bruce Fergusson, Halifax (chairman); Dr. W. Kaye Lamb, Ottawa; Professor Donald G. Creighton, Toronto; R. E. Taylor, Charlottetown; Richard Y. Secord, Winterburn, Alberta; Professor Margaret A. Ormsby, Vancouver; Professor W. D. Smith, Brandon; Clifford P. Wilson, Ottawa; Major C. G. Dunn, Quebec City; Arnold L. Agnew, Prince Albert; Edward B. Foran, St. John's; Professor Marcel Trudel, Quebec City. J. D. Herbert, Chief of the National Historic Sites Division, is Secretary.

REPORT OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION

by SANDRA GUILLAUME

The annual meeting of the Archives Section of the Canadian Historical Association was held on June 6th at McMaster University, Hamilton.

The morning business meeting met in Room 228, Arts and Administration Building under the Chairmanship of Mr. Hartwell Bowsfield, with 19 persons representing 14 institutions in attendance. Reports were received from the Executive officers and the institutions represented. Discussions on various items of business followed, the questions of a second Archives Training Course and Canadian-made document cases being referred to the incoming Executive for action.

Dr. W. Kaye Lamb reported on the progress of the Union List of Manuscripts in Canadian Repositories, a project of the Public Archives of Canada in co-operation with the Humanities Research Council and the Section. He noted that the compilation was well under way, over 1,000 entries having been received from the 110 participating institutions in the Maritime provinces, Quebec and Ontario. Dr. Lamb also reported to the Section on his attendance at the International Round Table on Archives, Madrid, and the Conference of the Society of Archivists, Plymouth, England.

In addition to the Union listing, the Section felt it advisable to undertake a master revision of the "Survey of Archivists Positions in Canada", and the publication of selected papers on Archival matters. As the Section was without funds, the Secretary was instructed to petition Council to permit the Section to levy its own membership fee, the position of Secretary to become Secretary-Treasurer should the Section have funds at its disposal. (Subsequently, Council granted the Section \$50.00 to aid its activities.)

The Section passed the following resolution, to be forwarded to the National Librarian: "RESOLVED, that in the experience of the

members of the Archives Section, Canadian Historical Association, it is both useful and valuable for historical research to have graduate theses microfilmed and available on Inter-Library Loan."

After selecting Mr. Pearson Gundy to chair the afternoon session, the Section elected the following officers for 1962-1963:

Chairman: Hugh A. Dempsey

Vice-Chairman: Allan R. Turner

Secretary-Treasurer: Sandra Guillaume

The business meeting then adjourned.

In the afternoon, the Section reconvened in the Study Hall of the Arts and Administration Building under Mr. Gundy's Chairmanship to hear the papers "Some Thoughts on the Role of the Archivist in 1967" by Dr. W. Kaye Lamb and "Archival Legislation in Canada" by Dr. Lewis H. Thomas.

Following the presentation of papers, the members of the Section toured the Canadian Baptist Historical Collection and attended a reception given in their honor by the staff of Mills Memorial Library.

REPORT OF THE TREASURER

RAPPORT DU TRÉSORIER

by R. S. GORDON

Statement of Receipts and Disbursements for the year ending February 28, 1962 CURRENT ACCOUNT

Receipts

Cash on hand and in bank, 1 March, 1961		\$1,741.18
Bank interest		61.48
Membership Fees		7,285.70
Sale of Annual Reports		210.50
Bank exchange collected from members	\$ 76.55	
Less exchange charged by the bank	72.53	4.02
Premium on U.S. funds	\$ 22.07	
Less earlier discounts	1.65	20.42
		<u>\$9,323.30</u>

Disbursements

Audit fee		\$ 15.00
Remittance for members' subscriptions:		
Canadian Historical Review	\$2,390.25	
Journal of Economics and Political Science including joint memberships in the Canadian Political Science Association	735.00	
Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique française	500.70	3,625.95
Printing and Publications:		
Annual Report for 1961	\$2,111.65	
Programme for Annual Meeting	149.85	2,261.50
Administration:		
Clerical salaries	\$ 734.72	
Stationery and office equipment	199.15	
Postage and bulk mailing	325.16	
Telephone and telegrams	32.80	
Addressograph	50.82	
Sundries	64.25	1,406.90
Cash on hand and in Bank, February 28, 1962	\$2,199.65	
Less outstanding cheque	185.70	2,013.95
		<u>\$9,323.30</u>

Travel Account

Cash in bank, 1 March, 1961	\$ 905.18
Receipts: Bank Interest	29.56
Travel Grant	1,400.00
	<u>\$2,334.74</u>
Disbursements: Grants to members to attend the Annual Meeting	\$1,115.00
Cash in bank, 28 February, 1962	1,219.74
	<u>\$2,334.74</u>

Reserve Account

Balance, 1 March, 1961:		
Cash in Bank	\$3,154.64	
Investment in bonds, at cost	4,985.00	\$8,139.64
Receipts:		
Bank Interest	\$ 57.88	
Bond Interest	243.74	301.62
Sale of Booklets		1,549.65
Donation from member		1.00
		<u>\$9,991.91</u>
Disbursements:		
Printing Historical Booklets	\$3,121.53	
Grant to the Local History Section	50.00	
Honorarium for Author	50.00	
Bank Exchange	6.70	

Discount on U.S. Funds	\$.80	
Less Premium on U.S. Funds19	.61
Annual Banquet	\$435.00		
Historic Tour of Montreal	30.00	\$ 465.00	
Less amount collected from members		456.00	9.00
Cash in bank, 28 February, 1962		\$1,769.07	
Investment in bonds, at cost	4,985.00	6,754.07	
			<u>\$9,991.91</u>

Examined with the books and vouchers and found correct.

Charles W. PEARCE,
Certified Public Accountant
 Robert S. GORDON,
Treasurer

Ottawa, 2 April, 1962.

Statement of Profit and Loss for the year ending February 28, 1962

CURRENT ACCOUNT

Total Receipts	\$7,582.12
Total Disbursements	7,309.35
Profit	<u>\$ 272.77</u>

RESERVE ACCOUNT

Total Receipts	\$1,852.27
Total Disbursements	3,237.84
Loss	<u>\$1,385.57</u>

Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth February 28, 1962

ASSETS

Cash:

Current Account	\$2,013.95	
Reserve Account	1,769.07	
Booklet Account	2,000.00	
Travel Account	1,219.74	\$ 7,002.76

Investments - Bonds:

\$1,500 Government of Canada, 3¼%, due 1979, at cost	\$1,500.00	
\$1,500 Ontario Hydro, 5%, due 1978, at cost	1,485.00	
\$2,000 Province of Ontario, 6%, due 1979, at cost	2,000.00	4,985.00

Accounts Receivable (Membership dues)	993.00
---	--------

Inventories:

Office Equipment (Less Depreciation)	\$ 200.00	
Stationery, at cost	225.00	
42,065 Booklets, at cost	4,206.50	
1,518 Annual Reports, including 390 Indexes, at cost	1,615.50	6,247.00
TOTAL ASSETS		\$19,227.76

LIABILITIES

Accounts Payable	\$ 270.00	
41 Life Memberships, at \$100.00		4,100.00
Travel Fund		1,219.74
Membership Dues Received in Advance		137.00
TOTAL LIABILITIES	\$ 5,726.74	
NET WORTH	\$13,501.02	

The Association has received a grant of \$2,000. to help publish the Historical Booklets. Starting with the new fiscal year all receipts and disbursements resulting from the publication and sale of the Booklets will be carried through a new Booklet Accounts.

Robert S. GORDON,
Treasurer

Ottawa, 2 April, 1962.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

(A) AFFILIATED SOCIETIES — SOCIÉTÉS AFFILIÉES

- Alberta Historical Society*, Mr. H. A. Dempsey, Editor, *Alberta Historical Review*, 95 Holmwood Ave., Calgary.
- American Antiquarian Society*, Salisbury St. and Park Ave., Worcester 5, Mass.
- American Geographical Society*, Broadway at 156th St., New York 32.
- Antiquarian & Numismatic Society of Montreal*, Château de Ramezay, Montreal.
- British Columbia Historical Association*, Provincial Archives, Victoria.
- British Columbia Historical Association*, West Kootenay Section, c/o Mrs. A. D. Turnbull, 18 Ritchie Ave., Trail, B.C.
- Canadian Church Historical Society*, 5220 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal.
- Canadian Temperance Federation*, Rev. John Linton, 11 Prince Arthur Ave., Toronto 5.
- Detroit Historical Museum*, Special Exhibits, 5401 Woodward, Detroit 2.
- Essex County Historical Association*, N. F. Morrison, 1112 Chilver Rd., Windsor.
- Finnish Canadian Historical Society*, A. R. M. Ritari, 7 Cedar St., Sudbury.
- Glenbow Foundation*, 1202 - 6th St. S.W., Calgary.
- Kent Historical Society*, Mrs. J. R. Huff, R.R. 5, Chatham, Ont.
- Lake St. Louis Historical Society*, 164 Lakeshore Rd., Pointe Claire, P.Q.
- Lennox and Addington Historical Society*, R. E. Robertson, Napanee, Ont.
- Lincoln Historical Society*, Mrs. W. F. Sherwin, 45 South Drive, St. Catharines.
- MacNab Historical Association*, Mr. Wm. McNab, P.O. Box 962, Sudbury.
- Minnesota Historical Society*, St. Paul 1, Minn.
- National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges*, Room 706, 75 Albert Street, Ottawa 4.
- Nova Scotia Historical Society*, H. R. Banks, 334 South St., Halifax.
- Ontario Historical Society*, 40 Eglinton Ave. East, Toronto 12.
- Quebec Literary and Historical Society*, Box 399, Quebec.
- Royal Empire Society*, Northumberland Ave., London, England.
- Saskatchewan History and Folklore Association*, L. S. Eley, 1630 Cowan Cres., Regina.
- La Société Historique de la Côte Sud*, Collège de Sainte-Anne, Kamouraska, P.Q.
- La Société Historique du Nouvel-Ontario*, Rév. L. Cadieux, Université de Sudbury, Sudbury.
- La Société Historique de Québec*, M. l'abbé J.-M. Thivierge, Université Laval, Québec.
- La Société Historique du Saguenay*, Séminaire de Chicoutimi, Chicoutimi, P.Q.
- La Société Historique de Saint-Boniface*, Mme H. Lane, 156, rue Masson, Saint-Boniface, Man.
- La Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste*, G. Meyers, C.P. 186, Trois-Rivières, P.Q.
- Thunder Bay Historical Society*, Mrs. J. Dale, Public Library Bldg., Fort William, Ont.
- Toronto Historical Board*, Stanley Barracks, Toronto 26.
- Wisconsin State Historical Society*, 816 State St., Madison 6.
- Women's Wentworth Historical Society*, c/o Mrs. V. R. Lapp, 100 Chedoke Ave., Hamilton.
- York Pioneer and Historical Society*, J. I. Rempel, 140 Bessboro Drive, Toronto 17.

HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS — MEMBRES HONORAIRES A VIE

- Fee, Norman, 712 Echo Drive, Ottawa.
- Groulx, M. le chanoine Lionel, 261, avenue Bloomfield, Outremont, P.Q.
- Massey, Rt. Hon. Vincent, Batterwood House, Port Hope, Ont.

LIFE MEMBERS — MEMBRES A VIE

In lists following asterisk (*) indicates a former President of the Association

- Barr, R. B. F., 43 Admiral Rd., Toronto 5.
 Bell, Winthrop, Chester, N.S.
 *Brown, G. W., Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
 *Burt, A. L., 1539 East River Terrace, Minneapolis 14, Minn.
 Chartier, Mgr Emile, 605, rue Villeneuve, Sherbrooke Est, P.Q.
 Child, A. J. E., 402 Bate Cr., Saskatoon.
 Davidson, Edgar, 32 Thurlow Rd., Hampstead, Montreal.
 Glazebrook, G. de T., Dept. of External Affairs, East Block, Ottawa.
 Graham, G. S., King's Col., Strand London, W. C. 2, England.
 Guillaume, Miss Sandra, 161 St. George St., Apt. 208, Toronto 5.
 Helstrom, C. T. E., Box 27, Gray, Sask.
 Hudson's Bay Company, Canadian Committee Office, Winnipeg.
 *Lancot, G., 5642 Woodbury Ave., Montreal.
 *Landon, F., 128 St. James St., Apt. 308, London, Ont.
 *Long, M. H., 11615 Saskatchewan D., Edmonton.
 *Lower, A. R. M., Queen's Univ., Kingston.
 Macdonald, Norman, 266 Market Street, Burlington, Ont.
 Mackenzie, D. R., 339 Island Park Dr., Ottawa.
 Mathews, Mrs. H. C., 10 King St., Oakville, Ont.
 Moir, J. S., Carleton Univ., Ottawa.
 Moore, Miss K. V., 157 Harris Ave., London, Ont.
 Morgan, C. F., Morgan Trust Co., 1455 Union Ave., Montreal.
 Myers, L. P., 89 Durie St., Toronto 3.
 Ostry, Bernard, Five Oaks, Aylmer Rd., R.R. # 1, Hull, P.Q.
 Peake, Rev. F. A., Director Religious Education, Christ Church Rectory, Glanworth, Ont.
 Raymond, Hon. D., The Senate, Ottawa.
 *Sage, W. N., 4687 - W. 4th Ave., Vancouver 8.
 Saunders, R. M., Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
 Scott, S. M., c/o Dept. of External Affairs, East Block, Ottawa.
 *Soward, F. H., Univ. of B.C., Vancouver.
 *Stacey, Col. C. P., 874 Avenue Rd., Toronto 7.
 Tombs, Guy, 1085 Beaver Hall Hill, Montreal 1.
 Tombs, L. C., 1085 Beaver Hall Hill, Montreal 1.
 Tufnell, 74 Haynes Ave., St. Catharines, Ont.
 Tweed, T. W., 923 Avenue Rd., Toronto 7.
 *Underhill, F. H., 116 Springfield Rd., Ottawa.
 *Wilson, G. E., Dalhousie Univ., Halifax.
 Wright, Mrs. E. C., 407 Island Park Dr., Ottawa.

ANNUAL MEMBERS — MEMBRES A L'ANNÉE

Col. denotes *College*; Univ. denotes *University*

- | | |
|---|---|
| Abraham, W. P., 9 Cathedral St., St. John's. | Aitchison, J. H., Dalhousie Univ., Halifax. |
| Acheson, T. W., 204 Fulton Ave., Nashwaakasis, N.B. | Alcock, Dr. F. J., 398 Third Ave., Ottawa. |
| Adair, E. R., 312 B West 34th St., Austin, Tex. | Amtmann, B., 750 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal. |
| Adams, E. G., Suite 203, 95 King St. E., Toronto 1. | Amyot, D. E., 1164, avenue du Parc, App. 6, Québec 6. |
| Ager, E. R., 2217 Webster Ave., Ottawa 1. | Andai, F., 5640 Gatineau Ave., # 12, Montreal 26. |

- Anderson, Mrs. J. R., 371 Claremont Ave., Westmount, P.Q.
- Anderson, Maj. Gen., W.A.B., Army Headquarters, Ottawa 4.
- Angus, Mrs. M., 20 Beverley St., Kingston, Ont.
- Archer, J. H., 3078 Montague St., Regina.
- Arkin, N., 252 Oxford St., Winnipeg 9.
- Armstrong, F. H., Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Armstrong, P. E., 1232 The Crescent, Vancouver 9.
- Arthur, Miss M. E., 322 South Archibald St., Fort William.
- Atherton, J., Public Archives, Ottawa.
- Aubrey, R., 411 Pius XII, Apt. 6, Eastview, Ont.
- Audet, L. P., 3400 Ridgewood Ave., App. 1, Montreal 26.
- Avakumovic, I., Dept. of Political Science Univ. of Man., Winnipeg.
- Ayre, D. E., Sir George Williams Univ., Montreal 25.
- Bailey, A., Univ. of N.B., Fredericton.
- Baker, P., 66 Coolbreeze Ave., Pointe Claire, P.Q.
- Baker, MSgt. R. E., 80 Landis Dr., East Greenwich, Rhode Island.
- Ballantyne, M. G., 233 Notre-Dame St. West, Montreal 1.
- Banks, Miss M. A., 377 Wharncliffe Rd., North, London, Ont.
- Barrett, W. G., 31 Duke St., Stratford, Ont.
- Barron, G. D., 1456 Edgecliffe Ave., Ottawa 3, Ont.
- Barry, J. R., 627, chemin Ste-Foy, Québec 6.
- Baudry, R.P. René, c.s.c., 58, rue N.-D.-des-Champs, Paris (VI*), France.
- Baudry, Ubalde, 38, rue des Patriotes, Ste-Rose (Laval), Que.
- Beaumont, Miss E., 540 Blueridge Ave., North Vancouver.
- Beck, J. M., Lunenburg, N.S.
- Bélanger, N., ptre, Séminaire, Rimouski, P.Q.
- Belisle, Mrs. P. E., Box 520, Buckingham, P.Q.
- Bell, J. C., 4698 Harwood Ave., Powell River, B.C.
- Bell, Hon. R. A., Fairfields Farm, R.R. # 2, Bell's Corners, Ont.
- Belleau, M. G., Musée Royal 22^e Régiment, La Citadelle, P.Q.
- Benson, Miss L. R., The Library, Univ. of Western Ontario, London.
- Berger, C. C., 316 Palmerston Blvd., Toronto.
- Bernard, J.-P., 2687 Joliette, Montreal 4.
- Best, H. B., 105 Woodlawn Ave. West, Toronto.
- Bettson, G. E., 27 Urbandale Ave., Willowdale, Ont.
- Bigras, L., 2615, ave. Letourneux, App. 1, Montreal 4.
- Bilsland, W. W., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Black III, R. C., Dept. of History, Trinity College, Hartford 6, Conn.
- Blackley, F. D., Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton.
- Blakeley, Miss P. R., Public Archives of N.S., Halifax.
- Bliss, J. M., 37 Huxley Ave. S., Hamilton, Ont.
- Bocking, D. H., 2226 Cumberland Ave. S., Saskatoon.
- Boland, Rev. F., Assumption Univ. of Windsor, Windsor.
- Bolger, Rev. F. W. P., St. Dunstan's Univ., Charlottetown.
- Boltuck, I., Quality Press Ltd., 1030 St. Alexander St., Montreal.
- Bonar, J. C., 599 Lansdowne Ave., Westmount, P.Q.
- Bonaventure, Brother, f.s.c., St. Joseph's College, Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton.
- Bond, Major C. C. J., 11 Fairhaven Way, Ottawa 2.
- Bonenfant, J.-C., Bibliothèque du Parlement, Québec.
- Bosnitch, S. D., Carleton Hall, Univ. of N.B., Fredericton.
- Bossons, J. D., School of Industrial Management, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge 39, Mass.
- Bouchard, Paul, La Société de Géographie de Québec, Univ. de Laval, Qué.
- Boudreau, J. A., Dept. of History, Univ. of Alberta, Calgary.
- Bouey, G. K., Research Dept., Bank of Canada, Ottawa.
- Boulianne, R. G., St. Joseph Teachers College, 3465 Durocher St., Montreal 18.
- Boutilier, Miss H. R., # 206 - 2820 Birch St., Vancouver 9.
- Bovey, J. A., 207 MacLaren St., Ottawa 4.

- Bowler, E. B., 9 Beechwood Rd., Wellesley, Mass.
- Bowler, R. A., 29 Union St., Kingston, Ont.
- Bowsfoeld, Hartwell, Provincial Archivist, Provincial Library, Winnipeg 1.
- Boyce, G. E., 174 Albert St., Belleville, Ont.
- Boylan, D., Dept. of History, Prince of Wales Col., Charlottetown.
- Brady, Alexander, Dept. of Political Economy, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Bragdon, Chandler, 11 Pleasant St., Plattsburg, N.Y.
- Brault, Lucien, Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Brennan, Terry J., Brookfield High School, Brookfield Rd., Ottawa 1.
- Brockman, A. M., Huntingdon, P.Q.
- Brockway, R. W., Box # 651, Univ. of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, La.
- Brooks, Wm. H., Kennetcook Hotel, Kennetcook, N.S.
- Brown, R. C., Dept. of History, Univ. of Alberta, Calgary.
- Browne, Lt.-Col., P. L., 327 - 5th Avenue, Ottawa.
- Brownlee, John, Dept. of East Asiatic Studies, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Bruchési, Claude, 10, avenue Sunset, Outremont, Montréal 8.
- Bruchési, S.E. Jean, Ambassade du Canada, Calle de Zurbano 36, Madrid.
- Brunet, Michel, Faculté des Lettres, Univ. de Montréal, Montréal.
- Brunet, Pierre, Archives publiques, Ottawa 2.
- Brunsdon, E. W., M.P., Room 616, House of Commons, Ottawa.
- Buckmaster, Miss Hilda, c/o Miss A. McGarry, 105 Paisley Blvd., Cooksville, Ont.
- Burford, W. T., Box 64, Terminal "A", Ottawa.
- Burgess, Miss L. M., 67 Grove Ave., Ottawa.
- Burnet, Jean, Dept. of Political Economy, 100 St. George St., Toronto 5.
- Burrows, Mrs. D. R., 3644 Ontario Ave., Apt. 31, Montreal.
- Buxton, George, 2063 Knightsbridge Rd., Ottawa 3.
- Cabana, Mgr Georges, Archevêque de Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, P.Q.
- Cairns, H. A., Dept. of Political Science, U.B.C., Vancouver 8.
- Cairns, J. C., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Calder, Loren, Dept. of History, Waterloo Univ. Col., Waterloo, Ont.
- Caldwell, Maj. R. V. B., 1179 Albany Drive, Ottawa 3.
- Campbell, J. P., Dept. of History, McMaster Univ., Hamilton, Ont.
- Campbell, J. R., Sudbury Mining and Technical School, Sudbury, Ont.
- Cappadocia, Ezio, Royal Military College, Kingston, Ont.
- Careless, J. M. S., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Carmichael, Miss J. B., Gleneagle, Kirk's Ferry, P.Q.
- Carmichael, Miss Reva, Box 710, Creston, B.C.
- Carrière, J. M., Dept. of Romance Languages, Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.
- Carter, Miss G. M., Dept. of Government, Smith Col., Northampton, Mass.
- Carty, B., 160 Waverley St., Ottawa.
- Caty, J. J., Ross Mines, Holtvre, Ont.
- Chapman, J. K., Univ. of N.B., Fredericton.
- Charlebois, Conrad, 138, rue Maisonneuve, Hull, P.Q.
- Cherihue, V. R., Room 304, 540 Burrard St., Vancouver 1.
- Choate, Miss B. P., 5484 Gilpin St., Burnaby 2, B.C.
- Chown, Gordon, M.P., 299 Yale Ave., Winnipeg 9.
- Church, H. B., Oranville, Ont.
- Clark, G. H., New Toronto Secondary School, 18th St., New Toronto.
- Clark, L. C., Dept. of History, Univ. of N.B., Fredericton.
- Clarke, J. K., 9 Ebenezer St., Ridgetown, Ont.
- Cohen, Maxwell, Faculty of Law, 3644 Peel St., Montreal.
- Collins, R. W., 11124 - 84th Ave., Edmonton.
- Comeau, Roger, Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Conacher, J. B., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Condon, Miss C. A., 70 College Ave., Ottawa, Ont.
- Conway, J. S., Dept. of History, Univ. of B.C., Vancouver.
- Cook, G. R., Dept. of History, Flavelle House, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto.

- Cooke, A. C., Univ. of B.C., Vancouver.
 Cooper, J. I., McGill Univ., Montreal.
 Cooper, J. E., 3237 West 26th Ave., Vancouver 8.
 Copeland, G. F., 825 Richmond St., London, Ont.
 Cornell, P. G., Dept. of History, Univ. of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ont.
 Corry, J. A., Queen's Univ., Kingston, Ont.
 Coryell, Mrs. W. R., Leskard, Ont.
 Cossette, Rev. J., s.j., Col. Saint-Ignace, 2919, rue de Bellechasse, Montréal 36.
 Couse, G. S., Dept. of History, Carleton Col., Ottawa.
 Cowan, A. W., 26 Nepean St., Apt. 105, Ottawa.
 Cowan, Miss H. I., 6303 Blackburn Court, Baltimore 12, Maryland.
 Cowin, J. E., 12195 Ridgeway Crescent, Haney, B.C.
 Craig, G. M., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
 Crane, B. A., c/o Gowling, McTavish, 88 Metcalfe St., Ottawa.
 Crean, J. G., 18 Balmuto St., Toronto.
 Creighton, D. G., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
 Croteau, Lionel, Archives publiques, Ottawa 2.
 Crowe, H. S., 1183 Albany Drive, Ottawa.
 Crunican, Rev. Paul, Christ the King Col., London, Ont.
 Currie, A. W., Dept. of Political Economy, 100 St. George St., Toronto 5.
 Currie, R. G., 2308 - Sandhurst Ave., Calgary.
 Dalton, R. C., Bethel Col., 1480 North Snelling Ave., St. Paul 4, Minn.
 Daly, G. M., Iroquois Falls High School, Iroquois Falls, Ont.
 Dandurand, Rév. Marcel, Séminaire, Valleyfield, P.Q.
 Daum, D. A., General Delivery, Enderby, B.C.
 Davidson, R. I., 155 Roxborough St. East, Toronto 5.
 Davidson, Mrs. R. I., 17 Elgin Ave., Toronto 5.
 Davies, G. O., Univ. of B.C., Vancouver.
 Davies, R. A., 3468 Melrose Ave., Montreal.
 Davis, A. K., Centre for Community Studies, Univ. of Sask., Saskatoon.
 Davis, H. A., 29 Kingsbury Ave., Bradford, Mass.
 Davis, J. A., 268 Lockhart Ave., Town of Mount Royal 16, P.Q.
 Davis, Mrs. P. M., Beaconsfield High School, 84 Beaconsfield Court, Beaconsfield, P.Q.
 Dawson, D. A., 530 Roosevelt Ave., Ottawa 3.
 De la Chevrotière, Gérard, St. Marc des Carrières, Cté de Portneuf, P.Q.
 Delisle, George, Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
 Deshaies, M. B., 7230, rue Musset, Ville-St-Michel, Montréal.
 Desmarais, J. P., St. Leo Col., St. Leo, Fla.
 Deutsch, J. J., Vice-Principal (Administration), Queen's Univ., Kingston.
 De Vlieger, Dan, 10822 - 74th Avenue, Edmonton.
 De Volpi, C. P., 109 Sunnyside Ave., Westmount, P.Q.
 Dick, T. J., 46 Glen Rd., Toronto 5.
 Dobbin, R. L., 295 Reid St., Peterborough, Ont.
 Dobell, Mrs. I. B., McCord Museum, McGill Univ., Montreal.
 Dobell, W. M., Dept. of History, Memorial Univ., St. John's.
 Dobie, Prof. Edith, History Dept., Univ. of Washington, Seattle 5, Wash.
 Dodson, Miss Edna, 3325 West 34th St., Vancouver 13.
 Dorotich, Daniel, 409 Roxboro Rd., Calgary.
 Douglas, H. T., 212 Rideau Terrace, Ottawa.
 Dranoff, Mrs. Linda, 3111 Aurelia Court, Brooklyn 10, N.Y.
 Draper, H. L., 11935 Acadia Crescent, Haney, B.C.
 Drey, Walter Inc., 257 Fourth Ave., New York 10, N.Y.
 Drouin, Gabriel, Institut Généalogique Drouin, 4184, rue St. Denis, Montréal.
 Dumas, P. E., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
 Duncan, Mrs. M. J., 21 Eastbourne Ave., Toronto 7.
 Dunn, C. W., Suite 104, 1364 West - 11th Avenue, Vancouver 9.
 Dunton, A. D., President, Carleton Univ., Ottawa.
 Eager, Miss Evelyn, University of Sask., Regina Campus, Regina.
 Easterbrook, W. T., Dept. of Political Economy, 100 St. George St., Toronto 5.

- Eastman, S. M., 203 "The Prince Charles", 2776 Pine St., Vancouver 9.
- Eastwood, Terence, 11047 - 125th St., Edmonton.
- Eccles, W. J., Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton.
- Edwards, C. G., Box 60, Mayerthorpe, Alta.
- Edwards, Miss N. L., 458 Elizabeth St., Burlington, Ont.
- Edwards, W. A., 4384 Sherbrooke St. W., Apt. 3, Westmount, Montreal.
- Elliott, G. O., 333 Hickson Ave., St. Lambert, P.Q.
- Fairley, Mrs. M. A., 90 Willcocks St., Toronto.
- Fallis, L. S. Jr., Dept. of History, Univ. of Man., Winnipeg.
- Farmer, Mrs. G. H., Box 46, Royston, B.C.
- Farr, D. M., Carleton Univ., Ottawa.
- Farrell, J. K., 190 Elmwood Ave., London, Ont.
- Faucher, Albert, Université Laval, Québec.
- Fergusson, C. B., Public Archives of N.S., Halifax.
- Ferguson, W. K., 1061 Waterloo St., London, Ont.
- Ferneyhough, Miss Beatrice, 2061 St. Luke St., Apt. 2, Montreal.
- Fieldhouse, H. N., McGill Univ., Montreal.
- Fingland, F. B., Box 2387, Whitehorse, Yukon Territory.
- Firestone, O. J., 375 Minto Place, Rockcliffe Park, Ottawa 2.
- Firth, Miss E. G., Toronto Public Library, Toronto 2 B.
- Foley, A. R., Dept. of History, Dartmouth Col., Hanover, N.H.
- Forsey, Eugène, 100 Argyle Ave., Ottawa.
- Forster, Donald, Dept. of Political Economy, 100 St. George St., Toronto 5.
- Fox, P. W., Dept. of Pol. Science, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Fraser, Miss Barbara, Dept. of History, Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton.
- Frégault, Guy, 586, avenue Mont-Marie, Québec 10.
- French, Goldwin, McMaster Univ., Hamilton, Ont.
- Friesen, William, 195 Wildwood Park, Fort Garry, Man.
- Gagné, M. S., 4, rue d'Orsonnens, Hull, P.Q.
- Galarneau, Claude, Université Laval, Québec.
- Galbraith, J. S., Univ. of California, Los Angeles 24.
- Gallagher, Paul, 3465 Durocher, Montreal 18.
- Gammell, H. G., 178 Douglas Drive, Toronto.
- Garner, John, 215 Waverley St., Ottawa 4.
- Gartz, V. E., 1321 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal 25.
- Gates, Mrs. P. W., Dept. of History, 215 West Sibley Hall, Cornell Univ., Ithaca, N.Y.
- Gerson, J. J., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Gibbard, J. E., 7607 Yukon St., Vancouver 15.
- Gibbons, A. O., 318 Lisgar Rd., Ottawa 2.
- Gibson, F. W., Queen's Univ., Kingston, Ont.
- Gibson, J. A., 211 Cunningham Ave., Ottawa.
- Gifford, Miss Hilda, Librarian, Carleton Univ., Ottawa.
- Giguère, Rev. Father G. E., 25 Jarry Ouest, Montreal 11.
- Gillies, J. H., Box 509, Unity, Sask.
- Gilpin, J. C., 493 A Parkside Drive, Toronto 3.
- Glass, Ogden, Principal, Bishop's Univ., Lennoxville, P.Q.
- Glassford, Mrs. Ross, 121 Macpherson Ave., Toronto 5.
- Glover, R. G., Univ. of Man., Winnipeg.
- Gluek, A. C., History Dept., Michigan State Univ., East Lansing, Mich.
- Goldenberg, H. C., 804 Dominion Square Bldg., Montreal.
- Goodsell, J. N., 184 Village St., Millis, Mass.
- Gordon, H. S., Carleton Univ., Ottawa.
- Gordon, R. S., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Gouin, Jacques, 59 Pharand Place, Hull, P.Q.
- Goulson, C. F., Asst.-Prof., Victoria Col., Victoria, B.C.
- Graham, W. R., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Grant, John, Editor, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. W., Toronto 2 B.
- Grantham, Ronald, Editorial Dept., Ottawa Citizen, Ottawa.

- Gray, John, 60 Woodlawn Ave. W., Toronto.
- Gregory, Dale, 2986 Point Grey Rd., Vancouver.
- Guest, H. H., 376 Waverley St., Winnipeg 9.
- Guillet, E. C., 736 O'Connor Drive, Toronto 6.
- Guilmette, M.P., Bibliothécaire, 5227, rue Chambord, Montreal.
- Guimond, M. L., Université d'Ottawa, Ottawa.
- Gundy, H. P., 44 Strathcona Crescent, Kingston, Ont.
- Gunn, Miss G. E., Librarian, Univ. of N.B., Fredericton.
- Hagar, F. A., Dept. of History, Memorial Univ. of Nfld., St. John's.
- Haigh, D. R., Box 494, Maple Creek, Sask.
- Hale, R. W., Archivist of the Commonwealth, State House, Boston 33, Mass.
- Hall, Miss E. I., Federal Day School Teacher, Frobisher Bay, N.W.T.
- Hallett, Miss M. E., 142 Albert St., Apt. 5, Kingston, Ont.
- Halpenny, Miss F. G., Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto 5.
- Hamil, F. C., 831 Madison Ave., Birmingham, Mich.
- Hamilton, W. B., Dept. of History, Duke Univ., Durham, N.C.
- Hamilton, W. B., P.O. Box 159, Pugwash, N.S.
- Hanrahan, Rev. T. J., St. Michael's Col., Bay and St. Joseph Sts., Toronto 5.
- Harding, A. W., P.O. Box 4, Ancaster, Ont.
- Hardy, Rév. Lucien, Col. St-Boniface, St-Boniface, Man.
- Hare, J. E., 519 Fontenay, Ste-Foy, Que.
- Harnetty, P., Dept. of History, Univ. of B.C., Vancouver 8.
- Harper, J. H., 332 Bessborough Dr., Toronto 17.
- Harris, R. I., 609 Medical Arts Bldg., St. George St. at Bloor, Toronto.
- Harrison, Eric, 505 Annandale, Kingston, Ont.
- Harrison, R. O., 809 Carlton Towers, Edmonton.
- Harvey, B. G., 2784 Thompson Ave., Victoria, B.C.
- Harvey, D. C., Public Archives of N.S., Halifax.
- Healey, Rev. J. E., s.j., Loyola Col., 7141 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal 28.
- Hecht, Mrs. I. W. D., 88 East Henrietta Rd., Rochester 20, N.Y.
- Heggie, Miss G. F., 477 Warden Ave., Scarborough, Ont.
- Heick, W. H., c/o Dept. of History, Waterloo Univ. Col., Waterloo Lutheran Univ., Waterloo, Ont.
- Heisler, J. P., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Held, C. H., 5237 Steadman, Dearborn, Mich.
- Henderson, George, Wilton, Ont.
- Herbert, J. D., 231 Brittany Dr., Apt. F, Ottawa.
- Herridge, H. W., M.P., Room 630 C, House of Commons, Ottawa.
- Hertzman, Lewis, Dept. of History, Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton.
- Heymann, F. G., Prof. of History, Univ. of Alberta, Calgary, Alta.
- Hilborn, K. H., Dept. of History, Univ. of W. Ont., Univ. Col., London, Ont.
- Hill, Lorne, 1388 Holleyrood Ave., Port Credit, Ont.
- Hillier, Charles, Gambo, Nfld.
- Hislop, Codman, Union Col., Schenectady, N.Y.
- Hislop, Miss Edna, Can. Telephone Empl. Asso'n, 2 Carlton St., Suite 1503, Toronto 2.
- Hitchins, F. H., 82 Huron St., London, Ont.
- Hitsman, J. M., Dept. of National Defence, Ottawa.
- Hodgins, B. W., History Dept., Middlesex Col., Univ. of W. Ont., London, Ont.
- Holmes, J. W., Can. Institute of Int'l Affairs, 230 Bloor St. W., Toronto 5.
- Hopwood, V. G., Dept. of English, Univ. of B.C., Vancouver.
- Horn, N. E., 387 Sunnyside Ave., Toronto 3.
- Houston, Miss M. J., Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto 5.
- Howell, B. A., 2321 Windsor Rd., Oak Bay, Victoria, B.C.
- Hubbard, R. H., National Gallery, Ottawa.
- Hull, W. H., Dept. of Political Science and Int'l Relations, Univ. of Man., Winnipeg.
- Humenuk, Stanley, 709 West Main, Urbana, Ill.

- Humphries, C. W., Dept. of History, Mount Allison Univ., Sackville, N.B.
- Hunt, Wm. C., 6 Patrick St., Kingston, Ont.
- Hunter, Lt.-Col. T. M., Historical Section, Army HQ., Ottawa.
- Huyda, R. J., 157 Mossdale Ave., Winnipeg 15.
- Hyatt, A. M., 836 Louise Circle, Durham, N.C.
- Inch, M. A., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Innis, D. Q., Queen's Univ., Kingston, Ont.
- Ireland, W. E., 132 Moss St., Victoria, B.C.
- Irvine, Brian, 258 Holmwood Ave., Apt. 2, Ottawa 1.
- Isbister, J. W., 37 Union St., Apt. 1, Kingston, Ont.
- Jaenen, C. J., 254 Belvidere St., Winnipeg 12.
- Jameson, Miss S. S., 2736 Cochrane Rd., Calgary.
- Janes, L. W., P.O. Box 5874, St. John's.
- Jensen, Rev. Vincent, s.j., St. Paul's Col., Winnipeg.
- Johnson, F. H., 4746 W. 6th Avenue, Vancouver 8.
- Johnson, J. K., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Johnston, C. M., McMaster Univ., Hamilton, Ont.
- Johnston, Miss Edith M.
- Johnston, J. G., Northern Ontario Bldg., Toronto 2.
- Johnston, M. R., 1820 De Longueuil, Trois-Rivières, P.Q.
- Johnston, Mrs. Wyndham, 5 Newholm Rd., Apt. 203, Toronto 14.
- Jones, Mrs. Constance, 1910 Haig Drive, Ottawa.
- Jones, D. R., Male Graduate Centre 314-B, Duke Univ., Durham, N.C.
- Jones, Mrs. D. W., 404 Laurier Ave. East, Apt. 203, Ottawa.
- Jones, H. F., M.P., House of Commons, Ottawa.
- Jones, R. L., Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio.
- Jones, R. B., 1827 Western Drive, Port Coquitlam, B.C.
- Kage, Joseph, Jewish Immigration Aid Service of Canada, 4221 Esplanade Ave., Montreal.
- Kautz, A. P., History Dept., Valparaiso Univ., Valparaiso, Ind.
- Kear, A. R., Dept. of Political Science, Brandon Col., Brandon, Man.
- Kendall, J. C., 1286 Wellington St., Ottawa 3.
- Kendle, J. E., King's Col. Hall, Champion Hill, London, S.E. 5, England.
- Kennedy, P. W., Dept. of History, Brescia Col., Owensboro, Kentucky.
- Keppel-Jones, A. M., Dept. of History, Queen's Univ., Kingston, Ont.
- Kerr, D. G., 1201 Richmond St., Apt. 517, London, Ont.
- Kesterton, W. H., Carleton Univ., Ottawa.
- Keyserlingk, R. H., 28 Garrick House, Carrington St., London, W. 1, England.
- Kierans, E. W., Montreal Stock Exchange, 453 St. François Xavier St., Montreal 1.
- Kilbourn, W. M., 67 Glen Rd., Toronto 5.
- King, R. C., 266 Islington Ave., N., Islington, Ont.
- Kirkwood, D. H., P.O. Box 247, Preston, Ont.
- Knight, H. C., Pointe Claire, P.Q.
- Knowles, D. C., 373 Echo Drive, Apt. 2, Ottawa.
- Knowles, Mrs. Valerie, Public Archives, Ottawa.
- Koerner, W. C., 1203 Matthews Ave., Vancouver.
- Koester, C. B., 87 Angus Cresc., Regina.
- Laberge, E. P., Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Africa.
- Laberge, Lionel, 6385, Avenue Loyale, L'Ange-Gardien, Montmorency, Qué.
- Labonté, M. R., 131, rue Cooper, App. 403, Ottawa 4.
- Lajeunesse, E. J., Assumption Univ., Windsor, Ont.
- L'Allier, Rév. Paul, Col. Jean-de-Brébeuf, 5625, rue DeCelles, Montréal.
- Lamb, W. Kaye, Dominion Archivist, Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Lambert, Hon. N. P., The Senate, Ottawa.
- Langlois, M. D., 184 Collin St., Saint-Jean, P.Q.
- Lapierre, F. G., Dept. d'Histoire, Col. Militaire Royal, Saint-Jean, P.Q.
- LaPierre, L. L., Loyola Col., Sherbrooke St., Montreal.
- LaTerreur, Marc, 285 McArthur Rd., Ottawa 2.

- Lavallée, Jean-Guy, Univ. de Sherbrooke, Cité Universitaire, Sherbrooke, P.Q.
- Lavers, J. F., Box 787, Lacombe, Alberta.
- Lawn, R. J., 25 A Gladstone Ave., Smiths Falls, Ont.
- Lawrence, J. C., Dept. of History, Univ. of B.C., Vancouver 8.
- Lawson, R. W., 30 Cooper St., Apt. 6, Ottawa.
- Leach, H. A., 1616 Ouellette Ave., Windsor, Ont.
- LeBlanc, André, 461 Welsely N., Montreal West.
- LeBrun, J. L., 257 Kissingbury St., Rochester 13, N.Y.
- Leddy, J. F., Dean of Arts and Science, Univ. of Sask., Saskatoon, Sask.
- Lee, L. S., P.O. Box 1020, Cowansville, Que.
- Lefebvre, J. J., Archiviste, Palais de Justice, Montreal 1.
- Leith, J. A., Dept. of History, Queen's Univ., Kingston, Ont.
- Leland, Miss Marine, Smith Col., Northampton, Mass.
- LePine, Rev. J. J., Campion Col., Regina, Sask.
- Leranbaum, Miss Miriam, Longmans, Green & Co., 137 Bond St., Toronto 2.
- Lerner, Arthur, Sir George Williams Univ., Montreal.
- Levasseur, M. E., C.P.A., Comptable-vérificateur, 18, rue Rideau, Ottawa 2.
- Levine, A. L., c/o Dept. of Economics, Univ. of N.B., Fredericton.
- Lighbody, C. W., Univ. of Sask., Saskatoon, Sask.
- Lindey, Miss J. M., P.O. Box 400, Dryden, Ont.
- Lingard, C. C., 2313 Carling Ave., Ottawa 3.
- LittelJohn, B. M., 4735 West - 6th Ave., Vancouver 8.
- Lloyd, Trevor, 73 St. George St., Toronto.
- Loggie, Miss Isabel, Fairview, Alberta.
- Long, Mrs. E. E., 17 Lytton Blvd., Toronto 12.
- Longarini, David, 256 Hazel St., Sudbury, Ont.
- Longley, R. S., Acadia Univ., Wolfville, N.S.
- Loosley, Miss Elizabeth, Dictionary of Cdn. Biog., Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto 5.
- Lovekin, James, 12 Pine Ridge Dr., Scarborough, Ont.
- Luxton, D'Arcy, 1548 Richmond St., London, Ont.
- Luxton, Miss E. G., Apt. 22, 616 - 13th Avenue, S.W., Calgary, Alberta.
- Lynch-Staunton, John, 3500 Atwater Ave., Apt. 106, Montreal 25.
- McCloy, T. R., 1202 - 6th St. S.W., Calgary, Alta.
- McClure, W. H., P.O. Box 543, Saginaw, Mich.
- McCartney, J. R., 53 St. Ives Crescent, Toronto 12.
- McGillivray, A., 32 Fulton Ave., Toronto 6.
- McCready, H. W., McMaster Univ., Hamilton, Ont.
- McCulley, Joseph, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- McCullough, E. E., 1441 Drummond St., Montreal.
- McCutcheon, Hon. M. W., The Senate, Ottawa.
- MacDonald, Rev. D. S. H., Alberton, P.E.I.
- MacDonell, Rev. Malcolm, St. Francis Xavier Univ., Antigonish, N.S.
- MacDougall, Rev. H. A., St. Patrick's Col., Echo Drive, Ottawa.
- McDougall, D. J., 17 Tranby Ave., Toronto 5.
- McEwen, J. M., 299 Balfour Ave., Winnipeg 13.
- McFadden, Miss E. M., Ste. 7, 25 - 20th St., Brandon, Man.
- MacFarlane, R. O., Carleton Univ., Ottawa.
- McGee, Frank, M.P., House of Commons, Ottawa.
- McGibbon, D. W., Imperial Oil Bldg., Treasurer's Dept., 111 St. Clair W., Toronto.
- MacGowan, S. D., 820 Levis Ave., Apt. 7, Quebec 6.
- McGuiness, Fred, Box 60, Medicine Hat, Alta.
- McGurn, J. E., 3 Castle Park, Rochester 20, N.Y.
- Mellwraith, T. F., Dept. of Anthropology, 100 St. George St., Univ. of Toronto, Toronto.
- McInnes, Edgar, York Univ., Toronto.
- MacIntosh, Alan, Dept. of History, Acadia Univ., Wolfville, N.S.

- McIntosh, Hilton, 368 Besserer St., Apt. 65, Ottawa.
- MacIver, A. F., Box 98, Churchill, Man.
- MacKay, R. A., Carleton Univ., Ottawa.
- McKellar, Mrs. Peter, 451 Barrie St., Kingston, Ont.
- MacKellar, P. E. (Mrs. J. Reid Hyde), Como, Que.
- Mackenzie, N. A., Univ. of B.C., Vancouver.
- MacKinnon, Frank, Principal, Prince of Wales Col., Charlottetown.
- MacKinnon, Rev. Hugh, s.j., Loyola Col., Montreal.
- MacKirdy, K. A., Dept. of History, Univ. of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ont.
- McKnight, Alan, Officers Mess, Fort Churchill, Man.
- McLane, Adam, 1390 Garden Lane, Menlo Park, Cal.
- McLaughlin, J. P., 124 St. James St., Apt. 102, London, Ont.
- MacLean, G. R., Dalhousie Univ., Dept. of History, Halifax.
- MacLean, R. A., 31 Glenforest Rd., Toronto 12.
- MacLellan, M. A., Principal, Xavier Junior Col., Sydney, N.S.
- McLeod, J. T., 73 St. George St., Toronto 5.
- McLeod, K. A., Box 1363, Melfort, Sask.
- MacLeod, Mrs. M. A., 138 Maryland St., Winnipeg.
- McMillan, Avro, Univ. of King's Col., Halifax.
- MacNab, J. E., 35 Willard St., Ottawa 1.
- McNaught, K. W., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- McNicol, Miss H. K., Box 563, Vanderhoof, B.C.
- MacNutt, W. S., Univ. of N.B., Fredericton.
- MacPhee, H. W., Dept. of History, N.S. Teacher's Col., Truro, N.S.
- MacQuarrie, H. N., Victoria, P.E.I.
- McQuiston, T. G., 226 Howland Ave., Toronto 4.
- McVey, K. A., 6 Washington Ave., Apt. 1, Toronto 5.
- McWhinney, Miss F. I., 462 Holland Ave., Ottawa.
- Magee, Mrs. Marion, Univ. of Toronto Press, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Major, T. G., c/o Mr. K. S. Major, 2061 Fairbanks Ave., Ottawa, Ont.
- Malchelosse, Gérard, 5759, ave. Durocher, Outremont, Montréal.
- Mallette, Noël, 578 Chapleau, Saint-Jérôme, P.Q.
- Mallory, J. R., McGill Univ., Montreal.
- Maltby, P. L., 511 Churchill Ave., Ottawa 3.
- Manning, Mrs. H. T., Featherbed Lane, Haverford, Penn.
- Manning, John, 122 Bessey Hall, Michigan State Univ., East Lansing, Mich.
- Mantha, Hector, 65, rue Milton, Montréal 18.
- March, R., Kelvin High School, Winnipeg.
- Markovich, Miss Rose, 44 Dunfield Ave., Apt. 1104, Toronto 7.
- Marshall, H. S., 57 John St., Oakville, Ont.
- Martyn, J. P., Sparta, Ont.
- Mast, J. H., 107 Byron Rd., Pittsburgh 37, Pa.
- Masters, D. C., Bishop's Univ., Lennoxville, P.Q.
- Matheson, M. T., P.O. Box 717, Rimouski, P.Q.
- May, Miss Betty, Russell, Ont.
- May, C. K., Univ. of Western Ontario, London, Ont.
- Mealing, S. R., Carleton Univ., Ottawa.
- Meisel, John, Queen's Univ., Kingston, Ont.
- Metcalfe, Wm. C., 9 Elderidge, Toronto 18.
- Milani, Mrs. C. D., 31 Christine Crescent, Willowdale, Ont.
- Milborne, A. J., P.O. Box 248, Knowlton, P.Q.
- Miller, T. B., Lakehead Col., P.O. 1166, Port Arthur, Ont.
- Milligan, J. D., 29 Lynndon Lane, Buffalo 21, N.Y.
- Mills, Mrs. Oscar, Oshawa, Ont.
- Mitchell, Harvey, Regina Col., Regina.
- Mitchell, Peter, 423 N. Col., Apt. # 1, Bloomington, Ind.
- Mitchener, R. D., Chief, Higher Education Section, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa.
- Moore, Miss E. R., Faculty of Education, Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton.
- Morgan, M. O., Dept. of Economics and Pol. Science, Memorial Univ., St. John's.
- Morley, W. F., 176 Congdon St., Providence 6, R.I., U.S.A.

- Morris, Miss A. Y., 120 Strathcona Ave., Apt. 2 A, Ottawa 1.
- Morris, W. O., 199 Chapel St., Apt. 14, Ottawa 2.
- Morrison, H. D., Box 280, Macdonald College, Ste Anne de Bellevue, Que.
- Morrison, I. W., 2513 Lake Shore Blvd. W., Apt. # 3, Toronto 14.
- Morrison, J. C., 86 Aero Drive, Lakeview, S.S. 4, Ottawa.
- Morrison, K. L., 1781 Forman Ave., Ottawa 3.
- Morton, W. L., Univ. of Man., Winnipeg.
- Muir, Robert, M.P., 107 Shore Road, Sydney Mines, N.S.
- Mullally, E. J., 21 Melbourne Ave., Westmount, Que.
- Muller, H. N., Dept. of History, Univ. of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y.
- Muller, Steven, Dept. of Government, Cornell Univ., Ithaca, N.Y.
- Mulvihill, Rev. D. J., Assumption Univ., Windsor, Ont.
- Munroe, D. C. Macdonald Col., Ste-Anne de Bellevue, P.Q.
- Murdoch, A. W., 246 Dunview Ave., Willowdale, Ont.
- Murray, A. L., Dept. of History, York Univ., Toronto 12.
- Murray, D. R., 144 Lockhart Ave., Mount Royal, P.Q.
- Murray, Miss J. E., Univ. of Sask., Saskatoon.
- Murray, W. D., 3031 - 18th Ave., Regina.
- Mutchmor, Rev. J. R., 85 St. Clair Ave. E., Toronto.
- Mylrea, A. J., c/o Reed, Shaw & McNaught, 25 Adelaide St. W., Toronto.
- Nadeau, Gabriel, Rutland State Sanatorium, Rutland, Mass.
- Naftel, Wm. D., Univ. of King's Col., Halifax.
- Naylor, R.P., 7135 Fielding Ave., Apt. 203, Montreal 28.
- Neatby, H. B., Dept. of History, Univ. of B.C., Vancouver 8.
- Neatby, Dr. H. M., Univ. of Sask., Saskatoon.
- Neilson, Miss J. M., 8 Haddon St., Toronto 12.
- Nelson, H. I., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Nelson, J. R., 1294 Snowden St., Ottawa 1.
- Nicholson, Col. G. W. L., 1101 Bronson Ave., Ottawa.
- Nish, Cameron, 4876 Côte des Neiges, Apt. 8, Montreal.
- Noble, C. W., 216 St. Clair Ave. W., Toronto.
- Norris, J. M., Dept. of History, Univ. of B.C., Vancouver 8.
- O'Connor, Rev. J. S., C.R., Resurrection Col., 2727 King St. E., Kitchener, Ont.
- Ogelsby, J. C., Dept. of History, Victoria Col., Victoria.
- Oglesby, Major R. B., 521 Mansfield Ave., Ottawa 3.
- O'Keefe, Rev. C. B., S.J., Loyola Col., 7141 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal 28.
- Oleson, Tryggvi, Univ. of Man., Winnipeg, Man.
- Oliver, J. L., Niagara Dist. High School, R.R. # 2, Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ont.
- Oliver, Michael, 631 Grosvenor Ave., Westmount, P.Q.
- Oliver, P. N., 185 Fairview Ave., Toronto.
- O'Loughlin, Miss Kathleen, 129 Ontario St., St. Catharines, Ont.
- Ormsby, Miss M. A., Univ. of B.C., Vancouver.
- Ormsby, Wm. G., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Osborne, K., 180 Glenwood Crescent, Winnipeg 5.
- Ossman, A. J. Jr., Prof. of Econ. and Pol. Sc., Chatham Col., Pittsburgh 32, Pa.
- Ouellet, Fernand, 350 Beaupré, Ste-Foy, P.Q.
- Overend, H. J., 11 Albert St. S., Orillia, Ont.
- Overton, R. C., Dept. of History, Middlesex Col., Univ. of W. Ont., London, Ont.
- Page, Ronald, 121 Orchard View Blvd., Toronto 12.
- Panting, G. E., Dept. of History, Memorial Univ. of Nfld., St. John's.
- Parizeau, Gérard, 10, avenue Glencoe, Outremont, Montréal.
- Park, F. W. Yau-tepec 71 - 10, Mexico 11, D.F., Mexico.
- Parker, R. A., 123 Midland Ave., Beaurepaire, P.Q.
- Parsons, R. W., 287 Airdrie Road, Toronto 17.
- Paterson, Major J. S., 4 Croxton Road, London, Ont.

- Patterson, F. H., Truro, N.S.
 Pearce, C. W., Ste. 405 Transportation Bldg., 45 Rideau St., Ottawa 2.
 Pearce, Rev. G. R., Anglican Parsonage, Kazabazua, P.Q.
 Peardon, T. P., Columbia Univ., New York, N.Y.
 Pearson, Hon. L. B., 409-S., House of Commons, Ottawa.
 Pease, Wm. H., Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., Dept. of History, Troy, N.Y.
 Peel, Bruce, 11047 - 83rd Avenue, Edmonton.
 Peel, Paul, Room 533, Federal Public Bldg., 107 St., Edmonton.
 Peers, F. W., Dir. of Information Programming, C.B.C., 140 Wellington St., Room 112, Ottawa.
 Pendergast, Rev. R. A., St. John Fisher Col., 3690 East Ave., Rochester 18, N.Y.
 Penlington, Norman, Dept. of Humanities, Michigan State Col. East Lansing, Mich.
 Pentland, H. C., Univ. of Man., Winnipeg.
 P. Jean de la Croix, Les Pères Capucins, Cap Rouge, P.Q.
 Perinbam, Mrs. B. M., 163 MacLaren St., Apt. 2, Ottawa 4.
 Pherrill, Raymond, 106 Marchmount Rd., Toronto.
 Phillips, A. T., 457 Forest Ave., West Kildonan, Winnipeg 4.
 Pick, Miss C. L., R.R. # 1, Richmond Hill, Ont.
 Pickersgill, Hon. J. W., House of Commons, Ottawa.
 Piepenburg, W. W., Dept. of History, 100 St. George St., Toronto 5.
 Pitfield, Michael, Saraguay Hall, Saraguay, Montreal.
 Polika, Julian, 632 Bathurst St., Toronto.
 Pollard, S. L., 10961 Esplanade Ave., Montreal 12.
 Potvin, M. l'abbé Pascal, Ecole Normale, 53 Déziel, Lévis, P.Q.
 Pouliot, R.P. Adrien, 14, rue Dauphine, Québec, P.Q.
 Power, C. G., The Senate, Ottawa.
 Pozniak, Miss Nancy, Box 45, Erickson, B.C.
 Prang, Miss M. E., Dept. of History, Univ. of B.C., Vancouver.
 Preston, A. W., Bishop's Univ., Lennoxville, P.Q.
 Preston, R. A., Royal Military Col., Kingston, Ont.
 Price, Maj. Gen. C. B., P.O. Box 277, Fayrethead, Knowlton, P.Q.
 Prideaux, J. M., 122 Beechwood Ave., Willowdale, Ont.
 Pritchard, H. D., Principal, Penticton Jr.-Sr. High School, 158 Eckhardt Ave. East, Penticton, B.C.
 Pritchard, J. S., 502 O'Connor St., Ottawa.
 Pryke, Kenneth, Dept. of History, Laurentian Univ., Sudbury, Ont.
 Pullen, Rear Admiral H. F., O.B.E., C.D. "Big Hill", Chester Basin, N.S.
 Purdy, J. D., Pickering Col., Newmarket, Ont.
 Raddall, T. H., 44 Park St., Liverpool, N.S.
 Ramsell, Mrs. W. B., Noranda High School, 10th Ave., Noranda, P.Q.
 Raymond, Raoul, 8960, rue Saint-Denis, Montréal 11.
 Rea, J. E., 995 Pritchard Ave., Winnipeg 14.
 Reford, Eric, 221 St. Sacrament St., Montreal 1.
 Regehr, T. D., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
 Reid, J. M. Jr., c/o Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
 Reid, J. H. S., Room 603, 77 Metcalfe St., Ottawa.
 Reid, W. S., McGill Univ., Montreal.
 Reynolds, Ralph, Canada House, London, S.W. 1, England.
 Riddell, W. A., 76 Douglas Dr., Toronto 5.
 Rife, C. W., 1689 Hewitt Ave., St. Paul 4, Minn.
 Ritchie, R. S., c/o Imperial Oil Ltd., 111 St. Clair Ave. W., Toronto.
 Robertson, Mrs. Duncan, 134 Humbercrest Blvd., Toronto 9.
 Robertson, R. W. W., Clarke, Irwin & Co., Ltd., 791 St. Clair Ave. W., Toronto 10.
 Rodney, William, c/o Dept. of History, Royal Roads, Victoria, B.C.
 Roe, F. G., 2547 Killarney Rd., Cadboro Bay, Victoria, B.C.
 Rollit, J. B., Room E 201, C.P.R., Windsor Station, Montreal.
 Rose, Wm. J., Naramata, B.C.

- Rosenberg, L., 493 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal 2.
- Ross, S. G., 196 Kamloops St., R.R. # 5, Ottawa.
- Rothney, G. O., Memorial Univ., St. John's.
- Rouleau, C. P., 446 Eight Line N., Oakville, Ont.
- Rousseau, Jean-Claude, 23, rue Saint-Cyprien, Napierville, P.Q.
- Rowe, J. G., Dept. of History, Huron Col., London, Ont.
- Roy, R. H., 3825 Merriman Dr., Victoria, B.C.
- Rudkin, D. W., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Russell, E. C., 516 Blair St., Ottawa.
- Rutherford, W. D., Institute of Iroquoian Studies, P.O. Box 1024, Brantford, Ont.
- Ryerson, S. B., 84 Gormley Ave., Toronto 7.
- Salmon, E. T., Dept. of History, McMaster Univ., Hamilton, Ont.
- Sametz, Z. W., 770 Lonsdale Rd., Ottawa 2.
- Saucier, Roger, 257, ave. Fournier, Ste-Foy, Québec 10, P.Q.
- Saunders, R. E., A. N., Myer Secondary School, 2338 O'Neill St., Niagara Falls, Ont.
- Saunders, S. A., 350 St. Clair Ave. W., Apt. L, Toronto.
- Savage, D. C., 4071 Grand Blvd., Montreal 28.
- Sawdon, W. B., P.O. Box 639, Sackville, N.B.
- Saywell, J. T., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto.
- Schneider, F. D., Vanderbilt Univ., Nashville 5, Tenn.
- Schull, Joseph, St. Eustache-sur-le-Lac, P.Q.
- Schultz, H. J., Dept. of History, Stetson Univ., Deland, Florida.
- Schurman, D. M., 59 Silver St., Kingston, Ont.
- Schuyler, R. L., 253 Alexander St., Rochester 7, N.Y.
- Schwarz, G. M., Dept. of History, Memorial Univ., St. John's.
- Scott, F. R., McGill Univ., Montreal.
- Seaman, John, c/o 4 A Finch Ave. W., Willowdale, Ont.
- Secord, R. Y., Winterburn, Alberta.
- Self, G. M., Univ. of Alberta, Calgary.
- Senior, H., 70 Rusholme Rd., Toronto 3.
- Shadd, D. T. W., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Shields, R. A., Office # 226, Univ. of Alberta, Calgary.
- Shipton, J. F., 50 St. Joseph St., Box 309, Toronto 5.
- Shkwarok, W. F., P.O. Box 314, Castlegar, B.C.
- Siberry, Miss S. K., 750 Coxwell Ave., Toronto 6.
- Simpson, G. W., Univ. of Sask., Saskatoon.
- Sinn, H. L., 1106 West Orchard, Independence, Mo.
- Sissons, C. B., Newcastle, Ont.
- Sissons, J. N., 204 Glenrose Ave., Toronto.
- Sister St. Callista, C.N.D., Prof. of History, Marianopolis Col., 3647 Peel St., Montreal 2.
- Sister Mary Jean, St. Mary-of-the-Woods Col., St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Ind.
- Sister St. John of Valencia, Notre Dame High School, 12 Malvern Ave., Toronto 13.
- Sister St. Mary of Cana, C.N.D., Marianopolis Col., 3647 Peel St., Montreal.
- Shelton, W. G., Victoria Col., Victoria, B.C.
- Skeoch, A. E., 455 Annette St., Toronto 9.
- Slater, E. H., 490 Grosvenor St., London, Ont.
- Small, Mrs. A. D., c/o Can. High Commission, P.O. Box 851, Lagos, Nigeria.
- Smart, J. D., 170 Burnhamthorpe Rd., Islington, Ont.
- Smith, D. L., Dept. of History, Miami Univ., Oxford, Ohio.
- Smith, E. F. S., P.O. Box 126, Hudson Heights, P.Q.
- Smith, Gaddis, 110 Filbert St., Hamden, Conn.
- Smith, G. W., 57 Blackburn Ave., Ottawa 2.
- Smith, H. G., The Gleneagles, Apt. B 53, 3940 Côte des Neiges Rd., Montreal 25.
- Smith, Mrs. J. G., 562 Jackson St., Kingsport, Tenn.
- Smith, Miss M. B., Dept. of English, Univ. of B.C., Vancouver.
- Smith, Peter, 314 Inglewood Drive, Toronto 7.

- Smith, S. D., York Univ., Queen's Park, Toronto.
- Smith, W. D., Brandon Col., Brandon, Man.
- Smith, Rev. W. E. L., Queen's Theological Col., Kingston, Ont.
- Smith, Wilfred, Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Snell, David, Bishop's Univ., Box 266, Lennoxville, P.Q.
- Soban, S., 18 St. Anne's Rd., Toronto 3.
- Spencer, R. A., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto.
- Splane, R. B., 116 Sherwood Drive, Ottawa 3.
- Spooner, C. M., Room 352, 3rd Floor, Toronto Western Hospital, Toronto 2B.
- Sprague, G. W., Dept. of Archives, Parliament Bldgs., Toronto.
- Sprung, Col. G. M. C., Director of Historical Section, Army Headquarters, 175 Nepean St., Ottawa.
- Spry, Mrs. Graham, 28 Chester St., London, S.W. 1, England.
- Stanley, G. F. G., Royal Military Col., Kingston, Ont.
- Stearns, O. P., 7 Pierce Rd., Watertown 72, Mass.
- Steele, Ian, 9 Waterloo Place, London, England.
- Stevens, Lt.-Col. G. R., 144 Strathearn Ave., Montreal West.
- Stevenson, A. A., 4022 Oxford Ave., Montreal.
- Stevenson, H. A., 1122 Don Mills Rd., Apt. 609, Don Mills, Ont.
- Steward, Russell, P.O. Box 689, Thornhill, Ont.
- Stewart, Miss A. R., Univ. of Maine, Orono, Me.
- Stewart, J. H., Dept. of History, Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland 6, Ohio.
- Stockton, Alan, 217 Belsay Ave., Pointe Claire, P.Q.
- Stokes, L. D., 185 Randolph Rd., Toronto 17.
- Stovel, H. V., Andex Ltd., 1010 St. Catherine St. W., Montreal 2.
- Strikwerda, Earl, Dept. of History, Calvin Col., Grand Rapids 6, Mich.
- Stuart, W. H., Box 182, Port Dover, Ont.
- Stubbs, G. T., Sr. High School Library, 1121 King Albert Ave., New Westminster, B.C.
- Sutherland, J. K., Col. of Education, Univ. of Sask., Saskatoon.
- Sutherland, Neil, c/o Faculty of Education, Univ. of B.C., Vancouver 8.
- Swainson, N. A., Victoria Col., Victoria.
- Swayze, J. F., Secondary Educ. Br., 40 Eglinton Ave. E., Toronto 12.
- Sweetman, P. W., 7 Ternhill Crescent, Don Mills, Ont.
- Symons, T. H. B., Univ. of Toronto, Residence for Men, 3 Devonshire Place, Toronto 5.
- Tait, T. D., 245 Wanless Ave., Toronto 12.
- Talman, J. J., Univ. of Western Ont., London, Ont.
- Tanchak, E., 133 Mossdale Ave., Winnipeg 15.
- Tancock, K. C., 103 Scarborough Rd., Toronto.
- Taylor, J., 103 Westland Ave., Rochester 18, N.Y.
- Teakles, Mrs. J. M., 165 Lakeway Drive, Rockcliffe, Ont.
- Temple, A. D., Ste Anne's Hospital, Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, P.Q.
- Tennyson, B. D., 15 Barrington Ave., Toronto 13.
- Thaler, R.P., Dept. of History, Bishop's Univ., Lennoxville, P.Q.
- Thatcher, M. B., Univ. of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
- Thomas, D. T., 33 Lakeshore Rd., Beaconsfield, P.Q.
- Thomas, L. G., Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton.
- Thomas, L. H., Regina Col., Regina.
- Thompson, D. F., 2 Oakdale Drive N., Charleswood 20, Man.
- Thompson, F. F., Dept. of History, Royal Military Col., Kingston, Ont.
- Thomson, D. C., Faculté des Sciences Sociales, Univ. de Montréal, Montréal.
- Thorburn, H. G., Queen's Univ., Kingston, Ont.
- Thorpe, F. J., 45 Somerset St. W., Apt. 21, Ottawa.
- Thorpe, Wm. W., Golf Club Road, Fredericton, N.B.
- Tolmie, M. M., Dept. of History, Mount Allison Univ., Sackville, N.B.
- Tomkins, G. S., 3803 West, 39th Ave., Vancouver 13.
- Totton, S. J., 25 Hollinger Rd., Toronto 16.

- Toupin, Rev. Robert, s.j., Univ. of Sudbury, Sudbury.
- Towle, E. L., Can. Studies Program, Rush Rhees Lib., Univ. of Rochester, Rochester 3, N.Y.
- Traynor, Rev. T. P., St. Paul's Col., Ellice and Vaughan Sts., Winnipeg 2.
- Trudeau, Raoul, L'Air Liquide, 1210 ouest, rue Sherbrooke, Montréal 2.
- Trudel, Marcel, Univ. Laval, Québec.
- Trueman, John, History Dept., McMaster Univ., Hamilton, Ont.
- Tucker, A. V., Dept. of History, Middlesex Col., Univ. of Western Ontario, London, Ont.
- Tulchinsky, G., 74 A Kendal Ave., Toronto 4.
- Turner, A. R., Archives Div., Legislative Library, Regina.
- Turner, A. C., Univ. of California, Riverside, Calif.
- Turp, F. J., 167 Stephen Dr., Apt. 204, Toronto 18.
- Ullman, Walter, Can. Studies Program, Dept. of History, Univ. of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y.
- Upton, L. F. S., St. John's Col., Winnipeg 19.
- Ursul, G. R., 43 Perkins Hall, Harvard Univ., Cambridge 38, Mass.
- Vachon, André, Directeur, Centre de recherches biographiques, Bibliothèque générale, Univ. Laval, Québec.
- Van Alstyne, R. W., 4407 Don Cota Place, Los Angeles 8, Calif.
- Vanasse, A. R., Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Ottawa, Ottawa.
- Van Sickle, J. V., Dept. of Economics, Wabash Col., Crawfordsville, Ind.
- Vant, Miss Margaret, St. John's High School, Machray and Salter Sts., Winnipeg.
- Vernon, Hugh, 287 St. Leonard's Ave., Toronto 12.
- Verrette, Abbé Adrien, 517, rue Pine, Manchester, N.H.
- Vogel, R., 4145 Marlowe, Montreal.
- Voisine, M. l'abbé Nive, Séminaire, Rimouski, P.Q.
- Vollmar, Rev. E. R., s.j., St. Louis Univ., 221 N. Grand Blvd., St. Louis 3, Miss.
- Vuckovic, M., Dept. of History, Assumption Univ., Windsor, Ont.
- Wade, Mason, 409 Rush Rhees Lib., Univ. of Rochester, Rochester 20, N.Y.
- Waines, W. J., Univ. of Man., Winnipeg.
- Waite, P. B., Dept. of History, Dalhousie Univ., Halifax.
- Waldon, Miss Freda, 36 Robinson St., Hamilton, Ont.
- Walker, F. N., 218 Inglewood Drive, Toronto 7.
- Walker, L. D., 406 St. Clements Ave., Toronto 12.
- Wallace, C. M., Dept. of History, Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton.
- Wallace, Prof. Elizabeth, Dept. of Pol. Economy, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Wallace, H. N., 1487 Military Trail, West Hill, Ont.
- Wallot, Jean-Pierre, Départ. d'Histoire, Univ. de Montréal, Montréal.
- Walmsley, N. E., Dept. of Pol. Science, Brandon Col., Brandon, Man.
- Walsh, A. H., Box 670, Kincardine Creamery Ltd., Kincardine, Ont.
- Walter, T. D., 2442 Gladstone Ave., Windsor, Ont.
- Warkentin, B. A., 4876 Côte des Neiges, Apt. 12, Montreal.
- Warkentin, J. H., Dept. of Geography, Univ. of Man., Winnipeg.
- Warner, D. F., Wisconsin State Col., Eau Claire, Wisc.
- Watkins, M. H., Dept. of Pol. Economy, 100 St. George St., Toronto 5.
- Watson, Peter, 2 Cromer Place, Weston, Ont.
- Waugh, David, 4545 Walkley Ave., Apt. 606, Montreal 26.
- Webster, T. S., Dept. of History, Univ. of Man., Winnipeg.
- Weilbrenner, Bernard, Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Weir, S. E., 486 Richmond St., London, Ont.
- Whitby, Lt. Commander J. P., R.C.N., P.O. Box 402, Shearwater, N.S.
- White, G. S., 194 Oakdale Ave., St. Catharines, Ont.
- White, Harry, 19 Spring Garden Rd., Toronto 18.
- White, Miss M. E., Trinity Col., Toronto.
- White, Michael, 190 Church St., Almonte, Ont.
- White, P. C. T., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- White, W. S., R.R. # 2, Ste Anne de Sorel, P.Q.
- Whitelaw, W. M., 4 Ridge Rd., Carmel, N.Y.

- Whiteley, W. H., 102 Park St., Kingston, Ont.
- Whiteside, Miss Robena, No. 2 - 81 Lenore St., Winnipeg 10.
- Whittard, Miss B. N., 19 Syke Ings., Iver, Bucks, England.
- Wilbur, J. R. H., 750 McEvoy St., Fredericton.
- Wilkinson, B., Dept. of History, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Williams, Chief Justice E. K., Law Courts, Winnipeg.
- Williams, R. J., Copp Clark Publishing Co., 517 Wellington St. W., Toronto 2B.
- Willms, A. M., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Willoughby, Wm. R., R.R. 1., Canton, N.Y.
- Wills, H. A., c/o Northland Post, Box 110, Cochrane, Ont.
- Wilson, Miss B. M., Public Archives, Ottawa 2.
- Wilson, G. A., Dept. of History, Middlesex Col., Univ. of Western Ont., London, Ont.
- Wilson, H. A., Hudson Heights, P.Q.
- Wilson, L. Wm., 9 Windsor Crescent, London, Ont.
- Winch, Mrs. M. E., c/o Dr. D. M. Winch, Dept. of Pol. Economy, Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton.
- Windsor, K. N., Trinity Col., Toronto 5.
- Winks, R. W., Dept. of History, Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn.
- Winter, C. G., 126 - 43rd St., Sacramento 19, Calif.
- Wirick, A. J., Extension Dept., Univ. of Sask., Saskatoon.
- Wise, S. F., Dept. of History, Queen's Univ., Kingston, Ont.
- Wishart, Rev. I. S., 1900 Grant Road, Regina.
- Wohler, J. P., 1324 Brown Blvd., Verdun, Montreal 19.
- Wolff, C. M., P.O. Box 413, Arnprior, Ont.
- Woods, H. D., Industrial Relations Centre, 1020 Pine Ave., Montreal.
- Woodward, C. J., 21 Findlay Ave., Ottawa.
- Wright, Miss H. K., Women's Residence, St. John's Col., Fort Garry, Winnipeg 19.
- Wright, Peter, R.R. # 1, King, Ont.
- Wright, Mrs. W. T., Fort Vermilion, Alberta.
- Wurtele, D. J., Box 341, Station H, Montreal.
- Wynne, R. E., Dept. of History, Univ. of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ont.
- Young, D. M., Dept. of History, Univ. of N.B., Fredericton.
- Young, J. C., Encyclopedia Canadiana, 311 Richmond Rd., Ottawa.
- Young, W. D., Dept. of Economics and Pol. Sc., Univ. of B.C., Vancouver 8.
- Younge, Miss Eva, 3600 University St., Montreal 2.
- Yuzyk, P., 1122 Hector Bay East, Winnipeg 9.
- Zacour, N. P., Dept. of History, Franklin and Marshall Col., Lancaster, Pa.
- Zaslow, Morris, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto 5.
- Zuurbier, H., Vice-Principal, Bowness R.C.S.S.D. No. 69, 7311 - 24th Ave. N.W., Bowness, Alta.

(35) 5 27 1.-4-0.F.

Date Due

2321 1972			
1:20			
4:10			
1:30			
12:00			
12:30			
NOV 15 1972			
2:15			
6:00			
FEB 05 1988			



TRENT UNIVERSITY



0 1164 0194742 3

F5000 .C26 1962

Canadian Historical Assoc
Rapport...

RESERVE

42025

Reserve:

1962

~~72025~~
42025

